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ABSTRACT 
 
Understanding Military Doctrinal Change During Peacetime 
 
Andrew A. Gallo 
 
This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace.  Given the 
conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these 
organizations innovate doctrinally?  Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between 
two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal 
theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to 
military doctrinal innovation.  I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study 
comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the 
post-World War II period until 2001.  The study yields seven findings.  First, the systemic causes 
of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory.  Second, contrary 
to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal 
innovation.  Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a 
particular jurisdictional domain.  Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function 
of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve.  Fifth, the complexity 
of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the 
interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation.  Sixth, military doctrinal 
innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise 
their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment.  Finally, the existence of 
doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine. 
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 Like most large organizations, bureaus have a powerful tendency to continue doing today whatever they 
did yesterday.  The main reason for this inertia is that established processes represent an enormous previous 
investment in time, effort, and money…Years of effort, thousands of decisions (including mistakes), and a wide 
variety of experiences underlie the behavior patterns a bureau now uses.  Moreover, it took a significant investment 
to get the bureau’s many members and clients to accept and become habituated to its behavior patterns.1   
 
 …in few spheres of human activity are change and progress so constant and the need for accommodation 
and adjustment so unremitting as in the military; yet in few spheres, seemingly, are the ruling minds so rigidly 
resistant to change.2  
 
The Puzzle 
 Organizational theory emphasizes the rigidity of large organizations.  The standard logic is 
as follows: large organizations that are responsible for complex tasks develop rules and procedures 
to effectively coordinate their members.  These procedures harden into established routines that 
constrain the organization’s ability to change.  Theorists contend that highly centralized and 
hierarchical organizations are the least likely to innovate.3  Members of these organizations will 
have a lot of ideas for innovation, but the implementation of those ideas will be more difficult.  
While dramatic organizational change may occur in rare instances, change is typically incremental 
in the form of minor adjustments to existing programs.  When dramatic change does occur, it is 
usually the result of a sharp decrease in budgets, forcing the organization to innovate to accomplish 
its assigned missions, or in the aftermath of a major organizational failure.4  When organizational 
survival is in jeopardy that might also serve as a crisis that increases the probability of innovation.5   
                                                           
1 Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (New York: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 195. 
2 John P. Campbell, “Marines, Aviators, and the Battleship Mentality, 1923-33,” Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution 109 (1964): 49-50. 
3 Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, and Brendan R. Green, eds., US Military Transformation and 
Innovation since the Cold War: Creation Without Destruction (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009), p. 7, discussing 
James Q. Wilson, “Innovation in Organization: Notes Towards a Theory,” in J. O. Thompson, ed., Approaches to 
Organizational Design (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). 
4 This organizational behavior paradigm is specified by Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 172. 
5 Wilson, 1971, p. 208. 
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 Proponents of this theory of organizational rigidity often point to military organizations as 
the most hidebound government bureaus.  The hierarchical, insular, tradition-based, rule-centric, 
and functionally specialized nature of military organizations predisposes them to organizational 
inflexibility.6  Resistance to change is especially pronounced when soldiers are committed to an 
existing mission set that is well-supported financially by the political leaders that oversee the 
organization.7  Commitment to the organization’s sense of purpose may help build cohesion and 
increase task effectiveness, but it also renders members unwilling to change existing ways of doing 
business.8  Militaries develop standard operating procedures to deal with complexity and to 
organize the efforts of their personnel, but these procedures can be routinized and inflexible.  
Military customs and traditions can constrain the options of leaders who seek to change the 
organization.  While this is also true of other organizations, customs are particularly important to 
militaries because they are used to connect the organization to past battlefield victories.  Militaries 
strive to avoid the uncertainty9 that usually comes with change.  When military organizations do 
change, the adaptations are normally made during the course of war under conditions of extreme 
duress.10  Change during peacetime is anomalous.  Finally, because the process of 
institutionalization can be so difficult even if a military organization desires change, military 
innovation is rare.   
                                                           
6 Perhaps the best example of the rigidity of military organizations is provided by Edward L. Katzenback, “The 
Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century,” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: Military 
Power and International Relations, 3rd ed. (Washington: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 152-171.  The 
author examines the survival of horse cavalry units even after the development of nuclear weapons and the 
introduction of the combustion engine on the battlefield. The military hierarchy and strong preference for battle-
tested systems were major components of a cavalry organizational culture that resisted change. 
7 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989), p. 222. 
8 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1957). 
9 All large organizations seek to reduce uncertainty, but doing so is especially important for military 
organizations because the consequences of unpreparedness can be catastrophic for the state. 
10 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 9. 
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 While this narrative is compelling, it fails to explain why some military organizations 
change frequently.  A review of the historical evolution of military organizations since the end of 
World War II suggests that certain military organizations change quite often.  From the end of 
World War II to September 11, 2001, the United States Army changed its doctrine - formal 
documents sanctioned by the organization that explain how the military plans to fight - five times.11  
Each doctrinal change imposed costs on the Army and involved uncertainty.  The most obvious 
reason for change - war - was not the cause of these changes; only one out of the five doctrinal 
changes occurred during wartime.  Three of the doctrinal changes - pentomic, Active Defense, and 
AirLand Battle - were fundamental redefinitions of the organization’s methods for fighting in war.  
The other two - counterinsurgency doctrine and Full-Dimensional/Full-Spectrum Operations - 
were promoted as major changes, but were changes in principle rather than practice.   
 This study seeks to determine why military organizations innovate doctrinally given the 
conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic organizations.  More specifically, why did the 
U.S. Army innovate doctrinally so frequently during peacetime from the end of World War II to 
2001?  What were the sources of doctrinal innovation?  Why was innovation pronounced in the 
three doctrines oriented on conventional warfare, but limited in the doctrines oriented on irregular 
warfare?  I also examine why military organizations change in different ways and at different 
intensity levels or frequencies when faced with relatively similar threat environments, availability 
of technology, and estimates of the geography of future battlefields.  To do this, I study doctrinal 
innovation in the U.S. Marine Corps during the same time period and I compare the results to the 
Army cases. 
 
                                                           
11 1950s - pentomic doctrine; 1960s - counterinsurgency doctrine; 1976 - Active Defense doctrine; 1982/1986 
AirLand Battle Doctrine; 1993/2001 Full-Dimensional and Full-Spectrum Operations. 
 4 
Relevance to Political Science 
 Military doctrine is relevant to the study of political science in eight ways.   
 First, a military organization’s wartime performance is critical for the accomplishment of 
a state’s foreign policy objectives.  Doctrine directs a military’s effort in training and in wartime 
and is therefore critical to military effectiveness.  Doctrine serves this purpose by affording the 
organization an opportunity to articulate its vision of warfare.12  Military leaders use this vision of 
warfare to determine priorities, to direct efforts, and to provide guidance to leaders and soldiers on 
principles, techniques, tactics, and procedures that are aligned with that vision.13  As President 
George Washington noted in his eighth annual message to the Congress in 1797: “However pacific 
the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without a stock of military knowledge 
for emergencies…”14  Doctrine is that knowledge.     
 Second, military doctrines and organizational structures are important inputs that combine 
with military tactics to form a state’s force employment.  Force employment is integral to a state’s 
military capability.  The common assumption that states employ military power optimally obscures 
variance in military capability which is a function of doctrine, tactics, and other non-material 
factors.   
 Third, states can use military doctrine to reassure allies and deter adversaries.  Formal 
military doctrine is almost always accessible to a wide audience that includes people that are 
outside of the military organization.  Long-standing doctrines are hard to conceal.  Today, doctrine 
is unclassified and available online.  Some military organizations unveil new doctrines with the 
                                                           
12 ADP 1-01 Doctrine Primer (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014), pp. 1-3.  The 
ADP combines operational effectiveness and a vision of warfare into two separate functions of doctrine. I combine 
them into one here. 
13 Barry R. Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 39, no. 2 (2016): 160.  I disaggregate (and add to) Posen’s four tasks of doctrine in this section. 
14 As cited in Virgil Ney, Evolution of the US Army Field Manual: Valley Forge to Vietnam (Fort Belvoir, VA: 
Combat Operations Research Group, 1966), p. 18. 
 5 
assistance of public affairs offices and branding packages.  Barry Posen argues that doctrine “sends 
diplomatic messages.”15  A military doctrine that prioritizes defensive over offensive operations 
can reassure an ally that a state is committed to a policy to defend it.  A doctrine that signals a 
military’s capability can also deter an adversary.16     
 Fourth, military doctrine informs domestic audiences.  Given that military doctrine is an 
expression of military means as an instrument of a state’s power, doctrine can serve as 
confirmation of a military’s subordination to civilian directives.  It can also demonstrate that the 
military means are aligned with a state’s strategic objectives.  According to Posen, doctrine 
“reassures society that the military is focused on those tasks that civilians have specified, that it is 
not a foreign policy or domestic menace.”17  Given that the people and the resources necessary to 
field a military come from the population, doctrine informs that population of the values, priorities, 
and missions of the military organization.   
 Fifth, doctrine can be a response to national strategy or a means to influence that strategy.  
When a state changes its strategy (or its strategic objectives), a military organization might change 
its doctrine.  A doctrinal change is only necessary if the determination is made that the instrument 
of military power which serves as the means of the strategy must change to achieve the new 
objectives.  Kevin Sheehan refers to this conception of doctrine as the “loyal bureaucrat view of 
doctrine.”18  It is also possible that a military organization uses its doctrine to influence national 
strategy.  Sheehan notes that a military “might ‘use’ formal operational doctrine as a means to 
‘signal’ to political authorities that military means are inadequate to protect political ends - and 
                                                           
15 Posen, 2016, p. 160. 
16 However, doctrine on its own cannot reveal a state’s intent.  Inferring capability by reading doctrine is very 
difficult. 
17 Posen, 2016, p. 160. 
18 Kevin Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War? Examining Peacetime Functions and Changes of Army 
Doctrine (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1988), p. 22. 
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political ends should probably be changed.”19  Grand strategies cannot be made in isolation from 
the means available.  Militaries can use their doctrine as a tool to inform policymakers of their 
capabilities and limitations.   
 Sixth, military doctrine is a mechanism for managing organizational change.  Political 
leaders can use doctrine as a tool to change a military after defeat in war or in the context of major 
grand strategic challenges.  Doctrine can be “a key weapon at the disposal of leadership to steer 
their organisation through an era of uncertainty and sustained change.”20     
 Seventh, just as in politics, the friction that exists between military actors plays out in the 
doctrine development process, and at its simplest, military doctrine is a result of a competition 
between “who gets what, when, and how.”21  Doctrine is “an institutional choice between 
competitive ideas.”22  Competition for limited resources amongst military organizations that are 
subordinate to the same state is similar to competition between branches of the federal government 
or between local, state, and federal entities.  Competition over technologies or the development of 
the most effective combat doctrine between military organizations of different states is an element 
of international relations that affects power, decisions related to war and peace, and relations 
between states.  Doctrine reflects both the power arrangement within a military organization and 
the final compromise of the relevant actors.   
 Finally, military doctrine is a justification for future budgets.  Given the finite nature of 
resources, military organizations must compete with other governmental agencies for their share 
                                                           
19 Sheehan, 1988, p. 21. 
20 Harald Høiback, “What Is Doctrine?” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (2011): 894, quoting Markus 
Mäder, In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence, The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold 
War Era, 1989-2002 (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004), p. 293. 
21 Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Whittlesey House, 1936). 
22 Paul H. Herbert, “Deciding What Has to Be Done - General DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5,” 
Leavenworth Papers, Number 16, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988, 
p. 107. 
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of the budget.  Militaries can use doctrine as a justification for the budgets and procurement 
programs that they desire.  Budget allocation is an inherently political process.  According to 
Sheehan, military organizations are often caught in a budget dilemma - though domestic societies 
may recognize the importance of a given military doctrine for the state’s security and/or ability to 
execute foreign policy objectives, it is very difficult for the military organization to demonstrate 
that increased budgets are linked to the organization’s ability to do that.23  To deal with this 
dilemma, militaries can use doctrine as a justification for the resources that they need.  Doctrine 
informs domestic audiences and legislators about the resources that the military needs.     
 For the military organization itself, doctrine provides a common frame of reference and a 
potential language.  A common framework is essential for cooperation on the battlefield.24  Jack 
Snyder notes, “One of the functions of doctrine is to provide rules of thumb for simplifying 
complex operational calculations.”25  This function of doctrine also integrates an organization’s 
cultural perspective.  A common culture “enables units to self-synchronize both within the unit 
and between units.”26  Doctrine can “facilitate tacit conventions in the heat of battle by 
prearranging salience and distinguishing relevant precedents.”27   
 Another important function of doctrine for a military organization is the role that it plays 
in imparting a sense of purpose to members of the military.  This sense of purpose is harnessed by 
military leaders who also use doctrine to increase unit cohesion.28  Doctrine often determines the 
desired character traits of members of the military organization.29  Often these character traits are 
                                                           
23 Sheehan, 1988, p. 17.  Sheehan calls this perspective on doctrine the “debater’s advantage view.” 
24 Posen, 2016, p. 160. 
25 Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 29. 
26 ADP 1-01 Doctrine Primer, p. 1-4. 
27 Høiback, 2011, p. 890. 
28 Ibid. 
29 ADP 1-01 Doctrine Primer, p. 1-5.  U.S. Army doctrine stresses “initiative, creativity, adaptability, and 
ethical action.” 
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explicitly specified in doctrine.  Posen views doctrine as a “source of cohesion” that “creates a 
fictive certainty about an inherently uncertain activity.”30  Doctrine is also a tool of education 
because it articulates the critical knowledge that members of the military organization must know.  
According to Harald Hoiback, “a doctrine, used as a tool of education, can…present particular 
cases that the military students…can use to reach their own conclusions.”31  Military organizations 
use doctrine to design the curricula for the basic training of new soldiers and military schools at 
all levels.   
 Understanding the nature, frequency, and intensity of military doctrinal change is important 
for the state for two reasons.  First, too little change risks failure to adapt to changing conditions, 
failure to optimize for purpose, and increased risk of defeat in war.  Too little change aligns with 
the prevailing narrative in the literature on organizational rigidity and it is this dynamic that is 
considered to be the riskiest for the state. Second, too much change risks damaging organizational 
efficiency, coherence, and readiness and wasting scarce resources.32  Too much change is 
anomalous according to the existing literature.  I argue that too much change is at least as 
problematic for a state’s security and prospects in future war as too little change. 
 Understanding military doctrinal change is also important because it lends insight on the 
state’s pursuit of military capability - a component of its national power.  While the political 
science literature on the causes and consequences of war is extensive, international relations 
                                                           
30 Posen, 2016, p. 160. 
31 Høiback, 2011, p. 889. 
32 This quote, attributed to the Roman warrior, Petronius Arbiter, sums up the perils of too much change: “We 
trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized.  I 
was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing, and a wonderful method it can be 
for creating the illusion of progress, while only producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.”  The only 
verified reference of this quote is Charlton Ogburn, “Merrill’s Marauders,” Harper’s Magazine, January 1957.  This 
quote is in Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: 
National Defense University Press, 1986), pp. 156-157.  Bacevich attributes it to an “old Roman warrior.” 
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scholars have long ignored issues related to the employment of military forces.33  Nonmaterial 
factors such as leadership, morale, doctrine, and tactics are rarely studied because in most theories, 
states are assumed to employ military power optimally. The effects of variance in the 
characteristics of these nonmaterial factors is rarely studied.  I seek to partially address that gap by 
exploring military doctrine - a component of force employment that focuses on the body of 
knowledge within militaries that explains the way they fight. 
State of the Literature on Military Doctrine 
 The political science literature on military doctrine is sparse.  The lack of attention to the 
topic is surprising considering the importance that international relations scholars place on the 
causes of war and war outcomes.  It is also curious given the importance attached to doctrine by 
military practitioners.  Military organizations operate in a competitive environment where the 
consequences of failure can include the collapse of the state.  Doctrine is the best formal 
articulation of how a military organization will fight in war.  The lack of scholarship on the topic 
is surprising given its implications.  
 The political science literature on doctrine that does exist posits numerous sources of 
doctrinal change.  They include changes in: technology,34 the geography of projected future 
battlefields,35 the nature of the suspected enemy threat and the balance of power of the international 
                                                           
33 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) is the most well-known exception.  The author (p. 18) laments the absence of scholarly 
attention to the nonmaterial factors that affect military power. 
34 John Stone, “The British Army and the Tank,” in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds. The Sources of Military 
Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 187-204. 
35 Robert A. Doughty, “The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,” Leavenworth Papers, Number 
1, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979. 
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system;36 the nature of the civil-military relationship;37 organizational culture;38 concerns related 
to organizational survival;39 competition between branches of a particular military service;40 
competition between services;41 and the influence of military leaders (junior, mid-grade, or 
senior).42  The impetus for change can come from outside the military in the form of civilian 
intervention or inside the military through action by military leaders.  Civilian intervention might 
be the result of military defeat, impending crisis, technological change, and/or a shift in the enemy 
threat or the balance of power in the international system.  Change initiated from within the 
military organization can be the result of military defeat, competition within the organization, 
competition between services (most often as a result of the fight for budgets) or anticipation of a 
changing enemy threat or balance of power shift.  Innovation is often mediated by culture but 
                                                           
36 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
37 Deborah D. Avant, The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars (Ph.D. diss. 
University of California, San Diego, 1991); Avant, “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in 
Peripheral Wars,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1993): 409–30; Avant, Political Institutions and 
Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
38 Austin Long, “Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-
1970 and 2003-2006,” RAND Counterinsurgency Study - Paper 6, 2008; Long, The Soul of Armies: 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); 
Long, First War Syndrome: Military Culture, Professionalization, and Counterinsurgency Doctrine (Ph.D. diss. 
MIT, 2010); Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 65–93; Kier, 
Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1997); Paula Holmes-Eber, Culture in Conflict: Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the Marine Corps (Redwood 
City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in 
Strategy and Analysis: A RAND Corporation Research Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); 
Joyce P. DiMarco, Service Culture Effects on Joint Operations: The Masks of War Unveiled (Master’s Thesis, 
United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2004); Theo Farrell, “World Culture and the Irish Army, 
1922-1942,” in Farrell and Terriff, 2002, pp. 69-90; Emily O. Goldman, “The Spread of Western Military Models to 
Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan,” in Farrell and Terriff, 2002, pp. 41-68; Adamsky, The Culture of Military 
Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
39 Frank Marutollo, Organizational Behavior in the Marine Corps: Three Interpretations (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 1990). 
40 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
41 Sapolsky et al., 2009. 
42 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); Posen, 1984 - the military maverick concept; Rosen, 1991. 
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sometimes cultural change is cited as the cause of military innovation.43  Given the preponderance 
of sources of military doctrine, it is not clear if doctrine is a result of rational calculations of the 
threat, the internal priorities and interests of the military organization, or the influence of ideas, 
identities, and culture.   
 While the purported causes of doctrinal change are numerous, many scholars treat doctrine 
synonymously with a state’s strategy, and this is problematic for many of the causal claims that 
these scholars make.  Imprecise articulation of doctrine as a dependent variable causes political 
scientists to see evidence of a change to a state’s doctrine in places where it does not exist.  This 
leads to inaccurate claims of causality, the exaggeration of doctrine’s importance, and the 
misidentification of strategy/policy change for doctrinal change.  I do not mean to suggest that 
military doctrine is orthogonal to strategy; the two are highly interrelated.  As a formal explanation 
of how a military organization fights, doctrine consists of the tactics and operations that the 
organization intends on employing.  Strategy is the bridge between the tactics and operations 
employed by the military and the state’s policies.  Military doctrine can be a tool used to execute 
a strategy, but it is rarely intended to be the strategy itself.  The March 1958 edition of the Army’s 
professional journal, Military Review, provides a quote which illustrates the difference: “Strategy 
relates to the attainment of objectives and doctrine relates to the employment of means.”44 
 Most political science scholars pay no attention to the formal manifestations of doctrine 
that are published by military organizations themselves.  It is rare for scholars to explore the formal 
doctrinal manuals of the militaries they study.  There is a tendency to underestimate or dismiss 
                                                           
43 Farrell and Terriff, 2002, pp. 7-10.  According to the authors, military leaders can try to change an 
organization’s culture to make innovation easier.  Sometimes, an exogenous shock can change an organization’s 
culture which can lead to innovation.  Finally, militaries may emulate other militaries when they share common 
cultural norms. 
44 Willard G. Wyman, “The United States Army: Its Doctrine and Influence on US Military Strategy,” Military 
Review XXXVII, no. 12, (March 1958): 3. 
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entirely the importance of manuals and military educational curricula.  Those who suggest that 
military doctrinal manuals are merely boilerplate statements that are devoid of meaning, seriously 
underestimate the degree to which military organizations rely on those manuals.  For a military 
organization, doctrine provides a common frame of reference and a professional language, it 
enhances operational effectiveness, it is a source of cohesion, it is a mechanism for managing 
change, it is the basis for military training and education, and it is often a reflection of intra- and 
inter-service compromise.45  Doctrine is critically important.  That said, some doctrinal innovations 
are more substantial than others.  In the analysis that follows, I explore the superficial doctrinal 
innovations made by the Army with respect to irregular warfare.   
 The literature on doctrinal change can be organized into three camps.  One camp claims 
that during periods of high threat, civilian intervention is necessary to compel the military to 
change its doctrine.46  Civilian intervention can be the result of military defeat, impending crisis, 
technological change, and/or a shift in the enemy threat or the balance of power in the international 
system.  Civilian elites are most effective at forcing doctrinal change based on realpolitik 
considerations which supersede a military’s own organizational interests (and its general tendency 
to avoid change in order to reduce uncertainty).  This argument is insufficient for explaining 
doctrinal innovation in the U.S. Army.   
 A second camp claims that the source of doctrinal change is not civilian intervention but 
competition between different factions within the military organization.  This dynamic is known 
as intraservice rivalry.  Doctrinal change occurs when military leaders develop a new theory of 
                                                           
45 This characterization applies to U.S. military organizations.  In some, non-U.S. military organizations, 
doctrine is much less relevant. 
46 Posen, 1984. 
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victory47 for war and leverage mid-level officers in the organization (usually through promotion) 
to institute innovations that support that theory.48  Intraservice rivalry does not explain doctrinal 
innovation in the U.S. Army.49 
 The third camp argues that variation in the interests of military organizations subordinate 
to the same state (i.e. services) is the source of doctrinal change.  This dynamic is known as 
interservice rivalry.  Competition between services for resources, standing, and prestige leads to 
innovation.50  Interservice rivalry sometimes played a role in U.S. Army doctrinal innovation, but 
this explanation is insufficient on its own.   
 I close this section by briefly addressing three studies - two dated and one recent - on 
military doctrine.  The first, written by Kevin Sheehan in 1988, argues that technological 
development in the form of new weaponry is the best explanation for Army doctrinal change.51  
This argument does not hold up in my study.  In fact, in one case - the Marine Corps’ vertical 
envelopment doctrine in the 1940s - the doctrine was instituted before the technology existed.  In 
2002, Charlie Miller also studied Army doctrine, and argued that while a balance of power 
approach best explains doctrinal change in the first half of the Cold War, Army leaders used 
doctrinal change to insulate their organization from the uncertainty that stems from changing 
                                                           
47 Rosen, 1991, p. 20, defines theory of victory as “an explanation of what the next war will look like and how 
officers must fight if it is to be won.” 
48 See also Suzanne C. Nielsen, Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform (Ph.D. diss. 
Harvard University, 2003).  Nielsen expands the focus to military reform - changes to doctrine, training, policies, 
organizations, equipment, and leader development programs.  Nielsen agrees with Rosen that external developments 
have an indeterminate effect on military change.  She focuses her analysis on how reform in military organizations 
occurs. 
49 Rosen dismisses doctrinal innovation. Instead he focuses on the creation of new combat arms. 
50 Harvey M. Sapolsky, “On the Theory of Military Innovation,” Breakthroughs 9, no. 1 (2000): 35–39; Samuel 
P. Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” The American Political 
Science Review 55, no. 1 (March, 1961): 40-52; Owen Cote, Jr., The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The 
United States Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles (Ph.D. diss. MIT, 1996); Sapolsky, The Polaris System 
Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1972). 
51 Sheehan, 1988. 
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defense policies.52  While both authors study a few of the same cases that I do, their study lacks 
external validity because they do not expand their analysis beyond one military organization - the 
U.S. Army.  Also, neither author takes their analysis beyond the end of the Cold War.    
 The most recent book on military doctrine by Benjamin Jensen, published in the midst of 
my own study of the topic, argues that military innovation comes from incubators - “new forums 
or subunits free from the normal push and pull of the bureaucratic hierarchy” - and advocacy 
networks - “loose coalitions of defense and civilian officials championing new reform 
initiatives.”53  According to Jensen, incubators and advocacy networks cause doctrinal change.  
Jensen and I seek to solve the same puzzle (what are the causal mechanisms for doctrinal change 
in modern military bureaucracies?), our definition of military doctrine is similar, and we both 
examine formal, doctrinal manuals for evidence of doctrinal change.  However, we use different 
methods and we draw fundamentally different conclusions.  Jensen confines his study to one 
military organization - the U.S. Army - whereas I test hypotheses on the U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Marine Corps.  Since the Marine cases are understudied, I make a contribution not only to the 
theoretical underpinnings of doctrinal change but also to our understanding of the Marine Corps 
as an institution.  Though Jensen and I both employ a qualitative approach, Jensen does not 
establish up-front the types of evidence that would confirm or deny the propositions that he tests.   
 Jensen provides a novel theory of how doctrinal change occurs, but he tells us little about 
why military organizations innovate in the first place.  He argues that doctrinal innovation is 
endogenous; it is triggered when “military professionals seek to overcome new operational 
                                                           
52 Charlie Miller, Serving Two Masters: Doctrinal Evolution in the U.S. Army (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 
2002). 
53 Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2016), p. 17 and p. 19, respectively. 
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challenges.”54  However, it is not clear why these new challenges do not stem from the very 
exogenous shocks that he dismisses.  I argue that the source of these operational challenges is the 
true cause of the innovation.  Like other scholars who have studied military innovation, Jensen 
seeks a monocausal explanation for doctrinal change, and this limits the utility of his theory.  
Though Jensen promotes the causal effect of incubators and networks, he states at the end of his 
study that it is “impossible to reject the argument that threats to the organization’s core 
mission…incentivize reluctant officers to develop new doctrine.”55  I find that when a military 
organization perceives a threat to its core mission, it is likely to innovate doctrinally.  Incubators 
and networks might help explain how doctrinal change occurs internal to a military organization, 
but they do not explain how threats to organizational survival can lead to innovation.  Finally, 
while Jensen finds no influence of technology on doctrinal change, had he expanded his analysis 
to the 1940s and 1950s he would have been forced to deal with the major effect that nuclear 
weapons had on the U.S. Army.56   
A New Theoretical Framework 
 I argue that the search for a monocausal explanation for doctrinal change has led scholars 
to focus on unique instances of innovation that enable the isolation of one of the above factors 
(while theoretically holding the others constant) to enable the confirmation of a causal claim.  As 
has been the case in the broader literature on innovation for years, “Factors found to be important 
for innovation in one study are found to be considerably less important, not important at all, or 
                                                           
54 Jensen, p. 15. 
55 Ibid., p. 146. 
56 No evidence of technological change causing doctrinal change is also surprising given the acquisitions of the 
“Big 5” - the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache attack helicopter, the Black Hawk 
utility helicopter, and the Patriot air defense missile system - in the 1970s and 1980s.  Most view these acquisitions 
as huge factors in the development of the Army’s preeminence in ground combat exemplified in the 1991 Persian 
Gulf war.  For a detailed account of the Big 5, see David C. Trybula, “‘Big Five’ Lessons for Today and 
Tomorrow,” accessed online at http://www.benning.army.mil/Library/content/NS P-4889.pdf. 
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even inversely important in another study.”57  None of the arguments above is sufficient on its own 
for explaining doctrinal change in the U.S. Army over the time period of interest.  Rather, I argue 
that the effect of one independent variable on doctrinal change often depends on the value of 
another variable.  Monocausal theories on doctrine fail to account for this interaction effect. 
 Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more of the above 
theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I argue 
that it is more fruitful to consider doctrinal innovation from multiple perspectives or levels of 
analysis.  I seek to develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one 
approach to military doctrinal innovation. 
 Drawing from the camps discussed above, I divide the literature on military innovation into 
three perspectives: the balance of power approach (states change their military doctrine in 
response to changes in the distribution of power in the system and due to other environmental 
factors such as the development of a new military technology), the organizational approach 
(competition between rivals within a military organization leads to military doctrinal change), and 
the interservice approach (competition between military organizations subordinate to the same 
state leads to military doctrinal change).58  Rather than viewing these perspectives as competing, 
I argue that they can be complementary when viewed as different levels of analysis.  The balance 
of power approach operates at the systemic level; the organizational approach operates at the level 
                                                           
57 George W. Downs, Jr. and Lawrence B. Mohr, “Conceptual Issues in the Study of Innovation,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no. 4. (Dec., 1976): 700.  The authors note, “Of 38 propositions bearing 
directly on the act of innovation cited by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971: 350-376), 34 were supported in some 
studies and found to receive no support in others.”  See, Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, 
Communication of Innovation: A Cross-Cultural Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1971).  This quote is also 
cited in Liam S. Collins, Military Innovation in War: The Criticality of the Senior Military Leaders (Ph.D. diss. 
Princeton University, 2014), p. 23. 
58 The balance of power perspective treats the military organization as a unitary actor; this is the systemic level 
of analysis.  The organizational perspective views a military organization as a bureaucracy with diverse interests.  
The interservice bargaining perspective focuses on competition between services subordinate to the same state. 
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of the military organization; and the interservice approach shifts the analyst’s focus to interaction 
between military organizations.   
 The balance of power approach is useful because it sheds light on why a military innovates 
doctrinally.  The organizational approach illuminates the answer to a slightly different question: 
given the decision to innovate doctrinally, what explains the nature or character of the doctrinal 
changes that were adopted (the why and the how)?  The interservice approach can provide insight 
on both sets of questions.59 
 The analytical framework that I developed to assess doctrinal change proceeds as follows: 
Theory of Victory: All military organizations have a theory of victory - a proposed explanation for 
how the organization will fight in the next war based on what it thinks warfare will look like.60  I 
argue that a theory of victory consists of two components - assumptions about the nature of war 
and a vision of warfare.  The vision of warfare consists of the mechanisms and methods that the 
organization plans to use in war. 
Shift:  When militaries perceive a shift in the balance of threat, they will examine how that shift 
affects their theory of victory.  When that theory is fundamentally redefined, the organization will 
initiate processes of doctrinal change.  Environmental shocks such as the development of a major 
military technology, the collapse/rise of great power(s), or a major change in the 
capability/intentions of an adversary should cause doctrinal innovation.   
Role of Civilians: Contra Posen, civilian intervention is not necessary for innovation.  When 
military and civilian preferences are aligned, I do not expect civilian intervention.  Civilian 
                                                           
59 I credit Terry Terriff, “U.S. Ideas and Military Change in NATO, 1989-1994,” in Ferrell and Terriff, 2002, p 
91, for helping me realize that the question of why a state changes its doctrine can be viewed in two parts: (1) why 
innovate? and (2) why innovate in the manner chosen?  For example, states don’t innovate doctrinally because of 
organizational culture, but when they decide to innovate doctrinally, organizational culture mediates the 
nature/character of the doctrinal change itself. 
60 Rosen, 1991, p. 20. 
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intervention to compel (or prevent) doctrinal change is unnecessary because both sets of actors 
already prefer the same outcome.   
 When civilian elites favor doctrinal change but military elites do not, I expect to see 
evidence of military doctrinal change in anticipation of civilian intervention as a way of warding 
off civilian influence and preserving the military’s first-mover advantage.  Preferences should 
initially not be aligned; the military organization should recognize this and take action; and the 
result should be a modified doctrine.  Rather than a major doctrinal innovation, I expect to see 
evolutionary or cosmetic changes that are promoted by the military organization as major changes.  
The evidence must show that civilian elites wanted change, military elites did not, and military 
elites acted prior to civilian intervention to satisfy the interests of civilians through minor doctrinal 
change which is promoted as major innovation.  Here, military elites use formal doctrine as a tool 
to minimize civilian interference. 
 I contend that the last possibility - military elites prefer doctrinal innovation but civilian 
elites are against it - is most rare because militaries are not inclined to innovate doctrinally in ways 
that would be harmful to a state’s national security interests.  Civilian resistance to doctrinal change 
during peacetime is not expected unless the military’s preferences for change are clearly 
insubordinate to national interests.  Doctrinal change is costly, so military organizations have little 
incentive to promote innovation in the face of civilian resistance.  If militaries favor change and 
civilians are against it, I expect that military organizations would avoid doctrinal innovation.61   
Character of the new doctrine: When a military organization decides to innovate doctrinally, I 
expect that the character of the innovation might be affected by three factors: organizational 
                                                           
61 Finding an example of military doctrinal innovation in the face of civilian resistance is difficult.  Civilian 
control over the budget gives civilian elites the upper-hand. 
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culture, competition between actors inside the organization (intraservice), and competition 
between services (interservice).  
 When a military organization changes doctrine in response to a shift in the international 
security environment, I expect the organization’s culture to affect the character of the new doctrine.  
Given the rigidity of organizational culture, it is rare for culture to be the source of military 
doctrinal change.  Instead, culture acts as an intervening variable between the international security 
environment (the source) and doctrinal innovation (the outcome).62   
 When an environmental shift causes a military organization to review its theory of victory, 
competition between branches might affect the new theory of victory and the character of the 
doctrinal innovation that follows.  Stephen Rosen is the most notable scholar to study how 
intraservice competition affects innovation, but he dismisses formal doctrine and fails to realize 
that innovation can occur without the development of a new combat arm or branch.63   
 When an environmental shift affects a military organization’s budget or causes a new 
mission area to emerge, interservice competition might affect the character of the innovation.  
Services will compete for scarce resources to either maintain their current position or to establish 
jurisdiction in the new mission area.  Competition between services subordinate to the same state 
can act as an intervening variable between the environmental shock and a new doctrine.  When 
two or more services are deadlocked in response to an environmental shock, I expect to see civilian 
intervention into the doctrinal process.  The purpose of this intervention is not to compel doctrinal 
change; it is to resolve friction between the two services.  In the absence of acute interservice 
competition, military organizations will anticipate civilian intervention and take action to render it 
                                                           
62 A major change to an organization’s culture could cause doctrinal innovation, but cultural shifts are rare for 
military organizations. 
63 Rosen, 1991. 
 20 
unnecessary.  When acute interservice competition is present and deadlock results, military 
organizations will have no choice but to allow (and respond to) civilian intervention.   
Method and Case Selection 
 The study of military doctrine lends itself best to a qualitative research design.  I conduct 
a structured, focused comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001.  The dependent variable is military 
doctrine and the independent variable is the balance of threat in the international system.  
Intervening variables that explain the character of doctrine are organizational culture, intraservice 
and interservice competition, and organizational interests related to survival.64   
 I privilege formal products - official field manuals, educational curricula, and 
correspondence written by military leaders responsible for making doctrine - over informal 
elements such as journal articles written by junior officers.65  I focus my analysis on doctrine as it 
is published in the military organization’s doctrinal manuals - it’s formal doctrine.  Given the 
proliferation of official field manuals that focus on a multitude of different functions within a 
military organization, I focus instead on a military’s keystone doctrine.  Most military 
organizations publish one central doctrinal manual which summarizes their approach to warfare in 
terms that apply to the entire force.  In most western militaries, all other field manuals are required 
to be aligned with this central, keystone manual.  
 This formal conception of doctrine contrasts with other scholars who argue that doctrine 
can also be informal.  Keith Bickel’s articulation of doctrine incorporates informal elements such 
                                                           
64 I don’t claim that balance of power factors are the only possible cause of doctrinal change but I approach the 
case studies in this dissertation from the balance of power perspective because I think it is the most fruitful level of 
analysis for understanding the causes of doctrinal innovation. 
65 I argue that formal doctrine in the United States began with the Army’s publication of the 1905 Field Service 
Regulation.  Jensen, 2016, p. 5, agrees but contends that doctrine did not focus on “the employment of forces that 
operate above the level of tactics” until 1941.  I disagree. 
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as professional journal articles, field orders, and the personal letters of soldiers.66  Bickel contends 
that the spread of ideas between members of the officer corps, though unsanctioned by formal 
institutions, is an integral component of understanding an organization’s military doctrine.  While 
I don’t dispute the idea that unofficial correspondence between members of the military is an 
integral component of understanding a military organization’s intellectual foundation, I contend 
that the inclusion of these unofficial elements blurs the line between (approved) doctrine and 
intellectual debate. 
 I divide my analysis of U.S. Army doctrine into a chapter on doctrine for conventional 
operations and a chapter on doctrine for irregular warfare to achieve variance on the dependent 
variable.  Doctrinal innovations for conventional warfare were the 1950s pentomic doctrine, the 
1976 Active Defense doctrine, and the 1982/1986 AirLand Battle doctrine.  I compare these 
doctrines with the absence of doctrinal innovation for low-intensity conflict in Vietnam and during 
the 1990s.  In the analysis of the Marine Corps, I examine the 1940s and 1950s vertical 
envelopment doctrine and the 1989 maneuver warfare doctrine.  I study these cases because they 
allow me to assess whether or not the Marine Corps innovated doctrinally in ways similar to the 
Army when exposed to the same stimuli.  Applying the theoretical framework to the Marine Corps 
also serves the purpose of determining whether the conclusions are relevant to other organizations 
besides the U.S. Army.     
 The origin of the concept of military doctrine in America can be traced back to Baron 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben (1730-1794), Inspector General of the United States Army at 
Valley Forge.  Von Steuben was a Prussian officer who joined George Washington in 1778 and 
developed a method of drill instruction that eventually grew into the U.S. military’s first formal 
                                                           
66 Bickel, 2001. 
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manual called Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States.  Von 
Steuben’s manual, colloquially known as the “Blue Book,” was signed into law by Congress on 
March 1779.67  The establishment of doctrine as a distinct military concept is credited to the French 
who used the term as early as 1903 to refer to explanations for how to win future wars and as a 
way of infusing the French military with the will necessary to do so.68   
 The word doctrine first appeared in the lexicon of the U.S. military in 1912 in an editorial 
in the Army’s Infantry Journal where it was defined as “a means to some national conception of 
war.”69  Doctrine first appeared in the Marine Corps lexicon in the services’ professional journal, 
the Marine Corps Gazette in 1916.  In 1961, Army General William E. DePuy who would later 
command the U.S. Army’s first organization dedicated purely to writing doctrine (Training and 
Doctrine Command, TRADOC) wrote a definition of doctrine that is worth quoting at length:  
 
Service doctrine is the whole process by which a fighting service is built up around a 
combatant function…in its broadest sense, [doctrine] is everything the services have been, 
are today, and plan to be.  The development and evolution of doctrine and its inculcation, 
mostly in the minds and hearts of the officer corps, are the life thread and the pulse of the 
fighting services…doctrine is institutional in character.  Doctrine and the institutions which 
it nourishes, and in turn, upon which it feeds, are exactly coextensive.  There is no doctrine 
outside the institutional walls - nor can the institution creep outside the doctrine which is 
its rationale…Because the services are solemn and venerable institutions they have 
acquired a wide range of traditions and values, and a long history of legendary exploits, 
victories and successes. These too are part of doctrine although they are seldom seen or 
fully understood until in some epic moment they become incandescent in action as at 
Carentan, in the battle of Midway, on Iwo Jima, or in MIG Alley.70  
                                                           
67 As cited by Harald Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: 
Routledge, 2013), p. 28. A copy of the manual is available here: https://archive.org/details/2575061R.nlm.nih.gov.  
Scholars use the spelling “Steuben” whereas the actual Blue Book uses the spelling “Stuben.”  I use the former. 
68 Høiback, 2013, p. 37. 
69 Bickel, 2001, p. 2. 
70 Richard M. Swain, “Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy: First Commander, U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command.” Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1973, p. 36.  
Swain reprints DePuy’s article, “Unification: How Much More?” Army 11, no. 9 (April 1961): 30-38. 
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 In today’s U.S. Army, there is general consensus that doctrine is “the way [the Army] 
fights”71  or “the body of thought on how Army forces operate as an integral part of a joint force.”72  
Today, the Marine Corps definition of doctrine is very similar to the Army’s, centering on 
guidelines for the way the Marine Corps fights.  According to the Marine doctrinal manual on 
Warfighting, doctrine “establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting…it 
establishes the way we practice our profession.”73  The Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military Terms defines doctrine as the "fundamental principles by which the military forces or 
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.  It is authoritative but 
requires judgment in application."74  While military organizations treat doctrine as a body of 
knowledge developed from lessons learned in previous wars, sometimes doctrine can be an engine 
of organizational change based either on the organization’s assessment of future threats or 
guidance from civilian leaders to institute a specific method of fighting.75      
Brief Description of the Findings 
 The analysis in this study generated seven, major findings.  I briefly describe each, below.  
A more detailed explanation for each can be found in the study’s final chapter.   
 First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are better described by balance 
of threat than balance of power theory.  Applied to military innovation, balance of threat theory 
                                                           
71 This is the definition used by the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), the organization responsible 
for overseeing the development, evaluation, and integration of concepts for the Army. 
72 This is the definition used by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). 
73 See Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, pp. 55-56. 
74 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 15 February 2016, p. 71. 
Accessed online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.  This is also the U.S. military’s joint 
definition (found in JP 1-02).  Joint doctrine is “fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States 
military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (CJCSI 5120.02C).”  The current U.S. Army definition of doctrine combines the Department of Defense 
and joint definitions into one. 
75 See Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011). For example, Kennedy’s directive to the U.S. Army to develop a 
counterinsurgency doctrine is an example of this type of civilian involvement.  This doctrine was meant to be an 
“engine of change” in the organization. 
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argues that militaries will develop doctrine in response to shifts in the threat.  The military 
organization evaluates the intensity and probability of the threat by examining a potential 
adversary’s aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.  Militaries 
treat the most menacing threat to the state, rather than the most likely threat, as the top priority in 
the doctrine development process.   
 Second, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation.  
In most of the innovations analyzed in this study, civilian intervention played little role in causing 
the innovation.  When militaries sense civilian intervention to compel change, they will act in 
anticipation of that intervention.  This is most likely when there is civilian preference for a 
doctrinal innovation for irregular warfare - a type of warfare that military organizations see as 
being at odds with their organizational purpose.   
 Third, military organizations constantly strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a 
particular jurisdictional domain.  The most common domains are land, sea, and air.  Establishing 
dominance over a domain is integral to the organization’s survival, as long as it can be shown that 
the possibility for future combat in that domain exists.  Military organizations will go to great 
lengths to establish a monopoly over a domain, and they will consistently reinforce the relevance 
of that domain in future warfare.     
 Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the 
strategic problem that a doctrine is designed to solve.  Insoluble strategic problems can lead to 
frequent doctrinal changes as a military organization attempts to develop new methods of fighting.  
When strategic problems are insuperable, we should expect to see repeated iterations of doctrinal 
innovation.  The military organization will perceive innovation as necessary to ensure 
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organizational survival, but the insolubility of the strategic problem will render military solutions 
to it impracticable.   
 Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal 
explanations of military doctrinal innovation are insufficient because they fail to account for the 
interaction effect that occurs between independent variables.  Of the seven doctrines studied across 
two services, no single, independent variable stands out as the most causative factor for innovation.  
This is why future studies of military doctrine (or military innovation more broadly), should be 
conducted through the lens of a levels of analysis approach.   
 Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military 
organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external 
environment.  Counterintuitively, military organizations are uncomfortable with periods of peace 
because their leaders are forced to make assumptions about the character of future war, but are not 
afforded an opportunity to confirm or deny those assumptions in war. 
 Finally, the existence of a doctrinal institution with purview over doctrine creation, 
publication, and distribution, will increase the volume of doctrine that a service produces and it 
will create a norm for a reliance on formal doctrine.  While obvious, this point is important because 
it sheds light on why the Army has a longer tradition of formal doctrine than the Marine Corps.  
More importantly, it illuminates the fact that the Army has consistently strived to reinvent itself 
doctrinally since the establishment of TRADOC in 1973.   
Roadmap 
 This study is organized into a literature review chapter, a research design chapter, three 
chapters focused on the case studies, and a conclusion.  The literature review is divided into two 
sections.  In the first section, I assess the political science and security studies literature on military 
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doctrine to derive a definition of doctrine.  In the second section, I assess the literature on the 
sources of military doctrinal change. I define military doctrine as how a military organization plans 
to fight in combat.  More specifically, doctrine is the formal collection of documents sanctioned 
by the military organization that military forces use to guide their actions in combat.  
 In the research design chapter, based on the limitations of the existing monocausal 
explanations for doctrinal innovation, I develop and define a new framework for assessing 
innovation using a levels of analysis approach.  Once I define the framework, I discuss the 
measurable indicators that would confirm or deny the relevant independent and/or intervening 
variables at each level of analysis.  I close the chapter with a brief discussion of the rationale for 
conducting a comparative case study analysis and I address the primary bodies of evidence that I 
use to understand the causes and character of doctrinal change.   
 Chapter three is focused on an analysis of doctrinal innovation for conventional warfare by 
the U.S. Army from World War II to 2001.  I conduct a case study analysis of three instances of 
doctrinal change - the 1950’s pentomic doctrine, the 1976 Active Defense doctrine, and the 
1982/1986 AirLand Battle doctrine.  All three cases are doctrines that focus on conventional 
warfare.76  Using the theoretical framework outlined in the research design chapter and a 
structured, focused case study approach, I analyze the sources of each doctrine. 
 Chapter four also focuses on the U.S. Army, but the analysis centers on the absence of 
doctrinal innovation with respect to irregular warfare.  Irregular warfare refers to a certain type of 
fighting defined by combat between a state military organization and non-state armed groups77 
                                                           
76 The use of the label "conventional" to refer to firepower-intensive, state-centric, and industrialized type of 
warfare is unfortunate because of the connotation of the term.  "Conventional" suggests that this type of warfare is 
standard, typical, and most common.  While warfare of this type might be the dominant convention during certain 
historical periods, most wars throughout history have actually been smaller scale civil wars (or intra-state wars). 
77 This military organization might be the government’s own military or another state’s military that is 
intervening in the conflict at the government’s request - for example, the U.S. in South Vietnam, or the U.S. in Iraq 
after the formation of the post-Saddam Iraq government. 
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involving competition for legitimacy and influence over a civilian population.78  First, I examine 
the absence of doctrinal innovation with respect to counterinsurgency operations prior to, during, 
and after the Vietnam War.  Second, I analyze the factors leading to two, incremental doctrines 
developed by the Army in the 1990s - Full-Dimensional Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations.   
 In chapter five, I use the same theoretical framework and structured, focused case study 
approach to analyze doctrinal innovations by the Marine Corps.  Rather than conducting an 
analysis of the Marine Corps over the entire period from the end of World War II to 2001, I focus 
on two doctrinal innovations - the vertical envelopment doctrine of the 1940s and 1950s and the 
maneuver warfare doctrine of the 1980s.  Studying both doctrines allows me to assess whether or 
not the Marine Corps changed in ways similar to the Army when exposed to similar external 
stimuli.   
 In the conclusion, I summarize the major findings on doctrinal innovation from the case 
studies.  I compare doctrine for conventional warfare to doctrine for irregular warfare.  I discuss 
the implications of the findings for the literature on military doctrine, and I consider ramifications 
for the state and the military organizations themselves.  
                                                           
78 The U.S. Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant population(s).” (DOD Dictionary, October 2015) 
 28 
Chapter 1: Understanding Military Doctrine and Doctrinal Innovation 
 The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the literature on military doctrine.  This 
chapter is divided into two sections.  First, what is military doctrine?  Why do military 
organizations develop doctrine?  Here I draw from the literature on international relations and 
security studies.  Second, what is innovation and why do organizations innovate? Why do military 
organizations innovate?  What are the causes of doctrinal change?  In this section I draw from the 
literature on organizations (theory and innovation), military innovation, and bureaucratic politics.   
1.1. What is Military Doctrine? 
 Militaries have used the term “doctrine” for over one-hundred years, but the concept is ill-
defined in the political science literature.  This is important because how one defines doctrine has 
important implications for the theories and causal arguments that one makes.  Though doctrine 
appears frequently in modern day literature on military organizations, the concept is often 
ambiguous or vague.  Existing scholarship on military doctrine tends to be highly applied and 
atheoretical.  Scholars are still grappling with key terms and the very questions that should guide 
research on the topic.1  The purpose of this section of the literature review is to develop the 
definition of military doctrine that I use in the remainder of the study.   
1.1.1. Defining Doctrine in the Political Science Literature 
 Political science interest in doctrine can be traced to literature in the 1970s and 1980s that 
focused on the destabilizing effects of offensive military doctrines which were often cited as a 
primary cause of World War I.2  Theories of international relations focused on the increased 
                                                           
1 Harald Høiback, “The Anatomy of Doctrine and Ways to Keep It Fit,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 
(2016): 186.  Høiback suggests that the study of doctrine is in Thomas Kuhn’s “pre-paradigm period of speculation.” 
2 See, e.g., Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no.2 (January 1978): 
167-214; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First 
World War,” International Security 9, no. 1 (1984): 58–107; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Van Evera, 
eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
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potential for conflict when the offense is strong relative to the defense.3  A second wave of scholars 
focused not on the effects of a particular type of doctrine but the causes.4  Though often undefined, 
military doctrine was commonly viewed as the aggregation of a state’s military power, its 
preference for a certain type of military operation, and a prescription for how a state would use its 
military in war.   An offensive doctrine not only meant that the military valued (and in some cases, 
glorified) attacking over defending but it also meant that the state’s grand strategy and its policies 
were offensive in nature.  In some cases, evidence for an offensive doctrine was even found in the 
sentiments of members of society.5  Aggressive statements by senior military officers, strategies 
devised by civilians that included offensive strategic aims, technologies that made offensive 
operations easier, and the glorification of offensive military postures were often seen as evidence 
of offensive military doctrine.   
 Many scholars treat doctrine synonymously with a state’s strategy, and this creates a host 
of problems for the causal arguments that these scholars make.  Imprecise articulation of military 
doctrine as a dependent variable causes political scientists to see evidence of military doctrine (or 
a change to a state’s military doctrine) in places where it does not exist.  This can lead to inaccurate 
claims of causality, the exaggeration of doctrine’s importance, and the identification of a doctrinal 
change that was actually a change to a state’s strategy and/or policy.  Depictions of doctrine as 
                                                           
3 In addition to the sources listed in the previous footnote, see George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the 
International System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977); Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations 
(London: Collins, 1950), pp. 19-20; John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 
2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-180; Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A 
Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (June 1984): 220-222. 
4 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Snyder, 1984; Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation 
and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: 
Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); 
Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 65–93; Kier, Imagining 
War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
5 Van Evera, 1984, p. 59.  The author notes that the German military inculcated German society with a belief in 
the superiority of the offense. 
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offensive, defensive, or deterrent are overly simplified conceptions which obscure the nuances 
found in the content of doctrine.      
 Scholars pay no attention to formal articulations of doctrine by military organizations 
themselves.  Scholars dismiss formal military doctrine (such as field manuals) for three reasons.  
First, they claim that changes to formal doctrine are unimportant if those changes don’t also bring 
changes to the central functions of military organizations,6 but they make this claim without 
examining whether or not that is the case.  Second, implicit in the literature is the idea that the 
doctrine that a military organization publishes is disconnected from the actual operations it 
conducts in war.  If this is the case, it is not clear why military organizations assume the high costs 
of developing and publishing doctrine.  This cost is a function of time, resources, organizational 
energy, and the difficulty of achieving consensus.  If doctrine is disconnected, it is also not clear 
why military organizations would use doctrine to train and educate soldiers and officers to the 
extent that they do.  Finally, there is the claim that not all militaries have a doctrinal tradition.7  
Though this is true, particularly in the case of non-western militaries, the states most examined - 
Russia, Britain, and France - do have long doctrinal histories.8   
 Political science interest in the causes of military doctrine can be traced to Barry Posen’s 
1984 book, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World 
Wars.  According to Posen, military doctrine serves two purposes: it is an articulation of priorities 
and a prescription for a military’s structure and employment.9  Prioritization is important because 
it synchronizes the efforts of different types of military forces (typically land, sea, and air) that are 
                                                           
6 Rosen, 1991, p. 8. 
7 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in Farrell and Terriff, eds. The Sources of 
Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 4. 
8 In fact, American military doctrine has its roots in Chinese, Greek, Roman, and French military doctrine. 
9 In more recent work, Posen defines doctrine as “a set of institutionalized principles about how to fight.” See 
Barry R. Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, 
no. 2 (2016): 159. 
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subordinate to the same state.  Prioritization and prescription of structure and employment are 
important because threats can be numerous and resources are almost always scarce.  Posen’s 
definition is helpful because the author seeks to explain how doctrine differs from strategy.  
Military doctrine is a “subcomponent of grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means 
(emphasis added).”10  For Posen, doctrine focuses on “What means shall be employed?” and “How 
shall they be employed11,” whereas grand strategy is “a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ 
security for itself.”12  Doctrine determines the organizational structure of the military and it 
explains how the military will fight.   
 Posen claims that doctrine “includes the preferred mode of a group of services, a single 
service, or a subservice for fighting wars.”13  The inclusion of preference in the definition is an 
acknowledgement that military doctrine is also the result of organizational interests.14  These 
interests may or may not be aligned with those of civilian leaders responsible for the state’s strategy 
and policy.  Posen’s definition also recognizes the multi-service nature of most modern militaries.  
Militaries are not monolithic organizations.  Not only do militaries consist of more than one service 
(each with their own doctrine), but there are also subgroups within each of those services.15  Posen 
astutely recognizes the existence of more than one service in military organizations, but he does 
                                                           
10 Posen, 1984, p. 13. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  Posen draws his definition of strategy from Edward M. Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. viii. 
13 Posen, 1984, p. 14. 
14 Austin Long, First War Syndrome: Military Culture, Professionalization, and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
(Ph.D. diss. MIT, 2010), p. 43.  Long makes the point that the incorporation of preference into doctrine allows for 
the possibility that organizational culture plays a role in doctrinal content. 
15 For example, the U.S. has four military services - Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.  The Army is 
subdivided into numerous combat, combat support, and combat service support branches that have different 
functions and interests.  The Navy is subdivided into carrier pilots from the attack or fighter communities, surface 
ship commanders, submariners, and antisubmarine warfare pilots.  The other services are similarly subdivided into 
components that align with their various requirements. 
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not explore whether or not this feature might be a source of military doctrine.  He also ignores the 
existence of multiple bureaucratic agencies with different interests within one particular service.   
 While Posen’s definition of military doctrine remains the most established in the field, its 
expansiveness lacks the clarity needed for any study that establishes doctrine as the dependent 
variable (the outcome of interest).  In Posen’s case study analysis, evidence of doctrine is found in 
a military organization’s force posture, hierarchical organizational structure, and the strength and 
disposition of units in war.  Curiously, in his case studies of France, Britain, and Germany, Posen 
does not cite any of the doctrinal manuals written and used by the military organizations of those 
three countries during the interwar period.  Posen also doesn’t recognize the link between doctrine 
and knowledge that is taught in military schools.  He doesn’t examine any military curricula to 
determine whether the doctrines that he cites were actually aligned with the knowledge taught to 
military officers in each country’s war colleges.  Posen’s analysis is centrally focused on two 
potential causes of military doctrine - grand strategy and policy - with limited attention to evidence 
of the military doctrine itself.  Complicating this further, evidence of doctrine in Posen’s analysis 
often appears in grand strategy, making it difficult to determine whether the outcome of interest is 
distinct from its causes.   
 Perhaps recognizing the limits of such an expansive conception of doctrine, Posen later 
subdivided military doctrine into two types: political-military doctrine and operational-tactical 
doctrine.  In an unpublished paper in 1999, Posen wrote, “By operational and tactical doctrine I 
mean the way the French army and air force planned to fight fights, battles and campaigns. This 
should be distinguished from a higher order concept that goes by many different names: national 
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military strategy, strategic doctrine, political-military doctrine, or ‘military doctrine.’”16  In Long’s 
assessment of the origin of counterinsurgency doctrine, the author uses Posen’s conception of 
operational-tactical doctrine.17  The definition of doctrine that I employ in this study is similar. 
 Though it is often not cited by scholars studying military doctrine, it is important to discuss 
Jack Snyder’s conception of doctrine in his 1984 book, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military 
Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914.  Snyder defines military doctrine as a "set of beliefs 
about the nature of war and the keys to success on the battlefield.”18  These beliefs help the military 
strategist simplify the complex task of planning for war.  According to Snyder, military doctrine 
is not only a simplifying tool for military institutions but it also provides a "simple, coherent, 
standardized structure...for strategic thought.”19  Doctrine helps the military develop standard 
operating procedures and it serves as the basis for the design of military organizational structures.  
Unlike Posen, Snyder recognizes that military leaders use military school curricula and field 
manuals to articulate and teach doctrine to soldiers.   
 Because Snyder views simplification as doctrine’s raison d'être, he focuses on how 
processes of simplification introduce biases into strategic analysis.  These “military biases” 
include: the disproportionate influence of formative experiences in past wars and early training, a 
tendency to overestimate war’s likelihood, a strong emphasis on standardization, doctrinal 
                                                           
16 See Barry Posen, “Still Strange Defeat? France 1940,” unpublished paper, 1999.  I do not have access to this 
paper but it was cited by Daniel Carter, Innovation, Wargaming, and Armored Warfare (M.S. thesis, MIT, 2005), p. 
11. 
17 Long, 2010; Long, The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); Long, “Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006,” RAND Counterinsurgency Study - Paper 6, 2008. 
18 Snyder, 1984, p. 27.  See also, Van Evera, 1984.  Van Evera doesn’t define doctrine but his conception of it 
appears to match Snyder’s.  Both authors argue that offensive doctrines help explain the outbreak of World War I.  
For critiques, see Marc Trachtenberg, “The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914,” International Security 15, no. 3 
(Winter, 1991): 120-150; Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” International Security 
11, no. 2 (Fall, 1986): 151-175. 
19 Snyder, 1984, p. 27. 
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dogmatism,20 and the pursuit of well-structured solutions even if those solutions are more difficult 
to implement.21  These biases have two primary effects on doctrine.  First, they affect the nature 
and content of the doctrine.  Here Snyder is most interested in whether biases influence doctrines 
that favor the offense or the defense.  Second, they shape the rigidity of doctrine - “Discrepant 
information is either ignored or incorporated into the belief system in a way that minimizes the 
need to change the system’s structure.”22  Since military doctrines are belief systems in Snyder’s 
view, they “reflect the need for continuity, ease of recall, and a restricted scope of attention to 
information.”23 
 Snyder’s conception of doctrine is helpful because it illustrates the role of belief systems 
and the biases that affect them.  Though he doesn’t use the term, the process of doctrinal 
simplification is really one of bounded rationality.24  Organizations use simplifying mechanisms 
to understand and respond to uncertainty.  These organizations operate according to routines and 
standard operating procedures rather than attempting to analyze each specific situation according 
to cost-benefit analysis, which can prove too difficult and expensive.  This satisficing leads to 
myopia, goal displacement (a focus on narrow operational measurements of goals rather than 
                                                           
20 According to Snyder, 1984, p. 38, criteria for dogmatism include: “a resistance to changing central beliefs in 
the face of disconfirming evidence; a narrowness of approach to problems; an insensitivity to the need for different 
solutions to fit different circumstances; and a reliance on deductions from theory rather than inferences from 
evidence.” The author cites Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic, 1960). 
21 Ibid., pp. 26-30. 
22 Ibid., p. 27.  On cognitive simplification, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Most track the origin of bounded rationality to Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational-
Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting (New York: Wiley, 1957).  In political 
science, the term is used in the literature on institutions - see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984) - individual-level theories on 
the causes of war - see Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 1, no. 1 (1998): 139–65, for a short literature review - and the nuclear weapons debate between Kenneth 
Waltz and Scott Sagan - see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring 
Debate (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995). 
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attention to broader situations and effects), and the processing of information through particular 
filters.   
 The complexity of warfare clearly requires bounded rationality.  However, the extent to 
which biases are relevant depends on the accuracy of Snyder’s claim that doctrine’s primary 
purpose is that of simplification.  During the period that Snyder focuses on - the pre-World War I 
years - military doctrines were more “simple, narrow, [and] deductive” than they are today.  In 
France, a country that Snyder includes in his analysis, doctrine was not a recognized concept until 
1903.25  Though he doesn’t focus on a U.S. case, the word doctrine didn’t even appear in the 
lexicon of the U.S. military until 1912 where it was defined as “a means to some national 
conception of war” in the Army’s Infantry Journal.26  Prior to 1905, military doctrine was 
prescriptive, focused on regimented drills and regulations that could be taught easily to 
inexperienced troops.  The doctrinal field manuals that did exist were often not sanctioned by the 
state’s War Department.  Manuals equated peacetime drill with combat drill; they were one and 
the same.  The idea of doctrine as a simplifying device is still relevant today (and, as such, so are 
the corresponding biases that Snyder discusses), but simplification is no longer doctrine’s defining 
characteristic. 
 While Snyder is careful to distinguish between strategy and doctrine from a definitional 
perspective, he occasionally combines the terms into one - “strategic doctrine.”27  It is not clear 
how strategic doctrine relates to or is distinct from doctrine at other levels of war.  If we define 
                                                           
25 Virgil Ney, Evolution of the US Army Field Manual: Valley Forge to Vietnam (Fort Belvoir, VA: Combat 
Operations Research Group, 1966), p. 37. 
26 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p. 2. 
27 Snyder, 1984, p. 9.  Strategic doctrine is used to refer to strategies for the employment of nuclear weapons.  
For example, Halperin et al. discuss strategic airpower as the primary strategic doctrine of the U.S. Air Force.  See 
Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla A. Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), p. 30. 
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strategy as the relationship between ends (strategic objectives), ways (the instruments of national 
power), and means (the resources available to pursue those objectives), one can argue that military 
doctrines are one component of an assortment of instruments of national power available for 
employment by the state.28  Snyder focuses more on a high-level doctrine which comprises the 
totality of a state’s military power.29  The danger in doing so is the tendency to misuse doctrine as 
an analog for grand strategy or as a way of describing a military’s operational orientation.30  
 In her influential book on Soviet innovation, Zisk31 focuses on doctrinal innovation, a 
process she defines as “a major change in how military planners conceptualize and prepare for 
future war” and a “reconceptualization of what sorts of military tasks need to be performed in 
wartime, or major alterations in how existing tasks are performed.”32  Zisk does not define doctrine, 
but her description of doctrinal innovation suggests that she views doctrine as the list of tasks that 
a military organization will perform during war.  For Zisk, doctrine is an expression of “military 
thinking and planning on questions such as whether war will be nuclear or conventional, whether 
nuclear war will be total or limited, and whether initial preparations for war must be offensive or 
defensive.”33  Zisk clarifies in a footnote that she views doctrine as “grand strategy” as opposed to 
“service missions.”34  This explains her focus on Soviet responses to the U.S. strategy of Flexible 
Response in the 1960s and the Schlesinger Doctrine in 1974.35  Zisk makes a powerful contribution 
                                                           
28 Other instruments of national power are diplomatic and economic. The military instrument can be further 
subdivided into functions for land (Army), sea (Navy), and air (Air Force). 
29 Posen, 2016, p. 159, uses the phrase “high-level doctrine” to refer to “all of a state’s military power.” 
30 Kevin Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War? Examining Peacetime Functions and Changes of Army 
Doctrine (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1988), p. 7. 
31 When her book was published in 1993, the author was named Kimberly Marten Zisk.  The author now goes 
by the name Kimberly Joy Marten. 
32 Zisk, 1993, p. 4. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 199. 
35 The author also focuses on the Soviet response to the American Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine and NATO’s 
Follow-on Forces Attack doctrine in the 1980s.  These align better with the definition of doctrine that I employ in 
this dissertation. 
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to the literature on military innovation, but the work is limited because of the absence of a 
definition for doctrine and the treatment of doctrine as synonymous with strategy.   
 We see the same challenge in Kier’s work on the effect of military culture on doctrine.36  
Kier does not define doctrine but treats it similarly to those who view doctrine as a high-level 
concept that is closely associated with strategy.  The dependent variable in her analysis is 
alignment between military and civilians on a particular doctrine but her conception of that 
doctrine is broad and undefined.  In a critique of Kier’s work, Porch astutely points out that by 
confusing strategy with doctrine, Kier exaggerates the effect of military doctrine on the 1940 fall 
of France.37  According to Porch, “Kier repeatedly contrasts the ‘offensive’ German doctrine 
against the ‘defensive’ Allied procedures; however, doctrine per se is neither offensive nor 
defensive.”38  The mobile warfare doctrine that Germany developed in the 1920s was conceived 
for defensive purposes; it was Hitler who employed mobile warfare as an element of an offensive 
strategy.  A military can use the same doctrine for both offensive and defensive purposes.39   
 In another important work on military doctrine, Avant carefully distinguishes between 
tactics, doctrine, and strategy.  Avant writes, “doctrine falls between the technical details of tactics 
and the broad outline of grand strategy. Whereas tactics deal with issues about how battles are 
fought, doctrine encompasses the broader set of issues about how one wages war, including ideas 
about how to best fight the enemy and assumptions about what part of the enemy is most 
                                                           
36 Kier, 1995, 1997. 
37 Douglas Porch, “Military ‘Culture’ and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay,” International Security 
24, no. 4 (2000): 165. 
38 Ibid., p. 168. 
39 In political science, poorly specifying the dependent variable by confusing doctrine with strategy can lead to 
inaccurate causal claims. In the world of policy, confusing the two concepts can affect relations between states.  The 
Germans thought that the U.S. Army’s AirLand battle doctrine was so aggressive that it could trigger war.  See 
White Paper 1983, “The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany,” Federal Ministry of Defense, 1983, p. 160, 
cited in Walter E. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2011), p. 210. 
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important.”40  A successful doctrine, according to Avant, is one that is well integrated with national 
security goals as reflected in a state’s grand strategy.  Avant’s definition is the first to include 
specific mention of an adversary.  This is helpful because it is an explicit acknowledgement of war 
as a competitive arena.  However, specificity with regard to an enemy threat is rarely seen in 
doctrinal field manuals.   
 Rosen examines twenty-one military innovations that occurred in the first half of the 
twentieth century.41  Though at least fourteen of those innovations involved major changes to a 
military organization’s doctrine, Rosen does not provide a definition of doctrine.  Rosen’s 
definition of major military innovation - “a change in one of the primary combat arms of a service 
in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat arm” - suggests that the author 
is primarily interested in changes to military doctrine (“the way [the military organization] fights”) 
and organizational structure (“the creation of a new combat arm”).42   Though he doesn’t define 
doctrine, Rosen makes it clear that changes to a military organization’s formal doctrine that don’t 
come with corresponding changes to the “essential workings” of the organization do not qualify 
as a major innovation.43  Rosen cites Sheehan,44 who examined three U.S. Army doctrinal shifts 
from 1945-1980, as proof that doctrine can change without corresponding change to “the central 
combat function of the army” which he defines as the fighting of a conventional war against the 
Soviets in Europe.  This is an astute point, but it doesn’t excuse Rosen’s lack of attention to any 
formal military doctrine in the vast array of cases that he examines.  If a western military, 
                                                           
40 Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” 
International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1993): 409–30.  See also, Avant, The Institutional Sources of Military 
Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars (Ph.D. diss. University of California, San Diego, 1991), and Avant, 
Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1994). 
41 Rosen, 1991. 
42 Ibid., p. 7. 
43 Ibid., p. 8. 
44 Sheehan, 1988. 
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especially the U.S. military, makes a major change to the way it fights (or creates an entirely new 
combat arm), one would expect to see evidence of this in formal military doctrine.   
  In summary, political scientists tend to conflate doctrine with strategy.  Imprecise 
specification of doctrine as the dependent variable reduces the explanatory power of theories that 
seek to explain the origins of doctrine.  Over-simplification of military doctrine with the use of 
blanket phrases like offensive and defensive is useful when one seeks to understand the effect of 
doctrine on a state’s foreign policy, but less useful when one makes causal claims on the sources 
of those doctrines.    
1.1.2. My Definition of Doctrine 
 The seminal author in the field of military doctrine, Barry Posen, eventually recognized 
some of the limitations that come with the oversimplification of doctrine and articulated a 
conception of doctrine that he labeled operational-tactical doctrine.  Operational-tactical doctrine 
is an articulation of how a military plans to fight.45  For the remainder of this study, I employ a 
definition of doctrine that aligns with Posen.46  I define doctrine as how a military organization 
plans to fight in combat.47  More specifically, doctrine is the formal collection of documents 
sanctioned by the military organization that military forces use to guide their actions in combat.48  
It’s important to note that in choosing an operational-tactical approach to doctrine, I am not 
                                                           
45 Posen, unpublished paper, 1999. Posen was the first to use this term and I think it is effective because it helps 
us avoid conflating doctrine with strategy. 
46 This definition is also used by Høiback, Long, Jensen, and Bickel, among others.  See Posen, 1999 
(unpublished); Høiback, 2011, 2013, 2016; Long, 2008, 2010, 2016; Bickel, 2001; Benjamin Jensen, Forging the 
Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). Jensen (p. 5) refers to 
this as “service-level formal doctrine.” 
47 Høiback defines military doctrine as “institutionalised beliefs about what works in war and military 
operations.”  See Høiback, 2016, p. 187.  See also, Harald Høiback, “What Is Doctrine?” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 34, no. 6 (2011): 879–900; Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach 
(London: Routledge, 2013). 
       48 Note that my definition of doctrine differs from the colloquial use of the term outside of military circles. 
Military doctrine is distinct from grand strategic doctrine (i.e. the Nixon doctrine).   
 40 
suggesting that doctrine is divorced from strategy.  Rather, doctrine describes the employment of 
military means to achieve strategic objectives.   
1.2. Why do Military Organizations Innovate Doctrinally? 
 In this section, I draw from the literature on organizations (theory and innovation), military 
innovation, and bureaucratic politics to assess theories of doctrinal change.  First, I briefly 
categorize the literature on military doctrine to clarify the general area where I seek to make a 
contribution.  Second, I draw from the literature on organizations to derive a general definition of 
innovation.  I briefly explain why organizational theory predicts that military organizations should 
be highly resistant to change.  Third, I use that general definition to articulate a definition of 
military innovation.  Here I discuss the element of that definition - doctrinal change - that I focus 
on throughout this study.  Fourth, I review existing theories on innovation that purport to explain 
why military organizations innovate doctrinally.  
1.2.1. Categorizing the Literature on Military Doctrine 
 Existing literature on military doctrine can be separated into four categories.  In the first 
category, scholars focus on the effect of military doctrine on a state’s foreign policy, performance 
during war, and/or outcomes in war.49  While not the central focus of this study, in my analysis of 
the sources of doctrine, discussing the effect of doctrine is inevitable.   
                                                           
49 See, e.g., Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004); Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); 
Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds), The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven A. Miller (eds), Do Democracies Win 
Their Wars? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, 
NJ; Princeton University Press, 2002); James S. Corum, Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military 
Reform (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992).  While some of these scholars don’t mention military 
doctrine per se, they all focus on the effect of how a military fights on a state’s foreign policy, performance during 
war, and/or war outcomes. 
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 Second, scholars study the process of doctrine formulation, adoption, and implementation.  
Political science literature in this area is scant.50  Though the process of doctrine formulation 
doesn’t necessarily explain the causes of a particular doctrine, it can provide insight on dynamics 
that affect doctrinal change.  For example, Jensen argues that military innovation comes from 
incubators - “new forums or subunits free from the normal push and pull of the bureaucratic 
hierarchy” - and advocacy networks - “loose coalitions of defense and civilian officials 
championing new reform initiatives.”51  While the existence of incubators and advocacy networks 
doesn’t necessarily explain why a military innovation occurs, they do help explain how it occurs.  
Understanding the latter can help shed light on the former.  
 Third, scholars focus on the ability of military organizations engaged in war to adapt 
existing technologies, techniques, and/or tactics to improve their performance.52  These scholars 
usually take a bottom-up approach to military change, focusing on instances in which soldiers at 
the small-unit level adapted in combat.  I do not focus on bottom-up innovation (now referred to 
as adaptation in war) in this study.   
                                                           
50 Exceptions include: Michael J. Meese, “Institutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process of Organizational 
Change,” in Richard D. Hooker, ed., Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), pp. 
193–216; Jensen, 2016; Jan Angstrom and J.J. Widen, “Religion or Reason? Exploring Alternative Ways to Measure 
the Quality of Doctrine,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 (2016): 198–212; Rosen, 1991.  I contend that 
Rosen, 1991, is a theory that explains how militaries innovate rather than why militaries innovate. 
51 Jensen, 2016, p. 17 and p. 19, respectively. 
52 See, e.g., Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan, 2006–2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 567–94; Adam Grissom, “The Future of 
Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 905–34; Ben Barry, “Adapting in War,” 
Survival 54, no. 6 (2012): 171–82; Kristen A. Harkness and Michael Hunzeker, “Military Maladaptation: 
Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 6 (2015): 777–800; Nina A. 
Kollars, “War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 4 
(2015): 529–53; Nina A. Kollars, Richard R. Muller, and Andrew Santora, “Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: 
Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in VIII Fighter Command 1943–1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 
August (2016): 1–24; Torunn Laugen Haaland, “The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up 
Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 7 
(2016); John B. Richardson, “Real Leadership and the US Army: Overcoming a Failure of Imagination to Conduct 
Adaptive Work,” The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011; Philipp Rotmann, 
David Tohn, and Jaron Wharton, “Learning Under Fire: Progress and Dissent in the US Military,” Survival 51, no. 4 
(2009): 31–48; Max Visser, “Organizational Learning Capability and Battlefield Performance: The British Army in 
World War II,” International Journal of Organizational Analysis 24, no. 4 (August 31, 2016): 573–90. 
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 Finally, scholars seek to understand why a state adopted a particular military doctrine - or 
more simply the sources of a new military doctrine.  The most common approach is to study the 
contents of a specific military doctrine to determine the causes that led to its adoption.53  This is 
where we find the most significant unresolved debate in the literature: is military doctrine the result 
of rational calculations of the threat, the internal priorities and interests of the military organization, 
or the influence of ideas, identities, and culture?  This study aligns best with this category and I 
seek to help resolve this debate.   
1.2.2. What is Innovation?   
 In the fields of political science and organizational theory, definitions of innovation are 
wide-ranging and often disputed.54  The concept is nebulous and attempts to define it are fraught 
with difficulties.  A lengthy exposition on the definition of innovation is outside the scope of this 
study.  Instead, I adopt James Q. Wilson’s well-respected definition:  “innovation is not any new 
program or technology, but only those that involve the performance of new tasks or a significant 
alteration in the way in which the tasks are performed.”55  Small changes which only affect 
peripheral tasks (rather than core tasks) are not innovations.56  While criteria can be developed to 
                                                           
53 See, e.g., Posen, 1984; Rosen, 1991; Zisk, 1993; Kier, 1997; Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military 
Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow. Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); Avant, 1994; Andrew J. Bacevich, The 
Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986); 
Bickel, 2001; Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Mary R. Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor 
Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Robert M. 
Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920 –1939 (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999); Alistair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
54 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989), p. xix.  Wilson notes that scholars have still not developed a comprehensive theory of bureaucratic 
and organizational behavior.  Most existing theories explain elements of bureaucracy but not bureaucratic behavior 
itself.  This continues to be the case in the bureaucratic and organizational literature. 
55 Ibid., p. 222. 
56 Wilson, 1989, p. 225, argues that JFK’s emphasis on counterinsurgency led the U.S. Army to give the 
mission to its Special Forces.  These forces were “treated as a peripheral (and trivial) activity in the army as a 
whole.”  Hence, according to Wilson’s definition, the Army did not innovate here. 
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classify an innovation as fundamental, Wilson points out that there is always a degree of 
subjectivity in the endeavor.  According to Wilson, innovation is a fundamental change to an 
organization’s task structure (the grand sum of all its tasks) and its incentive system (the grand sum 
of all the rewards given to its members).57  The literature on innovation posits a diverse array of 
characteristics of innovation - elements such as cost, compatibility, and effectiveness - but it is 
beyond the scope of this study to elaborate on these attributes.58   
 Military organizations are usually large.  Large organizations that are subdivided into 
numerous branches and offices and responsible for a vast array of tasks are expected to experience 
a high probability of proposed innovations, but a low probability of adopted innovations.59  When 
military organizations do change, the adaptations are most often made during the course of war 
under conditions of extreme duress.60  The organizational literature suggests that when 
organizations are distressed, the probability for innovation increases.61  When distressed, the 
incentives for accurate problem identification increase and the organization directs more of its 
energy towards problem solving.  Military organizations may experience distress during combat if 
they suffer heavy casualties or fail to complete their assigned mission(s).  Distress in peacetime 
                                                           
57 James Q. Wilson, “Innovation in Organization: Notes Towards a Theory,” in J. O. Thompson, ed., 
Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 198-199. Wilson 
also uncovers an element of innovation that many scholars who focus on military innovation ignore - for a change to 
be an innovation, it must incur a cost on the organization. 
58 For a comprehensive list of characteristics of innovation, see Kevin P. Kearns, “Innovations in Local 
Government: A Sociocognitive Network Approach,” Knowledge and Policy 5, no. 2 (1992): 45-67.  See also Liam 
S. Collins, Military Innovation in War: The Criticality of the Senior Military Leaders (Ph.D. diss. Princeton 
University, 2014), pp. 24-27. 
59 Wilson, 1971, p. 201.  Large organizations are diverse - they have a complex task structure and incentive 
system which makes it more difficult for executives to exercise influence over the organization’s members, thereby 
reducing the probability that innovations will be adopted. 
60 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 9. 
61 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Knight, “A Descriptive Model of the Intra-Firm Innovation Process,” The Journal of 
Business 40, no. 4 (Oct 1967): 484-485; Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
(Cambridge: Blackwell Business, 1992), p. 188; Michael L. Tushman and Charles A. O'Reilly III, Winning Through 
Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading Organizational Change and Renewal (Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 2002), pp. 221-222. 
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might be a function of budget reductions, loss of preferred mission set to another service, 
competition between actors within an organization for resources or preferential treatment, and/or 
increased stress caused by the adoption of new technologies.   
 Collins distinguishes distress (the perception that an organization is falling short of its 
mission) from failure (organizational extinction due to the nonperformance of a mission).62   When 
a military fails in war, its survival might be in jeopardy.  Though Posen argues that this can lead to 
innovation,63 defeat does not appear to be a necessary condition because there are numerous 
examples of military innovation after operational success.64   The prevailing logic suggests that 
military organizational change during peacetime is anomalous and only occurs when civilian 
officials intervene and compel change.65 
 Organizations will embrace changes most readily when those changes are aligned with 
existing methods and techniques used by the organization to complete its mission.  Organizations 
are biased towards existing ways of doing business - what Wilson calls “task definitions.”66  
Innovations that require fundamental shifts in task definitions should be bitterly opposed by 
members of the organization.67   
1.2.3. What is Military Innovation? 
 We can use Wilson’s definition of innovation to develop a general definition of military 
innovation.  Military innovation occurs when a military organization develops a new program or 
                                                           
62 Collins, 2014, p. 34. 
63 Posen, 1984, pp. 57-59. 
64 For examples, see Rosen, 1991. 
65 Posen, 1984. 
66 Wilson, 1989, p. 222. 
67 For example, in the U.S. Army of the 1930s, advocates of the tank argued for a separate tank corps for years 
but the infantry pushed back, arguing that tanks were merely infantry support weapons whose mission was to “assist 
in the progression of infantry by overcoming or neutralizing resistances or breaking down obstacles that check the 
infantry advance.” See Field Service Regulations (United States Army, Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1923), p. 13. 
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technology that requires the performance of new tasks or a fundamental change to the way existing 
tasks are performed.  Rosen defines military innovation as “a change in one of the primary combat 
arms of a service in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat unit.”68  
Rosen’s definition accords with Wilson’s and is useful because it recognizes that militaries are 
heterogeneous collections of services.  At its core, a military’s central task is to fight and win in 
war.  For a new program or technology to be an innovation, it must alter how the organization 
fights or intends to fight.  Therefore, military innovations are fundamental changes to doctrine, 
tactics, and/or organizational structure.   Though a major technological change is often considered 
an innovation, I argue that it is not unless the technology in question fundamentally changes the 
military’s tactics, doctrine, and/or organizational structure.  As Wilson points out, when an 
organization willingly incorporates a new technology into existing task definitions, this is not an 
innovation.69 
 In this study, I am primarily interested in military innovations that take the form of major 
doctrinal changes.  I do not ignore technological change, but I focus on it only to the extent that it 
is a variable that causes (or correlates with) doctrinal change.  I am not focused on organizational 
structural change70 per se, but I am interested in whether or not doctrinal change is an effect of 
organizational change or a driver of organizational change.  A major change to the organization’s 
structure - the hierarchical arrangement of personnel in the organization that determines how 
authority, roles, and responsibilities are assigned, controlled, and coordinated - is an innovation if 
the reorganization alters how the organization fights.   
                                                           
68 Rosen, 1991, p. 7. 
69 Wilson, 1989, p. 222.  Wilson notes, “Armies did not resist substituting trucks for horse-drawn carts.”  He 
also notes that the “bias toward maintaining existing task definitions often leads bureaucracies to adopt new 
technologies without understanding their significance.” 
70 An expansion or contraction in the organization’s size is not an innovation unless it changes the 
organization’s methods of fighting in war. 
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 A doctrinal change is an innovation if it redefines the organization’s method(s) of fighting 
in war.  I concur with Zisk who defines doctrinal innovation “as a major change in how military 
planners conceptualize and prepare for future war…a reconceptualization of what sorts of military 
tasks need to be performed in wartime, or major alterations in how existing tasks are performed.”71  
Alterations to a military’s formal doctrine - its officially sanctioned manuals - are not innovations 
if the organization itself does not change in the way the new doctrine specifies.72  Military 
organizations might have an incentive to exaggerate the magnitude of a doctrinal change in order 
to demonstrate the organization’s continued relevance or to signal that the organization is aligned 
with a new national strategy.     
1.2.4. Why do Military Organizations Innovate Doctrinally?   
 In the literature on military innovation, there are a wide array of theories that purport to 
explain why militaries innovate.  Much of this scholarship is work by military historians who focus 
on major changes to the nature of warfare which are referred to as revolutions in military affairs 
(RMA).  The RMA literature focuses on fundamental shifts in the nature and conduct of war and 
is usually centered on major technological innovation, the mechanization of war, and, recently, the 
effect of information technology on war.73  In recent years, some scholars have focused on military 
transformation efforts in the U.S. military since the end of the Cold War - many of which are rooted 
in technological change.74  Though I am interested in the potential for new technologies to 
                                                           
71 Zisk, 1993, p. 4.  Similarly, Jensen, 2016, pp. 9-10, defines doctrinal change “as a formal shift in how 
military professionals articulate the critical tasks required to achieve the ends of national strategy.” 
72 Rosen, 1991, p. 8, notes, “Changes in the formal doctrine of the military organization that leave the essential 
workings of that organization unaltered do not count as innovation…” 
73 See, e.g., Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History 
(London: Frank Case, 2002); Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500-
Today (New York: Penguin, 2006); Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of 
Military Revolution, 1300-2050, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Farrell and Terriff, 2002.  
For a more expansive list, see Jensen, 2016, p. 159. 
74 See, e.g., Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, and Brendan R. Green, eds., US Military 
Transformation and Innovation since the Cold War: Creation Without Destruction (London: Taylor & Francis, 
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influence how a military fights - its doctrine - the RMA literature is limited in its utility for my 
purposes because it is primarily descriptive and focused on understanding major shifts in warfare 
across more than one state over time.   
 The political science literature posits a number of theories - most tested on non-U.S. cases 
during the interwar period - that seek to explain military innovation.  Military innovation is often 
undefined, but most scholars focus on technological change and/or doctrinal change.  Very few 
scholars examine organizational structural change.75  Scholarship that focuses on doctrinal change 
often suffers from one or more of the definitional challenges with respect to doctrine that I 
discussed in the first half of this literature review.  Using an unclear, unspecified, or problematic 
definition of doctrine reduces the credibility of causal claims that purport to explain doctrinal 
innovation.  Finally, some scholars fail to recognize that doctrinal innovation during war might 
differ fundamentally from innovation during periods of peace.   
 I argue that the most significant limitation in existing scholarship on military innovation is 
the tendency to pursue a monocausal explanation for innovation.  In 1971, Downs and Mohr wrote, 
“Factors found to be important for innovation in one study are found to be considerably less 
important, not important at all, or even inversely important in another study.”76  Unfortunately, this 
statement applies to the current state of research on military doctrinal innovation.   
                                                           
2009); Dima Adamsky and Kjell I. Bjerga, eds. Contemporary Military Innovation: Between Anticipation and 
Adaptation (London: Routledge, 2012).  Sapolsky et al., 2009, p. 5, define the RMA as “the set of technologies that 
enhances the ability of a military to locate a relatively greater set of targets and destroy them with precision.” 
75 Sheehan, 1988, is an exception.  The author examines the pentomic division construct of the U.S. Army in the 
1950s.  The author treats this as evidence of doctrinal change but I argue that it is evidence of doctrinal and 
organizational change. 
76 George W. Downs, Jr. and Lawrence B. Mohr, “Conceptual Issues in the Study of Innovation,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no. 4. (Dec., 1976): 700.  The authors note, “Of 38 propositions bearing 
directly on the act of innovation cited by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971: 350-376), 34 were supported in some 
studies and found to receive no support in others.”  See, Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, 
Communication of Innovation: A Cross-Cultural Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1971).  This quote is also 
cited in Collins, 2014, p. 23. 
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 The search for a monocausal explanation for innovation has led scholars to focus on unique 
instances of military innovation that enable the isolation of one factor to allow for the confirmation 
of a causal claim.  This approach is problematic if the independent variable in question interacts 
with another variable to produce the outcome.  The lack of consensus on the factor(s) that cause 
innovation is evident in Grissom’s literature review on the subject.  He identifies four different 
theories of military innovation: civil-military relations, interservice politics, intraservice politics, 
and organizational culture.77  Sapolsky, Green, and Friedman narrow these down to three standard 
political science theories on military innovation: civilian intervention, competition between rivals 
within a military organization (intraservice politics), and rivalry between military services 
subordinate to the same state (interservice politics).78  In his thorough assessment of military 
innovation, Collins adds two additional sets of theories that explain innovation: the principal-agent 
model and the bottom-up explanation.79 
 Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more of the above 
theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I argue 
that it is more fruitful to consider military innovation from multiple perspectives.80  I seek to 
                                                           
77 Grissom, 2006, p. 908. 
78 Sapolsky et al., 2009, p. 7. 
79 Collins, 2014, p. 47.  The first scholar to propose a bottom-up analysis of innovation was Eliot A. Cohen, 
“Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004): 395-407.  Grissom, 
2006, reinforced the need for this approach.  The first bottom-up theory was developed by Theo Farrell, “Improving 
in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 567–94.  In recent years, most scholarship on military innovation has focused on bottom-up 
adaptation. 
80 Andrew M. Moravcsik, “Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement,” International 
Organization 43 (Winter 1989): 173-205.  In his analysis of international cooperation, Moravcsik discusses the 
advantages of using more than one theory to explain an outcome.  See also, John Duffield, Power Rules: The 
Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) and Terriff, “U.S. 
Ideas and Military Change in NATO, 1989-1994,” in Ferrell and Terriff, 2002, pp. 91-116.  Duffield and Terriff 
employ a levels-of-analysis approach to understand the evolution of NATO’s force posture. 
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develop and test a theory that synthesizes more than one approach.81  I will do so from the 
perspective of a levels-of-analysis approach.82  Rather than viewing the levels as competing 
explanations for doctrinal innovation, I contend that they can be complementary.  I maintain that 
a levels-of-analysis approach is necessary to provide a satisfactory explanation for military 
doctrinal change.   
 Below I divide the literature on military innovation into three perspectives: the balance of 
power approach, the organizational approach, and the interservice approach.83  These perspectives 
may also be viewed as different levels-of-analysis in the quest to understand military innovation.  
The balance of power approach operates at the systemic level; the organizational approach operates 
at the military organization; and the interservice approach shifts the analyst’s focus to interaction 
between services within the military organization.  The balance of power approach is useful 
because it sheds light on why a military innovates doctrinally.  The organizational approach 
illuminates the answer to a slightly different question: given the decision to innovate doctrinally, 
what explains the nature of the doctrinal changes that were adopted (the why and the how)?  The 
interservice approach can provide insight on both sets of questions.84   
 
                                                           
81 For an example of a scholar who attempts to synthesize two approaches - neorealism and culturalism - into a 
theory that explains military change, see Terriff, 2002, pp. 91-116.  As summarized by Terriff and Ferrell (p. 273), 
“neorealism provides the trigger for NATO change, while culturalism explains the character of NATO change.” 
82 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959); J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14, no. 1 
(October 1961): 77-92; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010). For Levy and Thompson, each of the levels (individual – state – system) is treated as an 
explanatory/independent/causal variable that explains the outcomes of peace or war.  The levels are “sources of 
causation.”  I view the levels-of-analysis for military innovation in a similar way. 
83 These approaches can also be thought of as levels of analysis.  The balance of power perspective treats the 
military organization as a unitary actor; this is the international level of analysis.  The organizational perspective 
views a military organization as a bureaucracy with diverse interests.  The interservice bargaining perspective 
focuses on competition between services subordinate to the same state. 
84 I credit Terriff, 2002, p. 91, for helping me realize that the question of why a state changes its doctrine can be 
viewed in two parts: (1) why innovate? and (2) why innovate in the manner chosen? 
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The Balance of Power Approach  
 The foundation of the balance of power approach is neorealism.  States operate in an 
anarchic system that requires them to maximize their relative power to ensure survival.  According 
to this approach, military doctrine is a function of the international system.  States change their 
military doctrine in response to changes in the distribution of power in the system and due to other 
environmental factors such as the development of new technology.  When a state perceives changes 
to the nature of the enemy threat or the balance of military capabilities it will innovate militarily.85  
According to Terriff and Farrell, “Neorealism predicts that the need to survive in the competitive 
international environment will force states to organize for war as efficiently as possible. Military 
change is a rational response to changing strategic circumstances; states adopt new military 
practices, and emulate best military practice, in order to keep up with the competition.”86   
 The balance of power approach suggests that innovation is a function of the following 
variables: military technology, the geography of expected future battlefields, changes in the enemy 
threat, and shifts in the balance of power.  Theorists who subscribe to this approach focus on how 
these variables lead to civilian intervention to compel military change.87  I argue that balance of 
power variables can cause doctrinal innovation without civilian intervention; intervention is not a 
necessary condition for change.  
                                                           
85 Terriff, 2002, p. 92.  Terriff provides a nice explanation of the balance-of-power approach that he employed 
in his study of military change in NATO. 
86 Terry Terriff and Theo Farrell, “Military Change in the New Millennium,” in Farrell and Terriff, 2002, p. 
271. These ideas are drawn from Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1979), p. 127 and Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International 
Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 82. 
87 Posen, 1984, is the most common.  Posen (p. 239) compared a balance of power approach with an 
organizational approach and concluded that the latter was a “slightly more powerful tool” for understanding 
doctrinal change.  I argue that the two do not need to be mutually exclusive. 
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 The seminal work that best defines the balance of power perspective of military innovation 
is that of Barry Posen written in 1984.88  Posen contends that strategic considerations lead to 
civilian intervention to compel military change.89  These considerations include changes in the 
enemy threat, a shift in the balance of power in the international system, a major technological 
development, and/or an increase in the prospects for military defeat.  Given the natural inclination 
of large organizations (and, especially large bureaucratic organizations like the military) to avoid 
and resist change, civilian intervention is necessary to force doctrinal change.90  During conditions 
of high threat to the state, Posen’s theory expects that civilians will intervene to cause doctrinal 
change.  During periods of low threat, military organizations are free to develop their own 
doctrines autonomously.  During crises, civilian elites are most effective at forcing doctrinal 
change based on realpolitik considerations which supersede a military’s own organizational 
interests (and its general tendency to avoid change in order to reduce uncertainty).  Uncertainty 
avoidance is the primary rationale behind a military organization’s unwillingness to innovate since 
innovations are inherently risky.    
 Posen tests and confirms his theory by examining doctrinal change during the interwar 
period in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.  According to Posen, German blitzkrieg 
(lightning war) and the British air defense system were two doctrinal developments that occurred 
after the international system changed and civilians intervened.  These cases are contrasted with 
the failed French Maginot Line defensive doctrine which was a method of fighting that the French 
military pursued in the absence of civilian intervention.  In order for civilian intervention in 
                                                           
88 Posen, 1984. 
89 This applies only to states that have a military that is subordinate to civilian political leaders.  Some scholars 
refer to this school of thought on military innovation as the “civil-military model.”  See Grissom, 2006, p. 908; 
Collins, 2014, p. 47. 
90 In addition to Posen, 1984, pp. 54-59, also see Kurt Lang, "Military Organizations," in James G. March, ed., 
Handbook on Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 856-885. 
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military doctrinal processes to succeed, the civilians must intervene with the assistance of a 
“military maverick” who has the necessary military expertise to shepherd the doctrinal change.91  
The author does not provide much insight on the interests, incentives, or capabilities of these 
mavericks, other than to suggest that mavericks are willing to dissent from their peers to align with 
civilian interests because they have independent, military judgment.   
 Posen’s theory doesn’t explain why a military organization would innovate doctrinally 
during periods of peace.  If military organizations seek to minimize uncertainty, there is little 
incentive for them to initiate doctrinal change in the absence of a conflict (and thereby the absence 
of civilian intervention).  Furthermore, during periods of peace, decreasing military budgets will 
restrict a military’s ability to conduct the training and war games necessary to vet new ideas.92  So, 
even if a military organization wanted to innovate doctrinally during a period of peace it should 
have trouble doing so “without support and patronage from civilian political leadership.”93    
 Posen’s theory is compelling but it fails to explain why some military organizations change 
their doctrine quite frequently without civilian intervention.  Given the instances of military 
doctrinal change in the U.S. military over the course of its history, often during periods of peace, 
one cannot argue that civilian intervention is a necessary condition for doctrinal change.  Though 
its parsimony is commendable, Posen’s theory suffers from a lack of attention to the potential role 
that rivalries within a military organization or between military services might have on doctrinal 
change.  The mechanisms of change as they relate to the role of the military maverick are not 
clearly specified.  What is a military maverick and how is he/she protected by civilians once he/she 
pursues ends that are at odds with the military’s preferences?  Also, some scholars, such as Meese, 
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argue that civilian leaders are more capable of stopping a military innovation than they are at 
starting one.94 
 In her book on military doctrine in the Soviet Union during the post-Stalin period, Zisk 
acknowledges the potential for military doctrinal innovation in the absence of civilian intervention 
but this is only the case when “military officers notice that a change in their adversary’s doctrine 
for future war has potential significant ramifications for the conduct of that war…”95  Zisk calls 
this type of military doctrinal change reactive change because the new doctrine is the result of one 
military organization reacting to the innovations of another.96  Zisk’s argument aligns with the 
balance of power approach because it suggests that military doctrinal shifts are a result of increases 
in the relative power of an adversary. 
 Zisk recognizes that there are varying degrees in the propensity of military leaders to 
propose or accept doctrinal innovations.  With the case of the Soviet response to the NATO strategy 
of Flexible Response, Zisk demonstrates that civilian intervention is not a necessary condition for 
military doctrinal change.  When civilian leaders do intervene, Zisk argues that the nature of that 
intervention can range from hostile to conciliatory.  Civilian intervention is most effective when 
civilians build coalitions with military officers to shepherd their preferred change.  The evidence 
that Zisk presents suggests that coalition building between military and civilian leaders played an 
important role in the Soviet’s response to the Schlesinger Doctrine,97 Flexible Response,98 and the 
NATO Follow-on Forces Attack.99 
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 Zisk’s work is notable because it is the first to examine how the international environment 
and military organizational interests combine to lead to change.  Zisk synthesizes both elements to 
articulate a comprehensive theory of innovation.  Unfortunately, her imprecise characterization of 
doctrine limits her theory’s utility in explaining military doctrinal change.  Zisk provides helpful 
nuance to arguments on civilian intervention but, as discussed in the previous section on defining 
doctrine, it is not clear that the outcome that she observes is military doctrine.  Zisk sees doctrine 
in “war plans and preparations of military commanders” and she conflates policies and strategies 
with doctrine.  In my view, Zisk provides compelling analysis that when an adversary adopts a 
new strategy or changes its strategic aims, a state will change its own strategic doctrine. 
 Avant compares the U.S. Army’s inability to adapt to counterinsurgency warfare in 
Vietnam with successful British adaptability in the Boer War and concludes that the nature of the 
civil-military relationship affects whether or not military organizations innovate.100  The structure 
of civilian institutions affects the principal-agent problem; institutional divisions among civilian 
leaders reduces the ability of senior civilians to monitor (and intervene in) military 
organizations.101  Civilian leaders in the United States had less control over the behavior of Army 
officers, based mainly on the fact that the President served as the commander in chief but the 
Congress controlled the Army’s budget, and so attempts by President John F. Kennedy to 
micromanage the Army were ineffective.  The British institutional structure enabled more effective 
civilian intervention.  In the case of the Boer War, Avant argues that British military adaptation 
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came from the initiative of military leaders because civilian leaders previously rewarded military 
personnel who responded effectively to new enemy threats.102   
 Avant’s work is relevant because it illustrates the effect of different institutional structures 
on innovation and because it reinforces the argument that civilian intervention is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for military innovation.103  Though Avant’s institutional approach to military 
innovation doesn’t fit neatly into the balance of power paradigm, I include it here because 
innovation in her theory is still a function of civilian intervention that occurs as a result of shifts 
in the international system.  Avant’s theory is one of wartime innovation, not peacetime innovation.   
 If civilian intervention to force doctrinal change does occur, the organizational literature 
on innovation suggests that the civilian proponent of the change will fail to fully appreciate the 
costs that would be incurred by the military if it adopted the innovation.  According to Wilson, “To 
the proponent the prospective benefits are…direct and easily conceived; the costs are remote, 
something ‘the organization’ will deal with.”104  Military personnel will experience the costs of 
change directly, and if there are perceived benefits, those benefits will be less tangible and remote.  
Civilian interveners will tend to underestimate organizational resistance to change.  Only the head 
of the military organization has the ability to correctly perceive the costs and benefits of the 
innovation.105  This suggests that civilian interveners can increase the chances of military 
organizational change by allying with military leaders.  Those military leaders can then ensure that 
the benefits of the change are well-articulated to members of the organization. 
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 Theories that employ a balance of power approach are valuable because they explain how 
innovation occurs despite the organizational rigidity predicted by organizational and bureaucratic 
theorists.  Civilian leaders respond to balance-of-power shifts which “trigger a rational updating 
of strategies in conformance with realpolitik.”106  Civilian intervention in military operations is the 
result.  Intervention can be hostile or conciliatory.  Intervention is influenced by the nature of 
previous civil-military interactions, and the effectiveness of intervention is a function of the state’s 
institutional structure.   
 However, the balance of power approach suffers from a number of weaknesses.  First, it is 
not clear that the innovations that are studied are doctrinal.  Imprecise definitions of military 
doctrine - the stated outcome of interest - weaken theories that purport to explain doctrinal change.  
Not a single author explored the formal doctrines of the militaries that they studied.  Second, heavy 
interest in the interwar period leads one to wonder if there is something unique about that particular 
period of time.  The value of studying states during the interwar period is that it affords the 
researcher the ability to assess the effectiveness of a particular doctrine that was developed in peace 
and employed in the second world war.  Now that we are over seventy years removed from the 
war, we can see that the period between the two most catastrophic wars in history might not be the 
most appropriate for understanding the sources of military doctrine during peace.  Sapolsky et al. 
make the cogent point that military innovation during the interwar period was so pronounced 
because “World War II was essentially a continuation of World War I.”107  Militaries experimented 
with technologies, organizational structures, and tactics during the first war, and then used the 
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interwar period to turn the results of those experiments into true innovations.108  The interwar 
period is one of the most innovative periods in history. 
 Third, and most problematic, this theoretical approach fails to adequately explain the 
numerous instances of doctrinal change in the U.S. military (and its services) throughout the 
twentieth century.  Civilian intervention to compel doctrinal innovation is the exception not the 
norm.  Besides Avant’s examination of the case of counterinsurgency, none of the scholars who 
subscribe to this approach have tested their theory on any U.S. cases.  Given the historical emphasis 
on civilian supremacy over the military in the United States, one would think that the U.S. would 
be an easy test of theories that predict civilian intervention as a consequence of change in the 
international system.  However, in the last one-hundred years, the four most significant civilian 
interventions into the U.S. military were the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920, the National 
Security Act of 1947, President Kennedy’s directives on counterinsurgency, and the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1985.109  Three out of four of these interventions changed the organizational 
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structure (not the doctrine) of the force.110  President Kennedy’s intervention to compel doctrinal 
change in the 1960s (which failed) is an anomaly.111   
 Finally, it is not clear why military organizations wouldn’t initiate the processes of 
innovation in anticipation of civilian intervention.  If military leaders sense an impending shift in 
the balance of power in the international system, why wouldn’t they initiate doctrinal change ahead 
of civilian intervention in order to maintain their first-mover advantage in shaping that change?  In 
his most recent work, Posen recognizes that militaries can use doctrine to “manage the risk of 
direct civilian intervention into military affairs.”112  They do this by “develop[ing] doctrine that is 
responsive to what appears to be the foreign policy preferences of civilians…”113  In other words, 
by anticipating the foreign policy preferences of civilians, militaries can modify their doctrine to 
show civilian leaders that they are operating in accordance with civilian desires.  This anticipation 
effect is rarely examined in the literature on doctrinal change.114    
 At its core, the balance of power approach to military innovation hypothesizes: changes in 
the balance of power in the international system lead military organizations to innovate.  The 
mechanisms through which this occurs can be summarized as follows.  A balance of power shift 
in the international system affects a state’s relative power.  If the shift causes a reduction in relative 
                                                           
110 It is perhaps unsurprising that we see civilian intervention in organizational structure but not in doctrinal 
change.  U.S. military organizations require funding and that funding comes through budget appropriations 
authorized by the U.S. Congress.  These appropriations indirectly affect military doctrine by affecting the equipment 
that military organizations can buy and the technologies they can afford.  However, in the case of the U.S. Army, the 
organization’s most expensive facet is personnel.  The most direct effect that civilians in Congress and the Executive 
branch can have on the Army is through organizational structure.  As was the case with the NDA when the decision 
to change the structure of the Army had major implications for national military policy, changes to organizational 
structure can have more profound effects on military organizations than changes to doctrine 
111 There are other minor instances of civilian intervention to compel doctrinal change in the case of Secretary 
of Defense McNamara and the Army’s new doctrine on airmobile operations. Another potential example of 
intervention occurs during the more recent Rumsfeld era. 
112 Posen, 2016, p. 168. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Jensen, 2016, p. 15, acknowledges it but he sees doctrinal change as “a function of anticipation” not of 
impending civilian intervention but of “new ways of war.” 
 59 
power and an increase in the perceived threat to the state, civilian political leaders will intervene 
in military operations to compel doctrinal change.115  This intervention is necessary because 
military organizations avoid change to minimize uncertainty.  When civilians intervene, they need 
to do so with the assistance of a military leader who is empowered to counter the military 
organization’s preference for no change. 
The Organizational Approach  
 Whereas the balance of power approach pays little attention to the influence of factors 
internal to military organizations, the organizational perspective draws heavily from the literature 
on bureaucratic politics and organizational theory to understand military innovation.  I argue that 
the balance of power perspective helps explain why a military organization innovates; the 
organizational approach helps us understand how the actual innovation occurs (and why 
alternatives are dismissed).  It is for this reason that I view the organizational approach not as a 
competing explanation for military innovation but as a different level of analysis through which 
we can understand innovation.  This view is at odds with the consensus in the field of military 
innovation studies which misreads Rosen’s seminal work and characterizes it as a direct rebuttal 
of Posen.116   
 Under the organizational approach, military innovation is a function of the varied interests 
of the organization itself.  The organizational behavior model explains how certain characteristics 
of organizations play an important role in explaining and predicting behavior.117  While the balance 
                                                           
115 If the shift causes an increase in relative power and a decrease in the perceived threat to the state - as was the 
case for the U.S. at the end of the Cold War - civilian intervention to compel doctrinal innovation is unlikely 
because such innovation is thought to be unnecessary.  However, civilians might intervene to reduce military 
budgets if the perceived threat to the state continues to diminish. 
116 Posen did not dismiss organizational theory outright; he acknowledged that the balance of power approach 
provided only a slightly better explanation for innovation.  Similarly, Rosen acknowledged that shifts in the 
international security environment caused the peacetime innovations he studied. 
117 See, e.g., Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, 
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974). 
 60 
of power approach treats the military as a unitary actor, the organizational approach recognizes 
that militaries consist of numerous agencies with varied interests.  Competition between rivals 
within the organization can affect the organization’s behavior.  Military offices “will seek to adopt 
structures and strategies that promise to confer prestige, increased resources, and secure 
autonomy.”118  Bureaucratic bargains and routines can affect the nature of military innovation.119  
The two primary sub-categories that align with the organizational perspective are intraservice 
politics and organizational culture.   
 The effect of intraservice politics on innovation is most associated with Rosen who argues 
that military innovation occurs when advocates for change compete with rivals in the 
organization.120  Just as in politics, doctrine is a result of a competition between “who gets what, 
when, and how.”121  Competition for limited resources amongst military organizations that are 
subordinate to the same state is similar to competition between offices within a branch of 
government.  The intraservice politics approach draws heavily from Allison’s bureaucratic politics 
model in which there is “no unitary actor but rather many actors as players, who focus not on a 
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single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems…making government decisions 
not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.”122   
 Examining twenty-one military innovations in peace and in war, Rosen argues that 
innovation is the product of a process in which senior military leaders develop a new theory of 
victory123 in war and they use mid-level officers in the organization to institute innovations that 
support that theory.124  Rosen sees the struggle between military officers to determine a theory of 
victory as an ideological one.  Like all political communities, the military must have a source of 
power.  Rosen argues that the source of power is control over who gets promoted.125  According to 
Rosen, “The organizational struggle that leads to innovation may thus require the creation of a new 
promotion pathway to the senior ranks, so that young officers learning and practicing the new way 
of war can rise to the top, as part of a generational change.”126   
 Military leaders who favor change use their rank to assert influence over the organization 
and to pursue their preferred innovations.  These leaders use promotion opportunities to entice 
mid-level officers to support their innovations.  In contrast with Posen, Rosen sees little role for 
civilians who are outsiders to the military community and don’t have the ability to make military 
mavericks who favor innovation legitimate in the eyes of their peers.   
 Rosen’s work on innovation is viewed as a counter to Posen on two accounts.  First, Rosen 
presents a credible alternative to the civilian-intervention requirement that we see in Posen’s 
                                                           
122 Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review 
63, no. 3 (September 1969): 707.  Allison’s model also applies to interservice rivalry. 
123 Rosen, 1991, p. 20, defines theory of victory as “an explanation of what the next war will look like and how 
officers must fight if it is to be won.” 
124 See also Suzanne C. Nielsen, Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform (Ph.D. diss. 
Harvard University, 2003).  Nielsen expands the focus to military reform - changes to doctrine, training, policies, 
organizations, equipment, and leader development programs.  Nielsen agrees with Rosen that external developments 
have an indeterminate effect on military change.  She focuses her analysis on how reform in military organizations 
occurs. 
125 Rosen, 1991, p. 20. 
126 Ibid., p. 20. 
 62 
theory.  Civilians are only effective when they intervene to promote a strategy that is already 
favored by senior military officers.  Second, Rosen’s theory accounts for the diversity of interests 
within military organizations rather than treating those organizations as though they are 
monolithic.  Variance in organizational self-interests leads to the ideological struggle over theories 
of victory which can provide an impetus for innovation.  These elements - innovation in the 
absence of civilian intervention and the role of intraservice rivalries - are Rosen’s most significant 
contributions to the literature on military innovation. 
 Rosen’s work suffers from a number of limitations.  First, in order for innovation to occur 
under Rosen, the military service must develop a new theory of victory, create a new combat arm, 
and amend existing promotion pathways to incentivize service in the new arm.  Two of the three 
peacetime innovations that he studies - the Navy’s transition from the battle fleet to the carrier task 
force and the Marines transition from small wars to amphibious assault - took over two decades 
from origination to implementation.127  The high bar that Rosen sets for a change to be classified 
as an innovation eliminates doctrinal changes from consideration unless those changes involve the 
creation of a new branch within the service.  I argue that a military service can innovate doctrinally, 
fundamentally changing how it fights, without creating a new combat arm or service.  In the case 
of the U.S. Army, the pentomic division construct and Active Defense were two major doctrinal 
changes that fundamentally altered how the organization would fight and neither involved the 
creation of a new combat arm.  As McMaster notes, “Invention is not innovation. Innovation often 
results from the identification of opportunities to use existing capabilities in new ways.”128 
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 Second, Rosen’s theory is most powerful in explaining how innovation occurs once the 
innovation process is triggered, but it is much less insightful in explaining why innovation occurs 
in the first place.  According to Rosen, new theories of victory constructed by military officers are 
the result of “perception of change in the structure of the international security environment.”129  
This explanation of the cause of innovation appears to align well with Posen’s argument and the 
prediction of most scholars who employ a balance of power approach to military innovation.  
Innovation was triggered by a shift in the balance of power.130   
 Third, Rosen’s case studies focus on innovations that occurred prior to the end of World 
War II except for one, so it is not clear if his argument is appropriate for explaining innovations in 
the second half of the twentieth century.  Additionally, the majority of Rosen’s cases are instances 
of innovation during war and due to technological change.  Fourth, Rosen focuses on doctrinal 
change but he pays absolutely no attention to formal doctrinal publications.   
 Finally, Rosen’s account tells us nothing about how ideological struggles between services 
- army, navy, air force, and marines - affect the development of theories of victory.   For example, 
in his case study on the Army’s development of the airmobile division, Rosen says nothing about 
the role of the Air Force and the Marine Corps.  In fact, a critical element of the story of this 
innovation relates to those two services.  In the post-World War II period, the Army determined 
that the helicopter’s role would be that of supply, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation.  Little 
attention was given to the possibility that aviation could play a significant role in large-scale 
ground combat.  In the emerging atomic age, the emphasis on long-range bombers took center 
stage, leading the Air Force to minimize the necessity for helicopters.  The conflict between the 
                                                           
129 Rosen, 1991, p. 57. 
130 That said, Rosen, 1991, p. 57, is clear in noting that innovation was “not the product of a close study of 
potential enemies.” 
 64 
Army and the Air Force vis-à-vis the helicopter opened the door for the Marine Corps.  In the 
helicopter, the Marines saw a way to evolve their historical amphibious role to one more 
appropriate for the modern-day battlefield.  The Marines developed doctrine and tactics for the 
helicopter, culminating in the historic first-ever airmobile operation in Korea in September 
1951.131  Rosen’s analysis of airmobility suffers from the author’s emphasis on a single service.  
 The second subcategory associated with the organizational perspective of military 
innovation is one in which scholars emphasize organizational culture as the explanatory variable 
for military innovation.  The only way that culture can be a cause of change is if it changes itself.  
Employing culture as a variable is difficult due to tautological concerns and the intangible nature 
of culture.132  The challenge for scholars who posit culture’s independent effect on innovation is 
to prove that culture - a dynamic typically viewed as highly resistant to change - changed, and that 
its change led to military innovation.  An alternative approach which I argue is more credible is to 
treat organizational culture as an intermediate (or mediating) variable between an exogenous shock 
and a military innovation.  This approach can provide clarity on why militaries change in the ways 
that they do when subject to exogenous forces.   
 Scholars argue that there are three ways in which culture can cause innovation.  First, 
military leaders can try to change a military’s culture in order to foster innovation generally or to 
facilitate a specific innovation.  Though Rosen doesn’t examine culture’s effect on military 
innovation, the ideological conflict that occurs between military leaders and the branches within a 
service that they lead to identify a new theory of victory is ideational.  This struggle can affect the 
norms and values of the military organization, generating “new beliefs of identity and appropriate 
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behavior.”133  The work of Richard Lock-Pullan on the U.S. Army’s 1982 AirLand Battle doctrine 
is often cited as an example of planned cultural change.134  Lock-Pullan argues that after Vietnam, 
Army leaders inculcated a new identity in Army personnel that focused on conventional warfare 
in Europe and placed new emphasis on formal doctrine, leading to the AirLand Battle construct.  
Long studied how military organizations respond to counterinsurgency and concluded that 
organizational culture had a significant effect on the operations and military doctrines of those 
organizations.135   
 Second, a cultural change caused by an exogenous shock can spur innovation136.  Third, 
militaries that share certain cultural traits with other militaries innovate by emulating137 their 
practices.138  The recent emphasis on culture as an independent variable coincides with the 1990s 
surge in constructivist approaches to international relations.   
 Kier dismisses balance of power approaches to military innovation, and instead argues that 
doctrine is the result of the interaction between domestic political constraints (beliefs that civilian 
policymakers have about the military’s role in society) and military organizational culture (“basic 
assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these 
meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated”).139  Doctrine is not a response to a 
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changing external environment, it is a result of the way in which a military’s culture interprets the 
constraints imposed on it by civilian leaders.   
 In another analysis of innovation that focuses on the interwar period, Kier argues that the 
French army’s organizational culture was a major factor which led to its adoption of the Maginot 
Line defensive doctrine in 1939.  When French policymakers reduced the required length of 
conscription (the domestic political constraint), the army adopted a defensive doctrine because of 
a belief that short-term conscripts could not execute more complex offensive operations.  
According to Kier, the belief that short-term conscripts “could not handle sophisticated technology 
or new methods of [offensive] warfare” was the cultural predilection that drove the French army 
to change its doctrine from offensive to defensive.  The problem here, as Porch notes, is that a 
belief in the inadequacy of conscripts is not necessarily an attribute of organizational culture; it 
might actually be a fact.140  Given that short-term conscripts have less training, military schooling, 
and experience, the contention that they are less capable of offensive operations is plausible so it 
is not clear why Kier believes that such beliefs are cultural prejudices.   
 Definitional problems notwithstanding, Kier’s biggest contribution is the idea that culture 
can condition the doctrinal options that a military organization believes it has at its disposal.  Rather 
than limit the mediating effect of culture on doctrine to the domestic political environment as Kier 
does, I think it is useful to consider how culture might be an intervening variable between the 
international security environment defined by the balance of power approach and military doctrinal 
innovation.  This might be a fruitful way to assess innovation from two levels of analysis - from 
the perspective of shifts in the international security environment and from the organization itself.  
                                                           
140 Porch, 2000, p. 170. 
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 At its core, the organizational approach to military innovation hypothesizes: the character 
of a military innovation is affected by competition between actors inside the military organization 
and organizational culture. 
The Interservice Approach 
 The third and final approach that explains military innovation is the interservice approach.  
Viewing innovation from the perspective of the interservice level of analysis is valuable because 
it expands the aperture to include interactions between political actors in different organizations.  
These organizations (referred to as services in the case of the United States) compete with each 
other for finite resources.  Scholars who posit this explanation for innovation argue that 
competition between services for resources and standing leads to change.  The cost of losing to a 
competitor is higher than the cost of change itself because budgets and standing are perceived as 
a prerequisite for organizational survival.141  At its worst, losing to a rival can mean organizational 
extinction.  When organizations suffer defeat or perceive that their survival is in jeopardy, we might 
see them innovate, particularly if they receive cues from civilians that indicate impending civilian 
intervention.  The interservice approach to military innovation allows the researcher to shift his/her 
focus from one military organization to the other military services within the state.  Differences in 
interests, capabilities, and jurisdiction may lead services to respond to similar external shocks in 
different ways.142  
 Associated primarily with Huntington, Sapolsky, and Owen, the interservice perspective 
argues that competition between military organizations that are subordinate to the same state for 
                                                           
141 Harvey Sapolsky, “On the Theory of Military Innovation,” Breakthroughs, Vol. IX, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 35-
39.  Also discussed in Sapolsky et al., 2009, p. 8. 
142 Duffield, 1995, p. 18, makes a similar point but it is in regard to intra-alliance differences in NATO. 
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resources, standing, and prestige leads to innovation.143  Huntington contested the conventional 
wisdom that “interservice competition necessarily undermines the economy, efficiency, and 
effective central control in the military establishment.”144  Rather, Huntington argues that the 
division of militaries into separate and distinct services has the effect of improving civilian control 
of the military and increasing the strength of the individual services.  Each service is forced “to 
develop the mechanisms and support necessary for survival in the pluralistic world of American 
politics.”145  Huntington doesn’t say much about military innovation, but by implication his 
argument supports the counterintuitive idea that rivalry between services forces services to become 
more effective political actors in the pursuit of their organizational interests. 
 Sapolsky argues that innovation is the result of “competition among organizational rivals 
for resources and standing, who overcome the costs of implementing change through their concern 
about the greater costs of losing to a competitor.”146  This explanation is important because it 
identifies the cost-benefit analyses that effect organizational decisions to innovate or not to 
innovate.  The cost of losing to a competitor includes loss of budgetary outlays and decrease in 
prestige.  At its most extreme, the cost of losing to a competitor or failing to maintain relevance 
might include organizational extinction.  If the military organization is no longer able to justify its 
critical role in the national security community, politicians might question that organization’s 
future relevance.   
                                                           
143 Harvey M. Sapolsky, “On the Theory of Military Innovation.” Breakthroughs 9, no. 1 (2000): 35–39; 
Samuel P. Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” The American 
Political Science Review 55, no. 1 (March, 1961): 40-52; Owen Cote, Jr., The Politics of Innovative Military 
Doctrine: The United States Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles (Ph.D., diss, MIT, 1996); Sapolsky, The Polaris 
System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972). 
144 Huntington, 1961, p. 40. 
145 Ibid., p. 44.  Huntington’s point is logical but he fails to acknowledge that interservice competition can be 
highly problematic in war when services might need to operate in a joint fashion. 
146 Sapolsky et al., 2009, p. 8.  Support for this argument is also provided by Cote, 1996 and Sapolsky, “The 
Interservice Competition Solution,” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1996). 
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 According to Sapolsky, rivalry between services is the independent variable that leads to 
military innovation.  When a service calculates that a loss in budgets or prestige to another service 
is costlier than innovation, we expect to see that service innovate.147  However, in Sapolsky’s 
theory, it is not entirely clear what type of shock must occur for resource scarcity to drive the 
competition (which then leads to innovation).  According to Grissom, “a new mission area may 
emerge in which none of the services have a dominant advantage, or an old mission may be 
reopened for competition between the services.”148  If a new mission area emerges, the services 
might compete for scarce resources to establish jurisdiction within that area.  Similarly, if there is 
dialogue over who has jurisdiction over an older mission, the services might compete.   
 Cote provides more insight on what must happen for the always-existing competition for 
scarce resources to trigger innovation.  According to Cote, not only can interservice rivalry have 
an independent explanatory effect on innovation, it can also serve as an intermediary variable for 
that innovation, linking an external or internal shock to the innovation.  Cote draws from 
Huntington’s argument that the existence of more than one service in a military enables more 
effective civilian control of the military.  Since services are independent of each other but 
theoretically equal in power, interservice rivalry is “more likely [to] result in the resort to external 
political (i.e. civilian) authority for resolution.”149   
 When services are locked in conflict, there is a high likelihood that civilian actors will need 
to intervene in order to mediate a resolution.  The value of this observation is that it connects 
interservice rivalry to Posen’s argument.  Posen’s theory is not concerned with interservice rivalry, 
but given the propensity for civilian intervention to result from that rivalry, one can argue that 
                                                           
147 For Sapolsky et al., 2009, p. 6, military innovation is a major change to a military organization’s doctrine 
and its organizational structure.  My definition is similar. 
148 Grissom, 2006, p. 910. 
149 Cote, 1996, p. 46. 
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rivalry is the intermediary variable between civilian intervention and innovation.  Interservice 
rivalry can also have a mediating effect on the intraservice factors that Rosen argues lead to 
innovation.  In the context of intraservice debates, innovators “can portray their proposals as 
doctrinal initiatives which come at the expense of another service rather than their own.”150  When 
innovators can demonstrate that their preferred change incurs a significant cost on another service, 
the odds of their innovation being implemented increase. 
 Another component of the interservice perspective of military innovation focuses on how 
threats to a military organization’s autonomy and by extension, survival, lead to change.151   
According to Downs, organizations cannot survive unless they consistently demonstrate that their 
"services are worthwhile to some group with influence over sufficient resources to keep it alive."  
In order to do this, organizations pursue relative autonomy or "a distinctive area of competence, 
clearly demarcated clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a function, service, 
goal, issue, or cause.”152  Militaries can use doctrine to articulate their comparative advantage 
within a domain to establish autonomy and ensure the organization’s relevance in an ever-changing 
security environment.  Autonomy not only preserves survival, it also enables the organization to 
justify requests for the resources it needs to carry out functions within a particular jurisdiction.  
Here doctrine serves as a justification for future budgets.  When a military organization receives 
cues from civilian leaders that its autonomy is in jeopardy, we expect to see that organization 
innovate doctrinally to carve out a new jurisdiction to ensure its survival.   
                                                           
150 Cote, 1996, p. 79. 
151 See, e.g., Marutollo, 1990; Herbert Kaufman, Time, Change, and Organizations: Natural Selection in a 
Perilous Environment (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1985). 
152 Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 8, quoting P. B. Clark and J.Q. 
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 The academic work on organizational survival and military innovation is limited because 
military organizational survival is assumed.  It is not clear how a military service might be rendered 
extinct without a fundamental transformation in the nature of combat.  As long as combat occurs 
in the air, on the sea, and on land, we assume that states will have no incentive to disband their air 
force, navy, or army.  However, the existence of two services capable of operating on land in the 
U.S. military - the Army and the Marine Corps - increases the likelihood of jurisdictional 
competition and raises the prospect that one organization might be rendered irrelevant.  In fact, the 
organizational survival of the Marine Corps has been in jeopardy multiple times over its history - 
a dynamic that Marutollo assesses in his 1990 work on the Corps.153  The Marines are not the only 
service that faced survival concerns in the U.S. military; many thought that the Army was irrelevant 
in the period immediately following the nuclear explosions that ended World War II.  Finally, today 
some argue that the proliferation of drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles threatens the 
existence of the Air Force in its current configuration.   
 Finally, culture can also play a role in interservice competition.  Halperin et al. discuss a 
concept known as organizational essence - “the view held by the dominant group within the 
organization of what its missions and capabilities should be.”154  Organizational essence can be 
understood as a subcomponent of organizational culture.  The authors assert (but do not test) four 
propositions: (1) members of an organization prefer policies that increase the organization’s 
importance relative to other organizations, (2) organizations work the hardest to gain and retain 
capabilities that members perceive as the most critical to the organization’s essence, and (3) 
                                                           
153 Marutollo, 1990. The author examines Marine Corps survival through the lens of three organizational 
constructs - the Structural Contingency Model, the Resource Dependence Model, and the Population Ecology 
Model. 
154 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla A. Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2006), p. 27. 
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organizations will resist if another bureau attempts to take away capabilities perceived as part of 
the organization’s essence.  While an organization’s essence is relatively static, the preservation 
of autonomy in the areas that the organization perceives as essential to its essence can drive rivalry 
between services.   
In summary, the interservice approach to military innovation hypothesizes: competition 
between services subordinate to the same state causes and shapes the character of military 
innovation. 
1.3. Conclusion 
 The purpose of this literature review was to critically assess existing theories that purport 
to explain military doctrinal innovation.  In its simplest form, doctrine is how a military 
organization plans to fight in combat.  Theories of doctrinal change are plentiful but they are 
limited in three ways.  First, imprecise conceptions of military doctrine weaken causal arguments 
that seek to explain doctrinal change.  Second, the emphasis on monocausal explanations for 
innovation has led scholars to focus on unique instances of military innovation that enable the 
isolation of one of the many factors that cause change to enable the confirmation of a causal claim.  
Unfortunately, the generalizability of these theories is limited and it is easy to think of numerous 
innovations where the particular posited independent variable was absent.  Third, military 
innovation scholars mistakenly treat theories that explain why militaries innovate as synonymous 
with theories that explain how militaries innovate once the decision has been made to innovate.  In 
the next chapter, I develop a framework for assessing doctrinal change that accounts for these 
limitations
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Chapter 2. Research Design 
 In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework that explains military doctrinal change 
from the perspective of different levels of analysis.  I employ this theoretical framework in the 
case study analysis that follows.  I also provide rationale for my analytical approach - the method, 
types of evidence, observable indicators, hypotheses, and case selection.  Finally, I provide 
background information on the evidence that I analyze as confirmation of military doctrinal change 
- formal doctrinal manuals - in the two organizations that I study - the U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Marine Corps.      
2.1. A New Framework for Assessing Military Doctrinal Innovation 
 The three approaches to military innovation - balance of power, organizational, and 
interservice - are different levels of analysis in the quest to understand military change.  While 
many scholars pit these perspectives against each other in an attempt to prove the superiority of 
one over another, I argue that the perspectives answer different questions.  A synthesis of the 
perspectives can serve as an effective framework for assessing organizational behavior and 
military innovation.  In this chapter, I present an approach to assess doctrinal innovation during 
peacetime that incorporates the insights of the literature discussed above across all three 
approaches to innovation.  After explaining each element of the framework, I discuss the evidence 
and the measurable indicators that would confirm or deny each.  I also develop hypotheses 
regarding when we should expect to see civilian intervention in the process.  The character of the 
resulting doctrine can be affected by intraservice and/or interservice dynamics in addition to being 
mediated by the organization’s culture.  I discuss the types of evidence that would confirm or deny 
the influence of these factors. 
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2.1.1. Theory of Victory 
 A military organization develops and maintains a theory of victory that governs how it 
plans to fight in the next war based on what it thinks that war will look like.1  The theory of victory 
is based on assumptions regarding the nature of the future enemy threat, the state of technology, 
and the state’s future relative power.2  Theories of victory are not static; they change as leaders’ 
assessment of the future changes.  When militaries craft and modify their theory of victory they 
are especially attuned to the material capabilities of the state and likely adversaries.   
 The emergence of a new adversary might affect a theory of victory if that adversary 
threatens the security of the state.  Since resources are always finite, I predict that militaries will 
prioritize the most menacing threats.  Resource constraints limit a military’s ability to prepare 
adequately for a wide range of threats.  Therefore, I expect that theories of victory (and the 
corresponding doctrine that supports those theories) will be oriented on the most dangerous threat, 
characterized by the threat that is most menacing.   
 A theory of victory consists of two components - assumptions about the nature of war and 
a vision of warfare.  According to Clausewitz, war is “a duel on an extensive scale” and “an act of 
force to compel our enemy to do our will.”3  We can think of war as “socially sanctioned violence 
to achieve a political purpose.”4  All militaries make assumptions about the fundamental 
characteristics of war that are constant over time.  Warfare, on the other hand, is “the mechanism, 
                                                           
1 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), p. 19; Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Stanford, 
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method, or modality of armed conflict against an enemy…Warfare is how combatants wage war.”5  
Unlike war, warfare changes over time based on the effect of technology, politics, and laws and 
norms, along with a host of other factors.  According to the Marines, “While the basic nature of 
war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously.”6 
 A theory of victory includes the assumptions that a military makes about war’s enduring 
characteristics and the vision of how the military will fight in the next war.  The former rarely 
change.  The U.S. Army focuses on three enduring characteristics of war: war is a human endeavor, 
war occurs amidst civilian populations, and war is inherently chaotic.7   The Marine Corps focuses 
on: friction, uncertainty, fluidity, danger, and the centrality of the human dimension.8  Based on 
the historical roots of American military doctrine and an emphasis on the philosophy of war in 
American military schools, it is not surprising that both organizations’ assumptions about the 
nature of war draw heavily from Clausewitz.9 
 The element of a military organization’s theory of victory that I am most concerned with 
in this study is the organization’s vision of warfare - the “mechanism[s], method[s], or 
modalit[ies]” that it plans to use in war.  The scholars who claim that militaries have theories of 
victory do not provide any insight on how to deduce an organization’s theory at any given time.10  
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The most recent work - Jensen (2016) - views theories of victory as “action repertoires” or “implied 
ways to solve problems” but it doesn’t tell us where we can find evidence of the concept.11   
 We can determine an organization’s existing theory of victory by assessing evidence from 
four different sources - senior leader testimony to Congress, procurement and weapons design 
programs, public speeches and official documents produced by the military organization, and the 
unofficial correspondence of military leaders.  Military leaders might use testimony to “convey 
information to the public about a government’s strategic or policy choices and its judgments about 
them.”12  What an organization buys (or plans to buy) is arguably one of the best ways to ascertain 
the type of weapons, equipment, and technologies that the organization thinks are most critical to 
its success in the type of warfare that it envisions it will conduct.  Service chiefs, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military leaders discuss elements of their vision of 
warfare in speeches made to military and civilian audiences.  These leaders view speeches as 
opportunities to reinforce the relevance of the organizations they lead, to commend the 
organization’s performance in training or combat, and to emphasize priorities for the organization 
which are based on leader assessments of the operational environment.  However, when analyzing 
this type of evidence, the researcher should be aware that these military leaders may also view 
public speeches as opportunities to build or maintain the prestige of their organization, to make 
the case for primacy over a particular domain of war, and/or to garner public support for 
organizational interests related to missions or technology.  
 
 
                                                           
11 Jensen, 2016, p. 17. 
12 Rosa A. Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies,” in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. 
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2.1.2. What causes innovation? 
 A shift in the balance of power in the international system should cause military leaders to 
reexamine their theory of victory.  A major technological development should have the same effect.  
If military elites conclude that their current theory of victory is inadequate based on the effect of 
the power shift, we expect to see doctrinal innovation.  Depending on the nature of the shift, the 
military might also innovate organizationally, fundamentally changing its structure.  Other factors 
- shifts in the budget, changes in the expected geography of future battlefields, and competition 
between intraservice rivals - are effects of balance of power shifts.  While they might affect the 
processes of innovation once the organization has decided to innovate, they should not, on their 
own, cause doctrinal innovation. 
 Absent a major shift in the balance of power, we do not expect to see doctrinal change.  
However, there are numerous examples of military doctrinal innovation without a major shift.  To 
account for this, I argue that a more effective way to understand doctrinal innovation is to confirm 
or deny the occurrence of a shift in the balance of threat.  In his work on alliance formation, Walt 
argues that states balance in response to threats.13  The level of threat is determined by four factors: 
aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.14  Aggregate power 
refers to a potential adversary’s total resources.  The more resources, the greater the threat.  
Proximity refers to the geographical distance of the adversary.  Nearby states are more threatening.  
Offensive capability suggests that states with strong offensive capabilities are more threatening.  
Finally, offensive intentions refer to the degree to which a potential adversary appears aggressive.  
A threat is a function of capability and intention.   
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14 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 
(Spring, 1985): 9-13. 
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 When militaries perceive a shift in the balance of threat, they will examine how that shift 
affects their theory of victory.  I expect that they will treat the most menacing threat to the state as 
the top priority in the doctrine development process.  The military organization will evaluate the 
intensity and probability of the threat by examining a potential adversary’s aggregate power, 
proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.  When a threat demands a doctrine that 
aligns with organizational preferences, I expect that militaries will embrace doctrinal change.  
When a threat does not align with preferences, I expect organizational resistance to doctrinal 
change.  For example, Krepinevich argues that the Soviet threat after World War II was perceived 
as the most menacing threat to the American state; this “‘worst-case’ threat…was also the 
‘preferred’ threat, and it contributed to [the Army’s] persistent ignorance of counterinsurgency 
warfare.”15  In my analysis, I am also sensitive to the possibility that a military organization’s 
threat assessment might be biased by its own preferences for training and/or combat.   
 I am not arguing that militaries only innovate when exposed to shifts in the balance of 
threat; I avoid these types of monocausal explanations.  Rather, I argue that analyzing doctrinal 
change from this perspective is the most fruitful approach for understanding the causes of that 
change.  Rather than test whether organizational factors instead caused change like so many other 
scholars, I make the claim that those factors are more likely to affect the nature/character of the 
new doctrine once the decision to change has been made.   
 Posen claims that civilian intervention is a necessary precondition for change once there is 
a balance of power shift.  I argue that civilian intervention to compel doctrinal innovation is not a 
foregone conclusion.  First, the preferences of military elites might align with civilian preferences, 
rendering intervention unnecessary.  Civilian intervention is costly in terms of time and potential 
                                                           
15 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 5. 
 79 
damage to the civil-military relationship, so civilian elites will not incur this cost when they don’t 
have to.  Here doctrinal change only happens when military leaders determine that their new theory 
of victory requires innovation to the way the organization fights.  If civilian elites support doctrinal 
change or if they are indifferent to it, I expect to see a major doctrinal innovation.   
 The degree of elite alignment (consonance between military and civilian elites) on 
preferences related to doctrine is understudied.  Betts finds a high degree of consonance between 
civilians and military professionals on decisions related to the use of force.  Divergence occurs 
once the decision is made to use force; military professionals are more aggressive than civilians 
on the amount and type of force necessary.16   
 Second, if the military anticipates civilian intervention in its doctrinal processes, it will act 
preemptively to change its doctrine in ways that suit its preferences.  Like other political actors, 
militaries seek to avoid intervention by outsiders, and they will take action to prevent intervention 
if they anticipate that it might be on the horizon.  Taking action prior to civilian intervention gives 
first-mover advantage to the military, enabling it to revise doctrine on its own terms.  The 
possibility of intervention can serve as the impetus for military innovation.  This doesn’t mean that 
military and civilian preferences are maligned; preferences between the two might be consistent, 
but the possibility of intervention incentivizes the military to move quickly in its doctrinal 
innovation. 
 When militaries reject change, but change anyway in anticipation of civilian intervention, 
I expect to see evolutionary or cosmetic changes to doctrine that are promoted as major 
innovations.  The best example of this in the case of the U.S. military can be found in the Army’s 
response to Kennedy’s promotion of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War.  In anticipation of and 
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in response to Kennedy’s intervention, the Army proclaimed that it embraced the mission set and 
was “making excellent progress” in adopting a counter-guerrilla doctrine.17  The reality was that 
there was deep institutional resistance to counterinsurgency in the Army.  Surface-level changes to 
doctrine were publicized as major doctrinal innovations.  This satisfied civilian demands while 
enabling little change, if any, to the Army’s theory of victory, and therefore, it’s keystone doctrine.  
 To assess these claims, I will start by determining and comparing the interests of military 
and civilian elites after an environmental shift.  The military elites that I am most concerned with 
are the service chiefs and the Chairman.  Relevant civilian elites are the service secretaries, the 
Secretary of Defense, other senior civilians in the Pentagon, and the President.18  Civilian 
intervention typically comes in the form of written or verbal orders, public speeches in which 
leaders give cues about their preferences, and National Security Council directives.   
 Evidence that shows that civilian elites favor doctrinal change but military elites do not 
should be a hard test of my claim that civilian intervention is unnecessary to compel doctrinal 
change.  Here I expect to see evidence of military doctrinal change in anticipation of civilian 
intervention as a way of warding off civilian influence and preserving the military’s first-mover 
advantage.  Preferences should initially not be aligned; the military organization should recognize 
this and take action; and the result should be a modified doctrine.  Rather than a major doctrinal 
innovation, I expect to see evolutionary or cosmetic changes that are promoted by the military 
organization as major changes.  The evidence must show that civilian elites wanted change, 
military elites did not, and military elites acted prior to civilian intervention to satisfy the interests 
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of civilians through minor doctrinal change which is promoted as major innovation.  Here, military 
elites can use formal doctrine as a tool to minimize civilian interference. 
 I contend that the last possibility - military elites prefer doctrinal innovation but civilian 
elites are against it - is most rare because militaries are not inclined to innovate doctrinally in ways 
that would be harmful to a state’s national security interests.  Civilian resistance to doctrinal change 
during peacetime is not expected unless the military’s preferences for change are too expensive or 
clearly insubordinate to national interests.  Doctrinal change is costly so military organizations 
have no incentive to promote innovation in the face of civilian resistance.  If militaries favor 
change and civilians are against it, I expect that military organizations would avoid doctrinal 
innovation.  If they pursue it, civilian elites can best prevent change through their control over the 
budget process.  
 In summary, when a relative power shift or a shift in the balance of threat causes a military 
organization to reevaluate its theory of victory, the logic above leads to two claims.  First, without 
civilian support, military organizations will not innovate doctrinally.  When civilians favor 
doctrinal change, militaries will change.  Whether or not that change is major or minor depends on 
military elite preferences.  When military elites favor change, expect to see major doctrinal 
innovation.  When military elites do not favor change, expect to see minor doctrinal change that 
the military organization promotes as major change.  
2.1.3. What Determines the Character of Innovation? 
 Once a relative power shift or a shift in the balance of threat causes a military organization 
to alter its theory of victory and innovate doctrinally, the second level of analysis which focuses 
inside the organization sheds light on the character of the new doctrine.  This level of analysis 
 82 
considers the possible role of competition between actors inside the organization, competition 
between services subordinate to the same state, and organizational culture.  I discuss each, below. 
2.1.3.1. Intraservice Rivalry 
 When an external shift causes a military organization to review its theory of victory, 
competition between branches might affect the new theory of victory and the character of the 
doctrinal innovation that follows.  Confirmation of the effect of intraservice factors on doctrinal 
innovation requires the presence of three conditions: (1) contrasting preferences between one or 
more branches/combat arms over how the organization should respond to the environmental shift, 
(2) evidence of a competition between the actors that represent those preferences, and (3) a 
doctrinal change that represents either a compromise between factions or an organizational 
decision to favor one faction over the other.   
 If intraservice competition affects doctrinal innovation, then mechanisms designed to 
reduce intraservice friction - such as the establishment of combined arms formations - should either 
reduce the frequency of doctrinal innovation or change the character of that innovation.  If the 
organization as a whole responds to the environmental shock with a coordinated doctrinal 
innovation, then that would deny the relevance of intraservice factors on innovation.  Also, greater 
homogeneity within the Marine Corps leads us to expect less intraservice competition when 
compared to the more heterogeneous Army.  Evidence of the influence of intraservice competition 
on the character of innovation can be found in the official and unofficial correspondence of the 
military leaders that are responsible for each of the branches, the curricula of branch schools, 




2.1.3.2. Interservice Rivalry 
 When an environmental shift affects a military organization’s budget or causes a new 
mission area to emerge, interservice competition should affect the character of the innovation.  We 
should see the services compete for scarce resources to either maintain their current position or to 
establish jurisdiction in the new mission area.  Competition between services subordinate to the 
same state can act as an intervening variable between an external shift and a new doctrine.  When 
two or more services are deadlocked in response to a shift, I expect to see civilian intervention into 
the doctrinal process.  The purpose of this intervention is not to compel doctrinal change; it is to 
resolve friction between two services.  In the absence of acute interservice competition, military 
organizations will anticipate civilian intervention and take action to render it unnecessary. When 
acute interservice competition is present and deadlock results, military organizations will have no 
choice but to allow (and respond to) civilian intervention.   
 Given the Marine Corps’ historical use as a second land army, interservice competition 
between the Marine Corps and the Army is possible.  In World War I, the performance of Marines 
on land in Europe “opened a rift between the Army and the Marines” that lasted for many years 
after the war and led some to question why the U.S. needed to maintain two services with the same 
capability on land.19  Today, the Army and the Marine Corps compete in the arena of “strategic 
mobility” - each organization wishes to be rapidly deployable and capable of forcible entry on land 
abroad.20     
 Confirmation of the effect of interservice factors on doctrinal innovation requires the 
presence of two conditions: (1) contrasting preferences between one or more services (army, navy, 
                                                           
19 Duane R. Worley, Shaping U.S. Military Forces: Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War World 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 180. 
20 Worley, 2006, p. 182. 
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air force, or marines) over the allocation of resources or jurisdiction and (2) evidence of 
competition between the actors of each service who represent those preferences.  When the result 
is doctrinal innovation by one or more of the services, the source is the environmental shift that 
caused the competition, and interservice competition is the factor that influenced the character of 
the innovation. 
 The Marine Corps’ historical struggle for survival is well-documented.  Marutollo notes 
that about every eleven years since 1829, the Marine Corps faced a major threat to its existence.21  
According to Worley, this struggle led to innovation in amphibious operations, well-integrated air 
and ground operations, the employment of helicopters for vertical envelopment, urban combat 
capability, and the creation of a chemical and biological response force.22  While the Marines 
clearly maintain primacy over all the services in the arena of amphibious assault, this mission is 
exceedingly rare and therefore difficult to use as leverage in arguments made with the executive 
branch over the Marine’s indispensability.  Much less has been written about instances in which 
the Army fought for its organizational survival, but there is evidence that it did so in the nuclear 
age of the 1950s.23  
 Given the scarcity of resources, the services are in a constant battle to maintain or increase 
their share of the overall military budget.   When an external shift affords a military organization 
a budget increase, I expect that the organization will be less likely to innovate because existing 
                                                           
21 Frank Marutollo, Organizational Behavior in the Marine Corps: Three Interpretations (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 1990), p. 1.  The author cites R. D. Heinl, “The Cat with more than Nine Lives,” U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings (June 1954): 658-671. 
22 Worley, 2006, p. 192. 
23 See, e.g., Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: 
National Defense University Press, 1986). 
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ways of doing business are unthreatened.24  When budgets decrease,25 militaries should be more 
inclined to innovate doctrinally to attain their own “doctrinally-sanctioned domains” within which 
they can assure an autonomy of roles and missions.26  According to Sapolsky, "There is no better 
spur to candor, error correction, and creativity in defense planning than a very tight budget and a 
few smart rivals competing for budget share.”27 
2.1.3.3. Organizational Culture 
 I use Kier’s definition of culture: “the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared 
understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and 
communicated to the members of an organization.”28  Long, drawing from the work of Builder, 
argues that culture is the “personality” of the organization29, and he emphasizes the important role 
of the formative experiences of military organizations on the shared beliefs that constitute their 
culture.30  These shared beliefs (or mental models) serve as “heuristics which facilitate decision 
                                                           
24 I acknowledge that this hypothesis is counterintuitive.  Others might suggest that scarcity will encourage 
organizations to focus on their core essence, while abundance will lead to experimentation or expansion into 
different realms. 
25 For example, in the 1950s, the U.S. Army was concerned with losing its budget share to the Air Force unless 
it adjusted to President Eisenhower’s New Look policy.  As such, it explored tactical nuclear weapons and 
fundamentally overhauled its doctrine/structure to the pentomic construct.  When President Kennedy shifted to a 
different nuclear policy that no longer placed a premium on tactical nuclear weapons, the Army was no longer 
threatened by losing budget share to the Air Force and so it shifted back to its conventional doctrine. 
26 Kevin Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War? Examining Peacetime Functions and Changes of Army 
Doctrine (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1988), p. 259. Also, see Asa A. Clark, “Interservice Rivalry and Military 
Reform,” in Asa A. Clark, Peter Chiarelli, J. S. McKitrick, J. W. Reed, eds., The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and 
Analysis. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), pp. 250-271.  From a research design perspective, the challenge is 
to account for the possibility that changes in the budget already take into account upcoming changes to doctrine. 
27 Harvey M. Sapolsky, “The Interservice Competition Solution,” Breakthroughs (Spring 1996): 119-120. 
28 Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 69-70. 
29 Austin Long, First War Syndrome: Military Culture, Professionalization, and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
(Ph.D. diss. MIT, 2010), p. 49;  
Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis: A RAND Corporation 
Research Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 7-8.  Builder uses the term “institutional 
personality” which Long argues is synonymous with “organizational culture.” 
30 Long, The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2016), pp. 25-29.  Long believes that a military’s “first war” experience has a significant 
effect on the organization’s culture.  This culture is then transmitted over time through the organization’s 
professional education system. 
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making under conditions of risk and uncertainty.”31  For Long, culture serves two purposes: it 
provides the mental model that military organizations use in their assessment of “how the world 
works” and it affects the military organization’s “view of right and wrong.”32  For the sake of 
simplicity, when I look for culture, I look at an organization’s values and norms. 
 I argue that organizational culture can condition the options that a military organization 
believes it has at its disposal. Organizational culture is not the source of military doctrine but rather 
it is an intervening variable between the international security environment (the source) and 
doctrinal innovation (the outcome).  A military organization’s culture should be resistant to change 
and therefore consistent and stable.  When the international security environment changes, the 
military organization “continues to think along the lines set by its culture and integrates exogenous 
changes into established way of doing things.”33  Culture mediates the effect of the exogenous 
shock on doctrine. 
 The challenge for the political scientist is to figure out what types of evidence must be 
analyzed to identify a military organization’s culture.  I agree with Kier that in order to determine 
a military’s culture, the researcher must study the organization’s history, internal correspondence 
between officers, educational curricula, and military journals.34  Long also provides a list of eight 
questions that the researcher can use to derive the elements of a military organization’s culture.  
For my purposes, three of those questions are particularly important: (1) “What are the optimal 
methods of war (attrition/firepower, maneuver/shock, etc.), and how should they be combined?” 
                                                           
31 Long, 2010, p. 48.  Long draws from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263-292; Kahneman and Tversky, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
32 Long, 2010, p. 35.  Long views these two functions as a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness.  
See also, James G. March and Chip Heath, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994). 
33 Kier, 1995, p. 80.  Kier focuses on changes in the domestic environment whereas I focus on changes in the 
international security environment. 
34 Ibid., p. 70. 
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(2) “What is the relationship between one’s own military and other organizations (foreign, sister 
services, civilians, etc.)? and (3) “Is war frequent/limited or infrequent/total?”35  Fortunately, I can 
turn to existing scholarship on the organizational cultures of the two military services at the center 
of my analysis - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - for a preliminary understanding of the 
personality of those organizations.  
 Books by Builder and Worley are the most comprehensive accounts of the cultures of these 
two services.36  Worley identifies six characteristics of modern Army culture: (1) a preference for 
major wars over small wars, (2) a preference for offensive operations over defensive operations, 
(3) a preference for firepower over maneuver,37 (4) a preference for combined arms operations 
over single branch operations,38 (5) an emphasis on professional soldiers rather than part-time 
soldiers, and (6) the importance of history and doctrine.39  While the Army of today emphasizes 
combined arms and joint operations throughout its doctrine, there are still distinct cultures within 
each one of the Army’s branches.  According to Worley, “Each branch has its separate entry point 
and cultural home, and all officers retain a strong relationship with their branches through which 
promotion and assignments are made.”40  The predominant cultures from which most of the 
Army’s senior leaders come are the infantry and the armor.  The Army’s “preferred conception of 
                                                           
35 Long, 2016, p. 19.  I quoted questions 1, 3, and 4 from Long’s framework. 
36 Builder, 1989; Worley, 2006. 
37 I argue that this preference existed until World War I.  After that war, the Army valued maneuver over 
firepower. 
38 This was not always the case.  Warfare in the 20th century led the Army to transform its culture from one that 
valued individual branches (primarily the infantry and the cavalry) to one that valued combined operations 
(integrated operations between more than one branch). 
39 Worley, 2006, pp. 70-73. 
40 Ibid., p. 72.  Builder, 1989, p. 27, makes the point that while Army officers self-identify with their branch, the 
“branches have a brotherhood not evidenced among the specialties of the other services.”  Rosen, 1991, is also 
particularly interested in the role that promotion pathways have on innovation. 
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war” tends to place infantry and armor “in the dominant supported role and all other branches in 
the supporting role.”41   
 Worley’s analysis supports Krepinevich’s development of the idea of an “Army Concept” 
which characterizes Army culture as oriented on “a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional war 
and a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties.”42  Builder’s account of Army 
service culture confirms most of these attributes and adds one more: historically, Army culture has 
resisted new technologies, emphasizing individual soldier skills over the value of new 
equipment.43  
 Worley identifies two, primary “strains” of Marine Corps culture: (1) a preference for 
“attack[ing] into the teeth of the enemy” in the form of the amphibious assault and (2) a preference 
for conducting “expeditionary interventions” in the form of small wars.44  The necessity for 
competence in amphibious assault and small wars leads Marine culture to emphasize versatility 
and adaptability.  Marine Corps culture values major wars and small wars, but at least one scholar 
suggests that Marines prefer the latter.45  Combined arms operations are important, but the 
Marine’s primary focus is on the rifleman; “every marine a rifleman” is a commonly used slogan.46  
The Marines are not as stratified as the Army in terms of separate branches.  Since World War II, 
                                                           
41 Worley, 2006, p. 73.  The author contends that the armor branch is in the supported role but my experience 
suggests that the infantry branch and the armor branch are both viewed in that way. 
42 Krepinevich, 1986, p. 5.  I don’t think that the author intends to suggest that the Army culture values 
firepower over maneuver.  Rather, I think he would argue that it values high volumes of firepower in support of 
maneuver. 
43 Builder, 1989, p. 24.  The author claims that in recent years, “the Army is getting ‘hooked’ on toys too.”  
Builder does not discuss the “institutional personality” of the Marine Corps.  I assume that this is because of a 
perception that the Marines did not have substantial influence on strategic issues or force planning as a service.  It 
might also be because the Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy. 
44 Worley, 2006, p. 176. 
45 See, e.g., Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-
1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p. 238. 
46 Worley, 2006 pp. 194-195. 
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the Marine Corps consistently searched for opportunities to integrate tactical air support (i.e. 
aviation) into their operations.47   
 Hoffman compares Marine culture to Army culture.48  According to Hoffman, the Marines 
value teamwork and an expeditionary ethos while the Army values its connection to the nation and 
its citizens; the Marines are more concerned about their legitimacy as an institution than the Army 
(even after the Corps’ minimum size was codified in legislation); and the Marines minimize the 
importance of subcultures within their own service while the Army values and emphasizes 
intraservice differences.  Holmes-Eber describes four Marine Corps cultural “ideals”: “every 
Marine a rifleman,” “soldiers of the sea,” “honor, courage, and commitment,” and “tip of the 
spear.”49   
 Now that I have explained how scholars have defined the distinctive elements of Army and 
Marine Corps culture, it is necessary to discuss how these elements might affect the character of 
doctrine once a shock in the international environment leads to the initiation of a doctrinal change 
process.  The challenge here is tautological.  As Long writes, “The distinction between military 
doctrine and military culture is often quite blurry.”50  To distinguish between the two, Long argues 
that culture represents what organizations believe; doctrine represents what organizations do.51  
Doctrine is physical whereas culture “is transmitted through particular experiences and 
environments.”52   
                                                           
47 Worley, 2006, p. 194. 
48 Frank. G. Hoffman, “The Marine Mask of War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (November 2011), 
accessed online at http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/11/the-marine-mask-of-war/. 
49 Paula Holmes-Eber, Culture in Conflict: Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the Marine Corps (Redwood 
City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), pp. 29-108.  These ideals have become clichés. 
50 Long, 2010, p. 42. 
51 Ibid., p. 43. 
52 Long, 2010, p. 44. 
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 To compound the tautological challenge, I argue that the attributes that Worley and Builder 
claim are cultural are really manifestations of culture and not attributes of culture.  The Army’s 
preference for large over small wars is not necessarily a cultural characteristic.  This is an issue 
beyond semantics.  Mischaracterizing a preference for a type of war as a cultural attribute leads to 
tautological problems when a researcher looks for evidence to confirm culture’s influence.  If the 
cultural attribute is a preference for major wars, then I would need to see evidence of doctrine 
oriented on large-scale wars.  This is tautological.   
 I argue that the actual cultural attributes that lead to the Army’s preference for large wars 
are: “fear of unpreparedness,” a desire to prepare for worst-case scenarios, a belief that a force 
competent in large wars will also be competent in small wars, and a penchant for the deliberate 
planning necessary to support the large-scale mobilization needed for a major war.53  A preference 
for offensive over defensive operations is the result of an Army culture that prioritizes 
aggressiveness and seizing the initiative.  Defensive operations are perceived to be counter to those 
traits - “one defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant.”54  This also 
explains the Army’s preoccupation with the armor and infantry branches - the two branches most 
critical to the spirit of the attack.  Finally, Army culture values heterogeneity55 in force structure - 
an attribute that explains the existence of subcultures in the Army’s branches and a preference for 
combined-arms operations.   
 Using a similar thought process, I argue that Marine Corps cultural attributes include: 
versatility and adaptability, (the Corps embraces two fundamentally different expeditionary 
                                                           
53 Worley, 2006, p. 54.  Worley addresses these facets of Army culture but does not distinguish them from the 
preferences which they lead to. 
54 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. S.B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 85. 
55 Karen O. Dunivin, “Military Culture: Change and Continuity,” Armed Forces & Society 20, no. 4 (Summer 
1994): 535.  The author focuses on military culture broadly (not service culture).  She characterizes military force 
structure as heterogeneous in the “evolving model” that she discusses. 
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mission sets - amphibious operations and small wars), warrior spirit (every Marine a rifleman; 
Marines operate at the tip of the spear), and homogeneity in force structure (lack of stratification 
and centrality of the infantryman).   
 When Army culture intervenes in a doctrinal process, I expect to see doctrines that are 
offensive, firepower-centric, oriented primarily on the role of the infantry and the armor, and 
focused on mid-intensity operations.56   When Marine culture intervenes, I expect to see doctrines 
that are offensive, infantry-centric, and broad rather than specific and prescriptive.  Broad doctrines 
enable maximum flexibility in operations; overly-prescriptive doctrines inhibit that flexibility.  
Infantry-centric doctrines are people-centric rather than equipment/weapons-centric.  If either 
service perceives civilian intervention to force the development of a doctrine that is counter to its 
culture, I expect to see overt resistance or military change in anticipation of intervention that 
satisfies civilian demands in a way that still preserves the service’s cultural preferences. 
2.2. Case Study Selection 
 In this section, I explain the rationale behind conducting a comparative case study analysis.  
I introduce the two military organizations at the core of the analysis - the U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Marine Corps - and I explain the advantages and disadvantages of analyzing two services that are 
subordinate to the same state.  I discuss the time period of analysis and the logic that drove it.  I 
also generate a list of general questions that I use for data collection in the case studies.  Finally, I 
describe the primary bodies of evidence that I will explore in the case study analysis - formal 
doctrinal manuals - to identify the outcome of interest - military doctrine. 
                                                           
56 High-intensity operations are characterized by “the large-scale exchange of strategic nuclear weapons.”  Mid-
intensity operations are “direct force-on-force clash[es] between conventional forces - the organized forces of 
states.”  Low-intensity operations are characterized by “social conflict, failed or failing states, and the employment 
of irregular, militia, or guerrilla forces using terrorist tactics.”  See Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940) cited in Worley, 2006, p. 7. 
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2.2.1. Methodology and Case Selection  
 The phenomenon under investigation in this study - military doctrine - lends itself to a 
qualitative research design.  While a quantitative research design would allow the researcher to 
analyze a larger number of cases, it is not appropriate here because of the complexity of the 
doctrinal innovation process and the fact that the variables of interest are not easily quantified.  A 
qualitative approach allows for a more careful study of fewer cases.  The specific qualitative 
procedure that I use is a structured, focused comparison.57  This approach is “structured” because 
I use general questions that “guide the data collection and analysis.”58  It is “focused” because “it 
deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case.”59  The purpose of a controlled 
comparison of two military organizations is to learn more about doctrinal innovation, to better 
develop the proposed theoretical framework, and to explain the cases that are examined.60   
 In regard to the design of the structured, focused comparison, the dependent variable is 
military doctrine and the independent variable is the balance of power in the international system 
(and, by extension, the nature of the perceived enemy threat).61  Though it is not the primary 
outcome of interest, I am also attentive to evidence of changes in organizational structure to 
determine whether or not structural change has bearing on doctrinal change.  Intervening variables 
                                                           
57 This approach is attributed to Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul G. Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and 
Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 
58 George, 1979, pp. 61-62. 
59 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
60 Ibid., p. 52, refers to this as a “heuristic” case study.  He attributes this to Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and 
Theory in Political Science,” in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1976), pp. 79-138. 
61 Because of the limitations of the balance of power approach discussed in the previous section, I deliberately 
decide, instead, to focus on the balance of threat in the international system. 
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that explain the character of doctrine are organizational culture, intraservice and interservice 
competition, and organizational interests related to survival.62   
 At first look, one might think that comparing two military organizations that are 
subordinate to the same state prevents variation on the independent variable, but I argue that is not 
the case.  Military and civilian elites with jurisdiction over each of the military organizations often 
have different perceptions of the threats.  It is not uncommon for assessments of the security 
environment to differ between services, particularly given the fact that services focus on 
components of the security environment that are most relevant to their own organizational 
missions, priorities, and interests. I can exploit the fact that changes in the threat environment have 
different effects on the Army and the Marines based on assumptions that each service has regarding 
the division of labor between the services as components of the broader U.S. military 
establishment.   
 From a research design perspective, employing change as an outcome variable is 
challenging because the existence of change and non-change can be subjective.  For this study, I 
define a doctrinal change as one that redefines the organization’s method(s) of fighting in war.  I 
expect such a change to be codified in an organization’s formal doctrinal manuals.  The primary 
body of evidence that I examine to detect change will be a military’s keystone doctrinal manual.  
New doctrines that are codified in a manual but are not reflective of the military’s actual methods 
and modes of operating, do not meet the doctrinal change threshold.  Changes in name only are 
inconsequential if/when the military goes to war.  I consider such cases to be evidence of non-
change.   
                                                           
62 I don’t claim that balance of threat factors are the only possible cause of doctrinal change, but I approach the 
case studies in this dissertation from the balance of threat perspective because I think it is the most fruitful level of 
analysis for understanding the causes of doctrinal innovation. 
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 I conduct the comparison between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps from the post-
World War II period until 2001.  While the interwar period between the World Wars has been 
studied extensively, there is very little scholarship on the period from the end of the World War II 
until 2001.  My primary purpose is to examine peacetime doctrinal change so I end my analysis 
prior to the U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks.63  
Conflicts that occur throughout the case-study period are assumed to serve as factors that could 
affect military doctrine.  These include military actions in Grenada, Panama, the first Gulf War, 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. This period also includes a major balance of power shift that 
occurred at the end of the Cold War.  The period from the fall of the Berlin wall to the 2001 attacks 
- referred to by some as the second interwar period64 - is interesting because it was a period defined 
by military budget reductions, interservice competition, and strong interest in technologies that 
promised to digitize the battlefield.  
 During the case-study period, the U.S. Army established four fundamentally different 
doctrines - pentomic, Active Defense, AirLand Battle, and Full-Dimensional/Full-Spectrum 
Operations.  The pentomic doctrine entailed a massive reorganization of the Army for the purpose 
of conducting tactical nuclear war.  Active Defense was the first Army doctrine in its history to 
promote defensive over offensive operations.  AirLand Battle synchronized the Army and the Air 
Force to an unprecedented degree.  Full-Dimensional/Full-Spectrum Operations expanded the 
traditional Army focus on offensive and defensive operations to also include civil-support missions 
and stability operations.  During the same period, the Marine Corps developed a vertical 
envelopment doctrine after the advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s and 1950s, and published 
a maneuver warfare doctrine in 1989.  Both organizations established a proponent for developing 
                                                           
63 I also don’t proceed past 2001 because material from recent years is not yet in the archives. 
64 Sapolsky et al., 2009, p. 2. 
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doctrines and concepts during the case-study period.  The Army developed the Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 and the Marines developed the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC) in 1985. 
 I expect that when both services are subject to similar external shifts and their perception 
of those shifts causes the development of a new theory of victory, they will generate similar 
doctrinal responses.65  Environmental shifts might also lead both services to initiate the doctrinal 
innovation process but change their doctrine in fundamentally different ways.  This is where we 
would expect cultural, interservice, and/or intraservice factors to come into play.  Existing 
scholarship on U.S. military doctrine is disproportionately focused on the Army; scholars have 
ignored Marine Corps doctrinal development during this time period.  Long conducts the only 
comparative case study of the Army and the Marine Corps in any time period, but he focuses only 
on counterinsurgency doctrine.66  The majority of my research on the Marine Corps cases required 
archival work in Quantico, Virginia. 
 Comparing the Army to the Marine Corps has advantages and disadvantages.  Comparing 
these two organizations is similar to a natural experiment in that both organizations are “armies” 
subordinate to the same state.  Unlike in other states, the Marines and the Army can both operate 
in the same domain of battle - ground combat.67  If the two organizations face similar external 
stimuli and their perceptions of those stimuli are the same, then I can hold external factors constant 
and exploit variance in the internal characteristics of the organizations that might affect the 
outcome of interest.  If the organizations face the same external stimuli but their perceptions of 
                                                           
65 In my analysis, I am sensitive to the possibility that there is more than one shift and/or variation in when and 
how a particular service responds to a shift. 
66 Long, 2010, 2016. 
67 Worley, 2006, p. 51, makes the point that “The Marine Corps, too, seizes and holds terrain in support of 
national objectives, but orients on expeditionary warfare rather than on sustained land combat and major war.”  Still, 
the existence of two services that can both seize and hold terrain subordinate to the same state is unique. 
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those stimuli are fundamentally different, then I can look to see if the organizations changed in 
different ways.   
 The key mechanism for doctrinal change in Posen’s balance of power theory is civilian 
intervention.  My theoretical framework only expects intervention when two services are 
deadlocked in interservice competition.  However, if civilian intervention in the Army did lead to 
more doctrinal innovation and the absence of such intervention enabled the Marines to avoid 
innovating, then that would confirm Posen’s theory.   
 The most significant limitation in the organizational comparison is the size difference 
between the two services.  In recent decades, the Army has traditionally been about twice as large 
as the Marine Corps.  The literature on organizations argues that large organizations adopt 
innovations less often than smaller organizations.68  Yet, with respect to the Army and the Marine 
Corps, we see the reverse: the larger, more diverse Army adopts more doctrinal innovations than 
the smaller, nimbler, and more homogenous Marine Corps.   
 A unique characteristic of the Marine Corps is its relationship with the U.S. Navy.  This 
relationship originated when the Corps was created in 1775.  Throughout the 1800s, Marines 
provided security on Navy ships and served as landing forces that operated from Navy platforms.  
As the Marine Corps mission changed over time from ship security to advanced base operations 
and small wars, the tactical link between the Navy and the Corps weakened but the administrative 
link endured.  Today, Marines still serve on ships, but they are capable of fighting on land, sea, or 
air.  Though the Marines are a separate service, they fall under the administration of the Department 
of the Navy.  Like the other services, the Marine Corps has a service chief - known as the Marine 
                                                           
68 Wilson, 1971, p. 201.  Large organizations are diverse - they have a complex task structure and incentive 
system which makes it more difficult for executives to exercise influence over the organization’s members, thereby 
reducing the probability that innovations will be adopted. 
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Commandant69 - but he/she reports to the Secretary of the Navy; the Marine Corps does not have 
a separate civilian secretary.   Like the other services, the Corps budget is usually listed as a 
separate line item but in reality, the Marines receive their budget through the Department of the 
Navy.   
2.2.2. Data Requirements for the Cases 
 To guide the comparison of the Army and the Marine Corps, I developed a list of general 
questions that I used in my analysis of each case.  These questions serve are the “data 
requirements” for the controlled comparison.70  The questions are general to ensure that they apply 
to all cases.  However, when appropriate, I also ask specific questions of each case to identify 
distinctive characteristics that are relevant for theory development.71 
1. What is the organization’s theory of victory? 
 (a) What assumptions does the organization make about the nature of war? (it’s enduring 
characteristics) 
 (b) What is the organization’s vision of warfare in the next war? (mechanisms, methods, 
modalities) 
2. Do external shifts - shifts in the balance of threat, development of a major military 
technology, collapse/rise of great power(s), change in the capability/intentions of an 
adversary, or a crisis/war - affect the existing theory of victory? 
 (a) How do military leaders respond to these shifts?  How do they perceive the effect of the 
shift on the military organization? 
                                                           
69 In the 1980s, the Marine Corps achieved full status on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  This gave it de facto equality 
with the other services, but, curiously, did not alleviate Marine Corps anxiety over its survival. 
70 George, 1979, p. 55. 
71 Ibid., p. 62. 
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 (b) What determines whether or not shifts cause a reevaluation of an existing theory of 
victory? 
 (c) To what extent do military leaders consider the capabilities/intentions of adversaries? 
 (d) How does the military organization prioritize threats when facing more than one? 
3. When does a new theory of victory lead to the initiation of a doctrinal change process? 
 (a) What are the perceived costs and benefits of changing doctrine?  Why does the 
organization think that the benefits outweigh the costs? 
 (b) Is organizational structural change considered in lieu of or in addition to doctrinal 
change?  If so, why? 
 (c) What factors are considered by military leaders when they initiate doctrinal change? 
4. How do civilians affect processes to reevaluate a theory of victory and to initiate doctrinal 
change? 
 (a) Are civilian interests aligned with military interests?  
 (b) If civilian elites want change, but military elites do not, what results? 
 (c) If military elites want change, but civilian elites do not, what results? 
 (c) Do military leaders take action in anticipation of civilian intervention? 
5. When a doctrinal change process is initiated, do factors internal to the organization affect 
the new doctrine’s character? 
 (a) What goals do military leaders have for the new doctrine? 
 (b) Do the cultural attributes of the organization -  intervene to affect the nature of doctrinal 
change?  If so, how? 
 (c) Is the organization competing with other organizations over technology, a desired 
mission set, or funding? 
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 (d) Are sub-elements of the organization competing amongst themselves?  
 (e) If one or both of these competitions are present, how do they influence doctrine?  
2.2.3. Evidence of Doctrine  
 The primary body of evidence that I use to confirm or deny the outcome of interest - 
doctrinal change - are keystone doctrinal manuals.  Below, I provide background on doctrine in 
the Army and the Marine Corps.  
2.2.3.1. Keystone Doctrine - U.S. Army 
 Keystone publications are the doctrinal manuals that provide the broadest expression of 
how the Army thinks it will fight at any given time.72  Ney and Kretchik provide the most 
comprehensive assessments of the history of U.S. Army keystone doctrine from the American 
Revolution to the present day.73  Ney contends that there are two, primary periods in the evolution 
of Army doctrine: the period from the American Revolution to World War I and from the end of 
World War I to the Vietnam War.74  In first period, the evolution of the Army field manual (an 
official publication encapsulating doctrine) was dependent primarily (though not entirely) upon 
the publications of private individuals.75  Field manuals published throughout the 1800s were 
mainly the work of military intellectuals at the United States Military Academy at West Point 
which was established in 1802.  The publication of the Field Service Regulations, United States 
Army, 1905 initiated the centralization of doctrine by the War Department.  In Ney’s second period 
(World War I to the Vietnam War), the post-World War I training literature program and the 
development of the Basic Field Manual by the War Department in 1930 initiated the beginning of 
                                                           
72 Army doctrine does not view keystone publications as superior to the dozens of other field manuals that it 
publishes, but it is clear that keystone manuals are the most informative when it comes to explaining how the Army 
will fight as an organization. 
73 Virgil Ney, Evolution of the US Army Field Manual: Valley Forge to Vietnam (Fort Belvoir, VA: Combat 
Operations Research Group, 1966); Kretchik, 2011). 
74 Ibid., p. 1. 
75 Ibid. 
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the “modern system of field manuals.”76  During this period, field manual production rested firmly 
under the control of the War Department (and by 1973, the Training and Doctrine Command, 
TRADOC) and the process formalized over time.  
 Kretchik concurs with Ney’s first period - the American Revolution to World War I (1792-
1904) - but subdivides Ney’s second period into three, distinct eras.  In the first era (1905-1944), 
the Field Service Regulation became the primary field manual officially produced by the Army’s 
War Department General Staff (WDGS) based on direction from the Secretary of War, Elihu Root.  
At the outset of this period, the Army conducted a series of comprehensive evaluations to 
consolidate lessons learned from World War I into U.S. Army doctrine.  While the interwar period 
lacked any fundamental doctrinal shifts, the onset of World War II spurred renewed attention to 
Army doctrine and resulted in another surge in the encapsulation of lessons learned in doctrine in 
1941 and 1944.  In the second era (1944-1962), doctrine expanded to account for multi-service (or 
joint) operations between the Army, the Navy, and the Army Air Force.  In the third and final era 
(1962-present), coalition (and later, multinational and interagency) warfare was codified in 
doctrinal publications.77   
 The Army established the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on July 1, 1973 - 
an organization charged with the development of doctrine, leader development, recruiting and 
training, and shaping the organizational structure of the Army through force structure design and 
the integration of capabilities and materiel.78  From the early 1940s to the late 1960s, the Army’s 
training, doctrine, and education programs were managed by Army Ground Forces (1942-1948), 
Army Field Forces (1948-1955), the Continental Army Command (CONARC) (1955-1962), and 
                                                           
76 Ney, 1966, p. 2. 
77 Kretchik, 2011, p. 284. 
78 See http://www.tradoc.army.mil/About.asp for information about TRADOC’s mission. 
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the Combat Developments Command (CDC) (1962-172).79  TRADOC was the first deliberate 
action by the U.S. Army to centralize the doctrine development and publication process within an 
organization separate from the Army’s central headquarters.  The decision to do so implied a clear 
recognition of the importance of doctrine and it addressed the long, historical challenge to 
synchronize doctrine between the headquarters, units in the field, and the Army’s school system.   
 From 1905 until 2016, the Army published 20 editions of its keystone doctrine.80  The 
1905, 1910, 1913, 1914, and 1923 publications were named Field Service Regulations, United 
States Army.  The 1939 manual was named Tentative Field Service Regulations Field Manual 100-
5 Operations.  The 1941, 1944, 1949, 1954, and 1962 manuals dropped the “Tentative” and kept 
the rest of the name the same.  The 1968 manual was named Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations 
of Army Forces in the Field.   
 In 1975, DePuy moved the task of writing Field Manual 100-5 from the Combined Arms 
Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to the Concepts Branch of TRADOC Headquarters.81  
By moving the doctrine-writing process to his headquarters, DePuy not only underscored the 
importance of the new FM 100-5, he also linked doctrine to acquisition - specifically, the 
development, analysis, and procurement of new weapons systems.82  The 1976, 1982, 1986, and 
1993 versions were named Field Manual 100-5 Operations.  In 2001 and 2008, the manual was 
renamed Field Manual 3-0 Operations.  In 2011, the name changed to Army Doctrinal Publication 
                                                           
79 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 
(Washington: Center of Military History, 2006), pp. 231-232. 
80 Today, the U.S. Army calls keystone doctrine “capstone doctrine.”  I argue that they are one and the same but 
I will use “keystone” throughout this dissertation. 
81 Benjamin King, “Victory Starts Here: A 35-Year History of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command,” 
Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008, p. 31. DePuy instituted this change 
in proponent partly because of a dispute over the role of doctrine with Lieutenant General John Cushman who 
commanded the Combined Arms Center while DePuy commanded TRADOC.  Cushman saw doctrine as a guide; 
DePuy saw it as regulatory. 
82 Herbert, 1988, p. 78. 
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(ADP) 3-0 Unified Land Operations.  Today, the manual is named Army Doctrine Reference 
Publication (ADRP) 3-0 Operations.   
 Although the life-span of each edition varied, on average the Army published a new 
keystone manual every five years.83  For the first one-hundred and fifty years of Army doctrine, 
there was little effort by the institution to promote new keystone publications widely outside of 
the Army.  This changed in the 1950’s when the Army branded its new organizational structure 
and keystone doctrine with the term pentomic division.84  After the pentomic division concept, 
branding doctrinal change became the Army’s norm.  The 1976 manual was known as Active 
Defense;85 the 1982 manual was Air-Land Battle;86 the 1986 manual was AirLand Battle Future;87 
the 1993 manual was Full-Dimensional Operations; the 2001 manual was Full Spectrum 
Operations;88 and the 2011 manual was Unified Land Operations.89  Today, the Army’s Combined 
Arms Center (CAC) is working on the next keystone publication which will update the Field 
Manual 3-0 that was released in 2008.90  
 In the case study analysis that follows, Army keystone publications serve as the primary 
evidence that I use to understand military doctrine.  Comparing a publication to its predecessor 
allows me to determine whether or not the manual is a doctrinal innovation.  Rosen warns us not 
to label “Changes in the formal doctrine of a military organization that leave the essential workings 
                                                           
83 The 1913 manual had the shortest life-span, lasting only a year.  The post-World War I 1923 manual had the 
longest life-span, lasting sixteen years. 
84 The pentomic doctrine was developed after the publication of the 1954 Field Service Regulations but was 
formalized in two updates to that manual in 1956 and 1958. 
85 Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976). 
86 Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1982). 
87 Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986). 
88 Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001). 
89 ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011). 
90 Jen Judson, “Army's New Operations Field Manual to Debut Next Year at AUSA,” Defense News (October 
13, 2016), accessed online at: http://www.defensenews.com/articles/armys-new-operations-field-manual-to-debut-
next-year-at-ausa. 
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of the organization unaltered” as innovations.91  Rosen cites the U.S. Army’s doctrinal change 
from 1945 to 1980 as an example of an institution that changed its formal doctrine without 
changing its “essential workings.”92  Though the Army changed its doctrine three times over that 
period - the pentomic division, Active Defense, and AirLand Battle - its central focus in all three 
“was on fighting a conventional war with the Soviet army on the battlefield of central Europe.”93  
For Rosen, this means that the Army’s “central combat function…remained unchanged.”94  I 
disagree.  While the Army’s mission was relatively unchanged over the time period, the Army 
articulated three distinct visions of warfare in each doctrine: the pentomic doctrine envisioned 
tactical nuclear warfare; Active Defense envisioned the primacy of defensive operations for the 
first time in the organization’s history, and AirLand Battle envisioned offensive, combined arms 
maneuver warfare.95  
 The content of these keystone publications can provide insight into the Army’s rationale 
for innovating doctrinally.  For example, the 1976 manual which became known as the Active 
Defense doctrine, points to the influence of the 1973 war in the Middle East and Warsaw Pact 
conventional superiority as two factors which caused and influenced the character of the new 
doctrine.96  Formal doctrinal manuals not only reflect a military organization’s theory of warfare, 
they also provide the motivation behind the organization’s decision to embrace a new doctrine.   
 
                                                           
91 Rosen, 1991, p. 8. 
92 Ibid., footnote 15, cites Sheehan, 1988. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 As Long writes, compared to Active Defense, “AirLand Battle derived from maneuver theory, not attrition 
theory; it focused on maneuver rather than firepower; it stressed the human dimensions of war instead of the 
technical, and it favored the offense over the defense.”  See Jeffrey W. Long, The Evolution of US Army Doctrine: 
From Active Defense to AirLand Battle and Beyond (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, 1991), p. 48. 
96 Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), p. 2-2. 
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2.2.3.2. Keystone Doctrine - U.S. Marine Corps 
 Unlike in the case of the Army, literature on the history of Marine Corps formal doctrine 
is limited.  A comprehensive account of the evolution of Marine Corps doctrine does not exist and 
it is beyond the scope of this study to generate one.  However, the evolution of Marine Corps 
doctrine can be traced by categorizing Marine history into distinct periods.  The Marine Corps 
fought for its survival numerous times over the course of its history.97  The Corps was not explicitly 
provided for in the Constitution, it was a substantially smaller service than the Army, and its 
original mandate - to fight aboard ships - was quickly rendered extinct.98  In some instances where 
organizational survival was in jeopardy, the Marine Corps developed new core competencies to 
remain relevant and avoid extinction.  When they did this, new formal doctrine manuals were 
written and published.   
 The four primary periods in the evolution of Marine Corps doctrine are: the period from 
the American Revolution to the start of the Spanish-American War (1776-1898), from the Spanish-
American War to the end of the Banana Wars (1835-1935), from the Banana Wars until the 
creation of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) (1935-1985), and from 
the creation of the MCCDC until the present day (1985-present).   
 In the first period of Marine Corps doctrine - the American Revolution to the Spanish-
American War (1776-1898), the Marine Corps role consisted of shipboard policing and manning 
naval gunfire batteries on the Navy’s battleships.  In 1834, Congressional legislation made the 
Marine Corps officially part of the Department of the Navy.99  In the second period of Marine 
                                                           
97 Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the US Marine Corps (Naval Institute Press, 1984).  
Krulak argues that there were 15 occasions in the Marines’ history where its organizational survival was in jeopardy. 
98 Alan. R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Free Press, 
1991), p. 6. 
99 Long, 2010, p. 32. 
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Corps doctrine - the Spanish-American War to the end of the Banana Wars (1898-1935) - the 
Corps found itself searching for a “distinctive area of competence” and an “undisputed jurisdiction 
over a function” to ensure organizational survival.100  U.S. intervention in the Caribbean at the 
outbreak of the century provided the Marines with the opportunity to shift from the shipboard 
mission to expeditionary warfare.  Expeditionary warfare consisted of two different types of 
missions: the advanced base mission to seize and defend bases abroad and the small wars mission 
to conduct land-based warfare and irregular operations as part of American imperial policing.101   
 In regard to the advanced base mission, the U.S. Navy (of which the Marine Corps was 
now a part) published the 1915 Landing Force Manual - the organization’s first official doctrine.102  
The Marine Corps continued to refine advanced base doctrine, releasing the Tentative Manual on 
Landing Operations103 in 1935 and the Landing Operations Doctrine104 in 1938.  A Marine force 
dedicated to advanced base operations known as the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was also formed 
at that time.105  With respect to the small wars mission, the banana wars in Haiti (1915-1934), the 
Dominican Republic (1916-1924), and Nicaragua (1927-1933) allowed the Marines to develop an 
expertise in the small wars mission which they could use to establish themselves as the preeminent 
service for fighting those wars.106  After the Dominican Republic, the Marines took more definitive 
informal measures to institutionalize doctrine for small wars.  In 1934, the Marine Corps 
                                                           
100 Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (New York: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 7. 
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103 Tentative Manual on Landing Operations United States Navy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
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Commandant, Major General James Breckenridge, ordered the production of a comprehensive 
field manual on conducting irregular warfare.  This document would become known as the Small 
Wars Journal, and from its publication in 1935 until the Army publication of Field Manual 3-24 
Counterinsurgency Operations in December 2006, it served as the most insightful military manual 
on the conduct of irregular warfare.107   
 In the third period of Marine Corps doctrine - the end of the Banana Wars until the mid-
1980’s (1935-1985) - the Marines fought in numerous wars and participated in multiple 
interventions, while also fighting to preserve the advanced base mission and the Fleet Marine 
Force.  In the interwar period, the Marine Corps conducted amphibious exercises which would 
later serve as the basis for amphibious operations in World War II.108  In 1948, the Marines drafted 
and published Amphibious Operations - Employment of Helicopters (PHIB-31)109 - a vertical 
envelopment doctrine on the use of helicopters in amphibious warfare.110  As they had for the 
Army, the nuclear explosions at the end of World War II had a profound effect on the Marines, 
leading the service to explore options for fighting on a nuclear battlefield.  
 In 1955, Landing Force Bulletin 17111 provided Marine doctrine on the integration of 
helicopters into amphibious operations.  Doctrine on helicopters would eventually lead to the 
development of the 1963 Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the concept of vertical 
envelopment.  MAGTAFs are “combined arms forces consisting of aviation, ground, and logistic 
                                                           
107 Bickel, 2001, p. 129.  See Chapter 6 for an extensive account of the development of the Small Wars Journal. 
108 MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Navy, United 
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109 Amphibious Operations Employment of Helicopters (Tentative), PHIB-31 (Marine Corps Schools, 1948). 
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Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 455-456.  Marine early helicopter doctrine faced opposition in the Marines and the 
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elements.”112  By the late 1970’s, the Marine focus on seizing advanced bases diminished as carrier 
aviation reduced the necessity for those types of operations.113  The Marines employed MAGTAFs 
in the Korean War and congressional legislation in 1952 supported the MAGTAF concept by 
organizing the Marines with three combat divisions and three aircraft wings.  From the end of the 
Vietnam War until the early 1980s there is no record of any substantial doctrinal innovations.  
 In the fourth and final period of Marine Corps doctrine - from the establishment of the 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) until today (1985-present) - the Marine 
Corps made a deliberate effort to formalize its doctrine.  Today, Marine Corps doctrine is less 
voluminous than Army doctrine, but the Corps views doctrinal processes and the importance of 
keystone doctrine in much the same way as the Army.  In 1987, the Marines created the MCCDC 
to develop “concepts, plans, doctrine, and training” for the Corps.114  Like the Army’s TRADOC 
created thirteen years earlier, the MCCDC serves as the Corps’ proponent for the development and 
publication of doctrine.  The establishment of the MCCDC formalized Marine Corps doctrinal 
processes and initiated the publication of the Corps keystone manual at more regular intervals.  
 In 1989, the Marine Corps published its first keystone publication since the Landing Force 
Bulletins - a manual called the Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1 Warfighting.115  According 
to General A.M. Gray - the Marine Corps commandant responsible for the doctrine - the 
Warfighting manual “provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to 
fight.”116  A comprehensive account of the development of FMFM 1 noted that the manual 
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“signaled the official adoption of maneuver warfare.”117  The timing of this maneuver warfare 
doctrine is significant because it was released at about the same time as the Army’s AirLand Battle 
doctrine.  This doctrine was updated in 1997 with the publication of Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting.118   
 Just prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Marine Corps released MCDP 1-0 Marine 
Corps Operations.119  This manual was significant because it operationalized the warfighting 
concept introduced in the 1989 and 1997 manuals, and it included doctrine on the Marine’s primary 
expeditionary force, the MAGTAFs.  The 2001 manual provides the Marine Corps’ vision of 
expeditionary operations and other concepts like operational maneuver from the sea and ship-to-
objective maneuver.120  The 2001 manual was updated in 2011.121  The 2011 manual reflected 
lessons learned from operations in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to Marine 
humanitarian and crisis response operations.  Of note, the 2001 manual was published the same 
year that the Army published its Full Spectrum Operations and the 2011 manual coincided with 
the Army’s publication of its Unified Land Operations doctrine.   
 Unlike the Army which published 20 editions of its keystone doctrine from 1905 until the 
present day, the release of Marine Corps keystone publications was more sporadic.  From 1905-
2016, the Marine Corps published 9 editions of its keystone doctrine.  Four of the first five manuals 
focused on amphibious and advanced base operations.  The 1935 Small Wars Journal focused on 
the other element of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary concept - the conduct of counterinsurgency 
and irregular warfare.  With the establishment of the MCCDC in 1987, the Marine Corps 
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formalized its doctrinal processes, and since then the Marines have released four doctrinal 
publications - the 1989 FMFM 1 Warfighting, 1997 MCDP 1 Warfighting, and two versions of 
MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations in 2001 and 2011.  Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps did 
not brand any of its publications.  
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Chapter 3. Doctrinal Change for Conventional Warfare in the U.S. Army   
 The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a case study analysis of three instances of doctrinal 
change in the United States Army - the 1950’s pentomic doctrine, the 1976 Active Defense 
doctrine, and the 1982/1986 AirLand Battle doctrine.  All three cases are doctrines that focus on 
conventional warfare.1  Conventional warfare refers to a certain type of fighting from the 
perspective of the state military.  This type of fighting is usually defined by: (1) combat between 
two (or more) military organizations that are subordinate to different states, (2) mid- to high-
intensity operations involving large-scale maneuver of military formations and the application of 
high volumes of firepower, (3) operational and strategic objectives related to the destruction, 
annihilation, or unconditional surrender of an adversary, (4) the absence of civil measures oriented 
on the civilian population,2 and (5) minimal (to no) coordination between the military and other 
agencies of the state.3  The three doctrines in this chapter were developed by the U.S. Army for 
the purpose of conventional warfare.   
 Using the theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter and the structured, 
focused case study approach, I analyze the sources of each doctrine.  All three instances of 
doctrinal change are peacetime innovations that were developed during post-war periods.  The 
pentomic doctrine was formulated after World War II and Active Defense and AirLand Battle 
came after the Vietnam War.  Only one of the doctrines - AirLand Battle - was actually employed 
                                                           
1 The use of the label "conventional" to refer to firepower-intensive, state-centric, and industrialized type of 
warfare is unfortunate because of the connotation of the term.  "Conventional" suggests that this type of warfare is 
standard, typical, and most common.  While warfare of this type might be the dominant convention during certain 
historical periods, most wars throughout history have actually been smaller scale civil wars (or intra-state wars). 
2 Examples of civil measures are: civil construction, road-building or other public works, military government 
(or operations designed to affect governance), agricultural reforms, judicial (including martial law), etc. 
3 Austin Long, First War Syndrome: Military Culture, Professionalization, and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
(Ph.D. diss. MIT, 2010), argues that total war involves large units, massive and unrestrained use of firepower, and 
minimal coordination with other agencies. 
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and validated in war.  The pentomic doctrine and Active Defense were major innovations, but after 
they were implemented, the Army jettisoned them.  
 I analyze the three doctrines in chronological order.  For each, I employ a balance of power 
approach to explore the cause of the doctrinal change and an organizational approach to understand 
why the change happened in the way that it did.  After providing an overview of each doctrine, I 
examine the environmental shift(s) that led to the change and I test hypotheses on civilian 
intervention, inter- and intra-service rivalry, organizational survival, budgets, and organizational 
culture.  In the chapter’s conclusion, I discuss implications for understanding military doctrinal 
change. 
 While I am primarily concerned with the source(s) of doctrinal innovation, I assess the 
content of each of the doctrines to gain insight on the source(s).  My analysis draws from Army 
doctrinal manuals, primary, and secondary sources.  When necessary, I explore Army educational 
curricula to better understand a particular doctrine.  I also assess organizational structural changes 
that occur in synchrony with doctrinal changes.  The pentomic doctrine came with a major 
organizational change that fundamentally altered the Army division.  
3.1. The Major Doctrines 
3.1.1. The Pentomic Doctrine 
 After fighting in the Korean War, the U.S. Army radically changed its core structure - the 
infantry division - to a nuclear-capable formation known as the pentomic division.  The pentomic 
division was the most significant structural innovation in the organization’s history.  Often 
overlooked because it was never put into practice, the doctrine that supported the pentomic 
construct was equally innovative.  Despite the time and energy that Army leaders put into the 
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pentomic innovation, by 1959 the organization jettisoned the construct and reverted to a more 
traditional structure and supporting doctrine.   
 In hindsight, it is clear that the Army knew at the time that no reorganization scheme could 
make a large fighting unit viable in the face of hundreds of nuclear detonations. Yet, Army leaders 
promoted the pentomic concept as a feasible and necessary innovation throughout the 1950s.  The 
purpose of this section is to determine the source of the pentomic innovation, paying careful 
attention to changes in the external environment and the role of factors internal to the Army.   
3.1.1.1. The Post-World War II Period (1945-1950) 
 Examining the immediate post-World War II period lends insight on the Army’s theory of 
victory in the years leading up to the pentomic innovation.  From May 1945 to June 1947, the 
Army post-war demobilization reduced the organization’s personnel strength from 8,291,336 
soldiers to 989,664 soldiers.4  The Army demobilized quickly due to pressure from Congress and 
a war-weary public.  The demobilization was not well-synchronized with remaining wartime 
demands, and the final personnel end-strength was divorced from any assessment of the short-term 
strategic environment.  To assist with the demobilization process and to determine postwar 
strategy, the Army established the Special Planning Division (SPD),5 and created a series of boards 
to evaluate its performance in World War II.  In general, the consensus amongst Army leaders was 
that the Army’s success in World War II meant that radical doctrinal and/or organizational 
innovations were not necessary. 
 The 1945 nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the success of firebombing in 
Japan led some analysts to argue that air power alone could enable the U.S. to achieve national 
                                                           
4 John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry Part I: Regular Army (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, United States Army, 1972), p. 71. 
5 Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 8-9. 
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objectives.  Air advocates such as Generals Curtis LeMay, Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, and Carl A. 
Spaatz, contended that Army ground forces were becoming increasingly obsolete.  The attack on 
Pearl Harbor was a vigorous demonstration of the overwhelming effectiveness of new airpower 
technologies.6  A 1946 report by General Joseph W. Stilwell argued that any future surprise attacks 
on the United States similar to Pearl Harbor should be met with airpower, aerial bombing, and 
long-range missiles.7  Army ground combat operations were important but less important than 
airpower.  
 Though Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight Eisenhower, argued for the continued 
existence of the Army Air Forces (AAF), the National Security Act of 1947 established a National 
Military Establishment led by the Secretary of Defense and including the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 
the heads of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and, now, a separate Air Force.8  Efforts by 
airpower enthusiasts to focus postwar planning on strategic airpower (rather than tactical airpower 
in support of ground troops) were successful in persuading civilian decision makers to establish 
an independent Air Force.9  The establishment of an Air Force reduced intraservice friction in the 
Army but it generated interservice rivalry between the Army and Air Force over missions and 
funding.10  In 1949, the new chief of staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley, acknowledged the 
importance of strategic airpower, but he cautioned against “starv[ing] the Army” in the effort to 
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support the Air Force.11  This new rivalry would affect decisions related to doctrine and 
organizational structure in the years to come.12   
 The Army’s first post-World War II keystone doctrinal publication - the 1949 Field Service 
Regulations FM 100-5 Operations - was approved by General Bradley and published on August 
15th, 1949.13  The manual was the first keystone doctrine to be approved under the auspices of the 
Department of the Army - the organization’s new designation in lieu of the War Department.  Cold 
War escalation led Army planners to assume that the next battlefield would be on the European 
continent.14  The 1949 manual was oriented on that vision of warfare.  The contention of some that 
the delivery of nuclear weapons via strategic airpower would change the nature of warfare and 
render ground combat unnecessary, represented a threat to the Army’s jurisdictional domain.   
 The 1949 manual emphasized offensive operations, large-scale maneuver, the centrality of 
the infantry branch within a broader combined arms approach, nine principles of war (objective, 
simplicity, unity of command, offensive, maneuver, mass, economy of forces, surprise, and 
security), and the dominance of the Army over the other services.  It also assumed that the Air 
Force would employ nuclear weapons in the first stage of war, and the Army would follow with a 
large-scale ground force operation.  The 1949 manual was a mechanism by which Army leaders 
expressed the importance of an effective ground combat force.  The employment of nuclear 
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weapons was not mentioned in the manual.15  The Army grudgingly acknowledged the increasing 
relevance of strategic nuclear weapons but rejected the idea that those weapons would render 
ground combat unnecessary.  Infantry divisions would “fight sustained close combat…to gain and 
hold ground.”16  Armored divisions would conduct “deep penetration and seizure of decisive 
objectives…and [cause] the destruction of hostile armor.”17 
 In 1949, the Army initiated a study to assess the feasibility of employing nuclear weapons 
in a tactical role.  Three important papers on the subject were published shortly thereafter: (1) the 
Army Field Forces published, “Tactical Employment of the Atomic Bomb,” (2) the Weapons 
System Evaluation Group (WSEG) published, “A Study on Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb,” 
and (3) Major General James M. Gavin published, “The Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb.”18  By 
the early 1950s, the consensus of many in the Army favored the tactical deployment of nuclear 
weapons.  Two faculty members at the Command and General Staff College produced “Atomic 
Weapons in Land Combat,” which argued, “Atomic weapons, tactically employed, should be 
incorporated into our first line of defense against any creeping aggression.”19  The Army was 
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3.1.1.2. The Korean War (1950-1953) 
 At the outset of the Korean War, most of the Army’s divisions had major equipment 
shortages and their personnel strength barely reached 70 percent of their authorized strength.20  
The American public was still war-weary, the Army’s budget was constrained, and Congress 
instituted personnel strength ceilings.21  The Army entered the Korean War unprepared for limited 
war and at a poor state of readiness.  General Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of the Eighth 
Army in Korea and the American commander in the Far East, stated that the Army was at a level 
of “shameful readiness” when the war began.22  Army forces stationed in the Far East before the 
outbreak of the Korean War functioned “not as soldiers, but as policeman, and [therefore] they 
were not trained for combat, for such training would have interfered with their police duties.”23   
 The Army’s vision of warfare rested on a belief that the next war would be global and 
similar in terrain and tactics to World War II.  Neither the Army’s organizational construct nor its 
doctrine were oriented on a more limited war like the one in Korea.  Not only was the war more 
limited than the total warfare of the World Wars, but it was the first time that U.S. Army units 
served America and a broader United Nations effort.24  As a result of its unpreparedness, the Army 
sustained significant casualties in the initial battles of the war during the summer of 1950 until the 
Inchon landing in September 1950.  The most notorious example of American unpreparedness was 
Task Force Smith - a battle in which American units were under-strength, under-trained, and 
under-equipped.  Eventually, after improved performance in combat, a cease-fire was initiated on 
July 27, 1953 and the U.S. settled for a negotiated armistice.   
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 Despite clear limitations in the Army’s effectiveness in combat operations in Korea, the 
Army took the official position after the war that the organization’s keystone doctrine did not need 
to be modified.  According to Doughty, “one of the training bulletins of the Army Field Forces 
concluded, ‘The mass of material from Korea…reaffirms the soundness of US doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, organization, and equipment.’”25  The Army fought in the Korean War with the same 
weapons and organizational structure that it had during World War II.  Tactics were modified 
slightly but the Army’s doctrine was unchanged.26   
 The Army’s post-Korean War interest in three missile programs - space exploration, air 
defense (including surface-to-air missiles, SAMs), and tactical surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) 
- fanned the flames of interservice rivalry between the Army and the Air Force.  Confusion over 
which service had jurisdiction over air defense operations (particularly, continental defense 
operations) led to friction between the Army and the Air Force in 1956, manifested best in the 
Nike-Talos competition.  The Nike was an Army long-range SAM with a nuclear warhead.  The 
Talos was a Navy missile in the developmental stage that the Air Force announced it would 
acquire.  The debate over which service would have jurisdiction over SAMs was only decided by 
the direct intervention of Secretary of Defense Wilson who established Army responsibility for the 
SAMS program.  While this was a short-term victory for the Army, it soon became clear that the 
enormous cost of the development of nuclear delivery systems and SAMs designed to destroy 
strategic bombers would deprive the Army of much-needed funds in other areas of 
modernization.27   
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3.1.1.3. The Pentomic Era (1953-1958) 
 Political decisions on the purpose and use of nuclear weapons affected the Army 
considerably in the immediate post-Korean War period.  President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New 
Look, the 1953 National Security Document 162/2 which granted nuclear weapons equal status 
with all other weapons, and the 1954 concept of massive retaliation all suggested that nuclear 
weapons were the new weapon of choice for policymakers.28  Civilian policymakers argued that 
nuclear weapons could serve as a powerful deterrent.  The threat to use nuclear weapons would 
intimidate adversaries and maintain order because of the known destructive potential of nuclear 
bombs.  This logic caused a paradigm shift in policymakers’ perception of the military’s purpose.  
Rather than field and train a powerful military for the purpose of fighting a war, nuclear weapons 
afforded policymakers the ability to field and train a powerful military to avoid war.29   
 The new emphasis on nuclear deterrence increased the prominence of the Navy and the Air 
Force since those two services had primary control over the United States’ nuclear capability.30  
The ability of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC) to conduct a nuclear attack gave that 
service preeminent status in the military hierarchy of the Eisenhower administration.  Although 
the Army and Marine Corps both endured the preponderance of the fighting in the Korean War, in 
the post war environment both services found themselves having to justify their relevance in a 
nuclear world. 
 The introduction of nuclear weapons - a new military technology - put pressure on the 
Army to initiate doctrinal change.  However, rather than responding to civilian intervention to 
compel change, the Army initiated doctrinal and organizational change processes on its own 
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initiative.  With the increased standing of the Navy and the Air Force, the Army felt pressure to 
prevent its irrelevance or at worst, its extinction.  The Army began to explore the concept of limited 
nuclear warfare which involved the employment of small, nuclear weapons in a tactical capacity.  
As early as 1949, the Army began drafting a manual on the tactical use of atomic weapons at its 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC).  The same year, the Army also added instruction 
on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons into the CGSC curriculum.31  Under the direction 
of the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins (1949-1953), the Army developed atomic-
capable artillery in the form of a 280mm gun called the M65 Atomic Cannon that employed a 
nuclear projectile.  The Army successfully tested that system in May 1953.  By 1954, the Army 
began equipping its units with a nuclear capable surface-to-surface missile known as the Honest 
John Rocket.32 
 One of the most prominent voices in the Army on the employment of tactical nuclear 
weapons was that of Major General Gavin, the former commander of the 82 nd Airborne Division 
in World War II.  In “The Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb,” Gavin wrote, “The greater the 
explosive effect of the atomic bomb the more effective it will be as a tactical weapon.”33  He argued 
that tactical nuclear weapons could be effective on the battlefield against Soviet and Chinese 
forces34.  In 1951, the Army released Field Manual 100-31 Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons35 
which validated Gavin’s logic.  Regardless of their stance on the employment of tactical nuclear 
weapons, most Army leaders at least realized that limited nuclear war offered an alternative to the 
undesirable mission of serving as constabulary forces as part of an army of occupation after a 
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nuclear attack.36  Limited nuclear war also helped the Army articulate its mission at a time when 
some officers in the organization bemoaned the lack of a clear mandate.37 
1954 Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 Operations 
 At the end of the Korean War, the Army’s keystone doctrine was still the 1949 Field 
Service Regulations - a manual written before the war that ignored the employment of nuclear 
weapons.  After the war, the Army initiated a process to update its keystone doctrine to capture 
wartime lessons learned.  The Army’s next official keystone doctrine - the 1954 Field Service 
Regulations FM 100-5 Operations - was the organization’s attempt to synthesize those lessons.38  
The Army also used the new doctrine to formalize a modified vision of warfare which signaled an 
increased interest in the employment of tactical nuclear weapons.  The 1954 FSR was an 
incremental step in the Army’s march towards a new organizational structure and doctrine which 
revolved around a vision of warfare centered on an atomic battlefield. 
 Compared to its predecessor, the 1954 FSR included more guidance on the role of atomic 
weapons in combat.  According to the manual, “Atomic weapons provide a commander with the 
most powerful destructive force yet…The proper integration of atomic firepower and maneuver of 
the forces is of utmost importance…The Commander may consider atomic fires as additional 
firepower…or he may fit his maneuver plan to the use of atomic fires.”39  The new doctrine 
emphasized nuclear weapons on the battlefield to a degree not yet seen, but the manual stopped 
short of suggesting that nuclear weapons required the modification of tactical doctrine.  The 
manual noted, “The integration of atomic weapons into tactical operations does not change tactical 
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doctrine for the employment of firepower…”40  Army leaders viewed nuclear weapons as an 
enabler of existing tactics for offensive operations.  Chemical, biological, and radiological agents 
could be used “to reinforce the effects of the attack.”41  Armored vehicles such as tanks were 
presumed to be the most effective platform on an atomic battlefield, and an essential capability for 
defeating a numerically superior enemy.42  Given the devastating ability for atomic weapons to 
destroy concentrated forces, the manual emphasized the importance of the dispersion of troops on 
the battlefield.43 
Interservice Rivalry  
 The character of the 1954 FSR was shaped by interservice rivalry.  The manual stated that 
the Army is “the decisive component of the military structure” because of ground forces’ ability 
to close with and destroy the enemy, to seize and control ground, and to defend critical areas.  It 
went on, “Army combat forces do not support the operations of any other component.”44  The new 
doctrine made a clear case that the Army was the military’s dominant service, and as such, when 
the Army interacted with other services in combat, it would do so only under conditions in which 
those services supported its operations.  The doctrine acknowledged the importance of the Air 
Force but it confined that service’s role to transportation, logistics, defensive cover, mid-range fire 
support, and long-range weapons delivery against rear area installations - all done “toward insuring 
the success of the land force operation.”45 
 Interservice rivalry was such an important factor during this period in both military and 
non-military circles that there was a front-page article on the release of the 1954 Field Service 
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Regulations in The New York Times on January 4, 1955.46  The article contended that the manual 
asserted the primacy of the Army and noted the irrelevance of the Air Force in smaller wars in 
Greece, Korea, and Indochina when air attacks were not permitted on the home territory of the 
Communist enemy.  This New York Times article is the only instance in which an Army doctrinal 
manual was analyzed and discussed on the front page of the nation’s most prominent newspaper.47 
 On a number of occasions throughout the 1950s, Army leaders resisted, often publicly, 
President Eisenhower’s New Look and the policy of massive retaliation - two programs which the 
Army perceived as a threat to organizational survival, as a rationale for reduced funding, and as a 
cause of low morale and frustration throughout the ranks.  According to Lieutenant General Gavin, 
New Look represented an “increasing emphasis on our strategic retaliatory power at the expense 
of our so-called ‘conventional’ forces.”48  Army leaders viewed New Look as a direct threat to 
personnel end-strength and the role of ground forces in combat.  Chief of Staff General Ridgway 
voiced his displeasure in a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and those 
remarks became public when the Committee chairman gave them to the press.49  After retiring in 
June 1955, Ridgway sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson - a major proponent of the New 
Look - in which he labeled the military “inadequate in strength and improperly proportioned” - an 
indictment of an over reliance on nuclear weapons and the disproportionate allocation of resources 
to the Air Force.50  
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 General Ridgway’s successor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, and his Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Research and Development, Lieutenant General Gavin, were also critical of the Eisenhower 
administration’s policies.   These officers made the claim that all-out nuclear war would be so 
destructive that states would refrain from employing nuclear weapons, and instead engage in 
limited, non-nuclear conflict.  This idea - that states with nuclear weapons will avoid war at the 
nuclear level of violence and will instead engage in conflict at lower levels of violence - gained 
prominence in the political science literature.  According to Glenn Snyder (1965), “the greater the 
stability of the ‘strategic’ balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at lower 
levels of violence.”51  Or, summarized by Jervis (1984),  “To the extent that the military balance 
is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”52  
Adversaries who possess nuclear weapons know that they will both seek to avoid nuclear war, but 
this “insurance policy” also increases the chances that they will engage in non-nuclear war.  If true, 
the paradox53 implies that the U.S. “needed to seek countervailing conventional and even tactical 
nuclear superiority over the Soviets to deter Soviet aggression, especially against U.S. friends and 
allies, for the sake of whom the United States could not credibly threaten its own survival.”54 
 The extent of interservice rivalry between the Army and Air Force was most forcefully 
articulated in an internal study that was leaked to The New York Times and discussed in another 
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front-page article, this time on May 19, 1956.55  The article quoted a leaked, classified Army study 
entitled, “A New Great Debate - Problems of National Security” (but informally known as the 
“Colonels’ Revolt”56), which claimed that the United States was unprepared to defeat the 
Communist threat, primarily because of too much reliance on the Air Force and the Navy.  The 
study (in addition to two other internal Army papers that were leaked to The Times) pointed to the 
Army’s “indispensable role” in military operations in the Korean War and the “inability of air 
forces to prevent an enemy from deploying and maintaining large and effective land combat 
forces.”57  In a counter-study, the Air Force claimed it was the “dominant force in the Korean War” 
and it pointed out that in World War II, “Japan surrendered with an army of 1,300,000 men intact, 
well-equipped, and capable of contest,” primarily because the presence of airpower made an Army 
invasion unnecessary.58  The debate between the Army and the Air Force is a distinguishing feature 
of this period and it had a major effect on the Army’s pentomic innovation, discussed in detail, 
below. 
The Pentomic Division and Its Doctrine 
 The Army resisted the growing U.S. emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons because such 
a theory of victory afforded little role for the organization on the battlefield.  However, nuclear 
weapons were a paradigm-shifting military technology that demanded that the Army change its 
doctrine and/or its organizational structure.  Army leaders amended post-World War II theories of 
victory which envisioned non-nuclear combat on a European battlefield.  New theories of victory 
developed by Army leaders like Taylor and Gavin gradually began to recognize the potential value 
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of tactical nuclear weapons.  The Army grudgingly embraced tactical nuclear weapons based on a 
pragmatic assessment of the political landscape in the mid- to late-1950s.  Years of resistance to 
President Eisenhower’s policies had done little for the Army.  Senior civilian decision-makers 
were firm in their contention that the nature of warfare had fundamentally changed with the advent 
of nuclear weapons, and there was little patience left for an intransigent Army.  The leaked 
“Colonel’s Revolt” and other internal Army studies already risked threatening the Army’s 
reputation within the defense establishment.  The Army recognized that embracing tactical nuclear 
weapons was a way to demonstrate the organization’s willingness to play ball in the new strategic 
environment.  
 Bacevich asserts that the Army was predisposed to tactical nuclear weapons based on its 
long-standing emphasis on firepower and new technology.59  While Bacevich is correct that the 
Army prioritized firepower over maneuver throughout much of its history up until this point, I 
refute the assertion that the Army was predisposed to new technology.  The historically infantry-
centric army emphasized people over technology and the organization as a whole was often slow 
to adopt emerging technologies.  The Army was slow to adopt machine-guns and armored vehicles 
throughout the early twentieth century.  In these cases, the Army’s dominant branch - the infantry 
- perceived these technological advances as a threat to their organizational domain, and, therefore, 
leaders in the infantry pushed back against their incorporation into infantry doctrine.  Even in 1958, 
we see an Army emphasis on people over technology.  That year, Colonel William DePuy noted, 
“No, Mr. Infantryman, you are not obsolete - you have never been more relevant to your country’s 
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need, more important to its future.  For no one yet has discovered how to acquire or defend land 
areas without you.”60   
 Whether it was due to an inclination to embrace new technology or a pragmatic assessment 
of the environment, Army leaders became enthused about the prospect of using tactical nuclear 
weapons.  A military doctrine focused on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons strengthened 
the Army’s case for its relevance in the pentomic era, and bolstered the Army’s contention that it 
needed a manpower increase.61  Rather than viewing tactical nuclear weapons as a revolutionary 
development, the Army believed that these weapons were similar to highly effective artillery.62  
Army leaders argued that the strategic nuclear arsenals possessed by the United States and the 
Soviet Union were off-setting and balancing.  Tactical nuclear weapons did not create an offsetting 
balance in the Army’s view because such weapons would not lead to escalation (the gradual use 
of larger and larger nuclear weapons). This stance was based on an assumption that the Soviet 
Union would use restraint.  
 In 1955, once the Army determined that it needed to change, the key question for the 
organization was how it would change.  Army leaders decided to fundamentally overhaul the 
organizational structure of their primary fighting unit - the infantry division.  The new construct, 
known as the pentomic division, was developed after the publication of the Army’s last keystone 
doctrine - the 1954 Field Service Regulations - but it was formalized doctrinally in updates to the 
manual in 1956 and 1958.  
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 The Army conducted a series of exercises to replicate the atomic battlefield and concluded 
that the existing infantry division structure was ill-suited to atomic warfare.  The Atomic Field 
Army-1 (ATFA-1) field tests suggested that a non-linear force structure would function more 
effectively on a nuclear battlefield.  The Army’s VII Corps conducted exercises under the direction 
of Major General Gavin.  Gavin believed that the armored division was the only existing 
organizational structure that was well-suited to atomic warfare.63  The infantry division needed the 
ability to extend from a traditional depth of five to ten miles to a much further depth of one-hundred 
to one-hundred and fifty miles.  Conventional artillery needed to be replaced with missiles that 
had much longer range.64  The AFTA-1 tests were conducted in 1955 with the 1st Armored Division 
at Fort Hood, Texas and the 47th Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia.65  These studies led 
to the reorganization of the 101st Airborne Division in September 1956 and the submission of the 
Army’s official request to the secretary of defense and the president for the reorganization of all 
Army divisions to the pentomic structure.66   
 The pentomic battalion became known as a battle-group, each battle-group was organized 
with five companies, and five battle groups formed one division (hence the name, pentomic 
division).  Each battle group was smaller than the preexisting regiment and larger than the 
battalion.  The purpose was to enable mobility while ensuring survivability.67  The division 
commander personally controlled the battle groups through special task forces which served as 
command and control (C2) nodes.  The division now included an armor battalion consisting of five 
tank companies.  At the end of the reorganization, each infantry division would decrease in size 
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by about 3,000 men.68  The division headquarters possessed control over nuclear-armed artillery 
and Honest John rockets.  While most previous organizational changes focused their aim at the 
division-level (and no lower than the regiment-level), in this case Army leaders focused their 
emphasis all the way down to the battalion-level.69  The belief was that the battalion-level was the 
lowest possible echelon capable of conducting independent operations in depth.  Each battle-group 
could disperse quickly and constantly shift to different positions on the battlefield.  As Bacevich 
recounts in detail, Army leaders believed that the pentomic division structure would maximize 
dispersion, flexibility, and mobility.70 
 The new pentomic structure and its corresponding doctrine were championed by Army 
Chiefs of Staff Ridgway and Taylor from 1955 to 1958.  In a move designed to ensure the Army’s 
survival and to promote the organization’s relevance on the atomic battlefield, they contended that 
the employment of limited war with tactical nuclear weapons was a mechanism that the United 
States could use to minimize the chances of major atomic warfare.71  Again, this contention rested 
on the assumption that the Soviets would not escalate a tactical nuclear war to a strategic nuclear 
war. 
 The premise behind the pentomic innovation was that it enabled Army units to operate in 
a dispersed manner.  Units at the battalion-level could now fight independently from one another, 
thereby minimizing the effects that a catastrophic nuclear blast would have on the force as a whole.  
The traditional division structure was an independent administrative unit capable of supplying 
itself for a combat operation.  However, the long supply trains that this required rendered the 
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division vulnerable on a nuclear battlefield since the trains were not mobile and could not disperse 
quickly.  According to Gavin, “Supplies will have to be moved far to the rear, out of division 
responsibility.”72  The new pentomic construct needed to survive a nuclear attack and maintain the 
ability to win in a tactical nuclear engagement.  Units in the pentomic structure needed to be pliable 
and sustainable.  Pliability was established by increasing the number of units under a commander’s 
control to provide him with numerous options for deploying forces on a non-linear battlefield.  
Sustainability was established by assigning units additional support assets capable of maintenance, 
reconnaissance, medical support, and communications.73 
 The final, approved pentomic division concept was unveiled at the Army’s annual 
Association of the United States Army conference in October 1956.  According to General Taylor, 
the pentomic division would optimize the force for the atomic battlefield while still maintaining 
the Army’s ability to conduct warfare on a non-atomic battlefield.  The Army, responding to the 
changed nature of warfare, developed what it perceived to be a “goldilocks” solution designed to 
not only justify the continued relevance of the Army but also to maximize the Army’s role in a 
conventional (non-nuclear) fight.  With the pentomic division structure, the Army focused 
primarily on the greatest threat - nuclear weapons - with the underlying assumption that an Army 
that is optimized for the atomic battlefield can also succeed on a non-atomic battlefield.  The 
organization planned primarily for the most dangerous course of action rather than the most likely 
course of action.  
 The pentomic concept called for a renewed emphasis on penetration as the primary method 
of offensive operations.  This approach was based on the assumption that a tactical nuclear blast 
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would devastate the enemy’s front, enabling mobile American forces in the pentomic construct to 
speed through the resulting gap to execute “the technical tasks and finishing touches” of the 
offensive operation.74  Army forces that successfully penetrated the gap would then destroy enemy 
logistics, reserve units, and communications to its rear.  According to Brigadier General William 
F. Train, the Assistant Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, the value of this 
approach was that it enabled “numerically inferior forces…[to] attain the capability of defeating 
numerically superior forces.”75 
 To carry out this type of offensive operation, Army forces needed dispersion, mobility, 
improved communications, and greater flexibility.76  Since attacking forces had to move in the 
open without cover or concealment, they would be particularly vulnerable to nuclear weapons.  
The requirement to maintain dispersion violated one of the Army’s principles of combat - mass.  
Mass refers to the concentration of soldiers at the decisive point.  According to Train, mass on the 
atomic battlefield was different in that, “Atomic weapons can of themselves create the effect of 
mass in a period of seconds or minutes.”77  Tactical nuclear weapons would enable the Army to 
achieve mass without concentrating troops, thereby preserving another principle of war - economy 
of force - the imperative to employ men, weapons, and equipment in the most effective (and 
economical) way possible. 
 Bacevich describes the folly of the Army’s logic with respect to offensive operations under 
the pentomic doctrine - “A few well-placed tactical warheads would accomplish what millions of 
shells fired over periods of days or weeks had failed to do in World War I. Armed with this faith 
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in nuclear firepower, the Army believed the only question to be the technical one of learning how 
to pass exploitation forces through an area scorched by nuclear fires.”78  The critical question for 
a penetration through an enemy force devastated by a nuclear explosion was whether or not the 
maneuvering American soldiers would be harmed from the nuclear fallout. 
 In a highly publicized nuclear test in 1955 called Desert Rock VI in Yucca Flats, Nevada, 
an armored force maneuvered approximately two miles from a 30-kiloton atomic device and 
apparently suffered no ill-effects.  However, according to a classified Army after-action report, the 
exercise was labeled “an unrealistic maneuver” since the administrative posture that troops 
maintained would have rendered them vulnerable to a true enemy threat.79  During the exercise, 
high radiation levels inside Army tanks required the commander to maneuver his forces away from 
the tactical objective into an administrative zone.  Additionally, the support vehicles that a unit 
would have to rely on in real combat did not participate in the exercise. 
 Pentomic doctrine on defensive operations was innovative in that it ran counter to 
traditional defensive doctrine.  The requirement for dispersion was challenging in a defensive 
operation because it required forces to separate themselves at distances that made mutual support 
impossible.  Under the new pentomic concept, rather than executing a traditional linear defense or 
a defense-in-depth, Army forces were required to conduct an area defense with small, mobile 
elements that could operate independently for unknown periods of time.  In the area defense, the 
defender “attempts to canalize the attacker into noncritical areas…He ejects or destroys the enemy 
and restores the position by employing concentrated firepower, atomic, and non-atomic, in 
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conjunction with vigorous counterattacks.”80  Defensive units would employ tactical nuclear 
weapons to disrupt or to slow attempted enemy penetrations.  This type of defensive operation 
would succeed only if Army units were able to conduct surveillance in the gaps between their 
independently operating units.  Effective surveillance demanded reliable communications and 
other forms of control.  A pentomic defensive operation would only work if Army forces employed 
nuclear weapons, but it is not clear how those forces would do so without causing their own 
destruction. 
 The establishment of the pentomic innovation had a deep effect on the Army’s military 
education system.  Faculty at Army schools taught officers and soldiers about the requirements of 
the atomic battlefield.  The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) transitioned its 
curriculum from a deliberate focus on a conventional, non-nuclear battlefield to the atomic 
battlefield and the pentomic concept in the 1957-1958 academic year.81  By 1959, the Army had 
made substantial progress in its effort to redefine its mission in the atomic era.  Army leaders 
succeeded in developing a fundamentally new organizational structure and a doctrine in support 
of that structure. 
3.1.1.4. Understanding the Sources of the Pentomic Innovation 
Environmental Shifts 
 The environmental shift that affected the Army’s theory of victory in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s was the introduction of nuclear weapons.  The Army’s initial response to the 
resounding effectiveness of the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the military’s infatuation 
with the new weapon system, was one of resistance.  The Army thought that if it embraced the 
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transformative nature of nuclear weapons, it would only bolster arguments on the irrelevance of 
future ground combat which were being pushed by civilian and military elites, some of whom were 
motivated by a desire to increase the standing of airpower and the newly independent Air Force.   
 Further study on the feasibility of employing nuclear weapons in a tactical capacity, 
conducted in the context of increasing interservice rivalry between the Army and the Air Force, 
opened the door for the Army to reconsider its theory of victory.  Though I did not uncover 
evidence that Army leaders were concerned with the Soviets’ newfound nuclear capability as 
demonstrated in their successful 1949 nuclear test, one would assume that the Soviet possession 
of this capability heightened interest in the employment of nuclear weapons.  Propelled by the 
arguments of influential leaders such as General Gavin who saw great value in the tactical 
employment of nuclear weapons on the battlefield against the Soviets or the Chinese, the Army 
modified its theory of victory from one oriented on a non-nuclear, conventional fight to one that 
envisioned a nuclear battlefield.  
 The Army believed that the possession of strategic nuclear weapons by the U.S. and the 
Soviets created a condition of mutual deterrence; the possession of nuclear weapons by both states 
created an offsetting balance.  Its new theory of victory was based on the belief that, “In the next 
war tactical nuclear weapons would provide the great equalizer.”82  The next war would progress 
as follows.  First, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces or allies (not U.S. cities), with “nibbling 
aggression,” having carefully determined that such aggression would not trigger a U.S. strategic 
nuclear weapons attack.83  Then, the Army would respond to the attack using conventional force 
similar to Army operations in World War II.  Finally, the Army would “resort to small-yield, 
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limited-range, highly accurate [tactical] nuclear weapons, delivered either by cannon or rocket.”84  
The use of these tactical nuclear weapons would enable the Army to overcome the numerical 
superiority of the Soviet forces.  
 Since tactical nuclear weapons would support Army conventional forces in the attack, not 
replace them, the Army still required sizable ground forces that were capable of large-scale 
maneuver.  This new theory of victory accounted for the transformative effect of nuclear weapons, 
while at the same time emphasizing the Army’s traditional framework for combat.  However, since 
the new theory also assumed that the Soviets would employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield, 
the Army determined that it needed to change its doctrine and structure to increase the survivability 
and effectiveness of Army forces on an atomic battlefield.  The pentomic innovation was the 
Army’s solution. 
Role of Civilians 
 Civilian elites’ emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons was not the source of the Army’s 
pentomic construct.  Rather, the roots of the pentomic doctrine predate the Army’s experience in 
the Korean War and the Eisenhower Administration’s nuclear weapons policies.  The Army, 
responding to the introduction of nuclear weapons as a transformative weapons technology in the 
post-World War II period, initiated the innovation process first in the absence of civilian 
intervention.  Where Army elites and civilian elites clashed was over what the Army perceived to 
be the Eisenhower Administration’s overemphasis on “strategic retaliatory power at the expense 
of…so-called ‘conventional’ forces.”85  As General Gavin noted, Army leaders believed that “The 
thesis upon which the New Look was based was entirely wrong…”86  Though President 
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Eisenhower supported the tactical use of nuclear weapons if necessary to account for U.S. 
personnel shortages with respect to the Soviet Union, New Look and massive retaliation prioritized 
strategic nuclear weapons as the focal point of American war policy.  The policy specified in NSC 
162/2 rested on America’s “capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive 
striking power.”87  That capability rested with the Air Force and its Strategic Air Command (SAC).  
This afforded the newly independent Air Force preeminent status in the military hierarchy - a fact 
that grated on Army leaders who worried deeply about the Army’s organizational survival.  
Interservice Rivalry 
 The emergence of nuclear weapons increased the prominence of the Air Force and led to 
competition between the Army and the Air Force over budgetary outlays and battlefield 
jurisdiction.  Individuals inside and outside the Army worried about the organization’s survival in 
the atomic era.  In 1955, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer noted, “it seems to me that the very survival 
of the Army…is at stake.”88  Some analysts outside the Army believed “the Army is obsolescent 
and probably obsolete.”89  The magnitude of interservice rivalry between the Army and the Air 
Force in the 1950s can be seen in the growing disparity between the two services’ defense 
expenditures.  By 1955, the Air Force’s share of the budget was twice the size of the Army’s and 
this trend continued into the early 1960s.90  From 1955-1961, the Army cut 240,000 personnel.91 
 In a nuclear war, some questioned whether the Army had a role.  Junior officers writing in 
professional military journals, senior officers in the Army, and observers outside of the Army 
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contended that the Army was becoming obsolete.92  Diminished budgets, personnel cuts, and the 
rising status of the Air Force reinforced that view.  In addition to manpower concerns, the Army 
bemoaned the fact that funding was not provided for its surface-to-surface and surface-to-air 
missile programs, its satellite program (proposed in 1954), and research and development 
programs tied to developing land forces in the atomic age.93  An altered Army force structure with 
a supporting doctrine would not only fare better against the Soviets in combat, but it would also 
ensure the Army’s survival in the atomic era and it would place the organization on a more equal 
footing with the Air Force.  
 Competition between the Army and the Air Force in the early 1950s acted as an intervening 
variable between the introduction of a new military technology - nuclear weapons - and the 
pentomic doctrine and organizational structure.  The Army’s diminished status relative to the other 
services put it on the defensive and this magnified tension and increased interservice rivalry.  We 
don’t see civilian intervention in this interservice competition to resolve the friction because there 
was not deadlock.  The allocation of the strategic nuclear mission to the Air Force and the tactical 
nuclear mission to the Army resolved friction over any jurisdictional concerns.   
Budgets 
 From a budgetary perspective, the theoretical framework suggests that when a service 
experiences a decrease in its budget it is more likely to innovate.  The decreasing budget should 
force the organization to innovate to maintain its influence and to justify requests for an increase 
in their allocation of resources.  This appears to be the case with the Army of the 1950s.  Reeling 
from sharp spending and personnel decreases after the Korean War and from the prioritization of 
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resources to the Air Force, the Army innovated.  In a search to “find some use of the Army,”94 the 
organization engaged in a healthy debate on the effect of nuclear weapons on future warfare and 
the Army’s role on an atomic battlefield.95   
Organizational Culture 
 The pentomic innovation ran counter to some of the Army’s cultural imperatives.  While 
it aligned with a preference for major wars over small wars and firepower over maneuver, the 
construct emphasized decentralized operations and cellular offensive and defensive tactics.  This 
was in tension with the Army’s traditional preference for centralized operations and linear 
offensive and defensive operations.  However, concern for the Army’s organizational survival and 
its standing vis-à-vis the Air Force outweighed cultural preferences.   
3.1.1.5. Conclusion 
 In its determination to validate the relevance of the Army in a nuclear world, Army leaders 
promoted the pentomic innovation despite the fact that there was little evidence to suggest that the 
concept would enable the Army to prevail against a nuclear-armed adversary.  Army leaders 
refused to accept the idea that ground combat during the nuclear era was not feasible.  The Army 
adopted the pentomic doctrine in the face of evidence which illuminated its futility. 
 By 1959, the Army jettisoned the construct at the first available opportunity because 
leaders recognized that no potential scheme for reorganization could make a large fighting unit 
viable in the face of hundreds of nuclear detonations.  By that year, the Army’s budget had 
increased and calls for the Army’s irrelevance diminished.  Regardless of their mobility or degree 
of dispersion, it is unlikely that Army units could have succeeded on a battlefield marked with 
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nuclear fallout from their own tactical nuclear weapons, let alone Soviet nuclear weapons.  Though 
the Army used the Desert Rock VI tests as proof that it could operate on an atomic battlefield, the 
tests were unrealistic.  The lack of realism in the field tests was due to overeagerness on the part 
of Army leaders to demonstrate the Army’s relevance on an atomic battlefield.  Army leaders 
should have been attentive to NATO’s 1955 Carte Blanche exercise which simulated the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons and revealed that those weapons would prevent military units from 
fighting effectively regardless of their structural organization or doctrine.96  
 Even in recent years, the Army has been unwilling to acknowledge the artificiality of the 
atomic tests that it conducted to validate the pentomic innovation.97  The Army’s official position 
on the failed pentomic construct (written over forty years later), contends that the major weakness 
of the concept was “that it lacked the combat power to cope with an enemy armored force in a 
conventional battle.”98  While the pentomic division’s ability to defeat an enemy armored force on 
a conventional (non-nuclear) battlefield was clearly in question, it is curious that the Army assesses 
this as its primary weakness.  One could make the argument that under the pentomic construct, the 
Army was incapable of effective operations on any type of battlefield (armored or not), given the 
Soviets’ numerical superiority.  It is also not clear that the pentomic construct would have enabled 
effectiveness on a nuclear battlefield given the artificiality of the tests and exercises that the Army 
cited as proof of concept.  Army leaders were clearly relieved that the pentomic concept was never 
put to the test in war.  According to General Paul Freeman, commander of Continental Army 
                                                           
96 Adam Rawnsley, “Revealed: NATO's Cold War Nuclear Battle Plan Would Have Killed Millions,” The 
National Interest (September 6, 2015).  The exercise also concluded that tactical nuclear warfare would result in 4-5 
million civilian casualties. 
97 Combat Studies Institute, “Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend Analysis,” Combat 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1999, p. 20. 
98 Combat Studies Institute, 1999, p. 23. 
 139 
Command, “Every time I think of the…Pentomic Division I shudder…Thank God we never had 
to go to war with it.”99 
 Even if the pentomic construct could have worked, the Army failed to synchronize the 
organizational transformation with the requisite technology, personnel, and doctrine.  These 
mechanisms were necessary to translate the pentomic concept into practice.  The new technology 
required to support the organizational construct - radios, other communication equipment, radars, 
aircraft - was not available in time to field to the units.  The Army claims that the concept failed 
because “the Eisenhower administration…would not develop and fund the artillery, 
communications equipment, and airlift capabilities to put viable pentomic divisions in the field.”100  
The Army also experienced significant reductions in personnel strength under the Eisenhower 
administration.  Personnel strength decreased from 1,026,778 soldiers in 1956 to 861,964 soldiers 
in 1959.101  The Army emerged from the Korean War with 20 combat divisions but by 1961 there 
were only 14 divisions remaining (three of which were training divisions that were not prepared 
for combat).102  Given the catastrophic nature of a nuclear attack, the Army argued that it needed 
a personnel end-strength increase, but increased budgetary outlays to the Air Force caused the 
opposite to happen.   
 Finally, offensive and defensive operations under the pentomic construct required a 
paradigm shift in Army tactics and doctrine.  Remarks from junior Army leaders and enlisted 
soldiers at the time indicate that aspects of military training that are normally critical such as 
building camaraderie and reinforcing unit history and traditions were no longer valued in the post-
World War II (and post Korean War) Army.  Bacevich presents convincing evidence that the Army 
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transitioned to an organization that was, “centralized, bureaucratic, and impersonal.”103  Contrary 
to any previous period in its history, Army leaders focused on science and technology and 
prioritized efficiency over effectiveness.  Though the Army amended the 1954 FSR twice in 1956 
and 1958, the changes that were made were not comprehensive enough to support the major 
changes to unit tactics that senior Army leaders envisioned were necessary under the pentomic 
construct.  Rather, in the Army’s haste to develop and field the pentomic construct, it failed to 
codify the pentomic concept’s major warfighting tenets fully in formal doctrine, relying instead on 
senior leader speeches and articles in professional journals. 
 It is worth considering whether or not we can characterize the pentomic construct as an 
innovation given the speed with which it was replaced.  Bacevich notes that in retrospect the 
pentomic reforms were “striking for their impermanence.”104  I argue that despite its short-lived 
nature, the pentomic construct qualifies as an innovation because the Army fundamentally altered 
its view of how the organization would fight.  Though doctrine in support of the pentomic construct 
was never fully implemented, the organizational structural change alone was a major innovation 
which drastically changed an Army structure that had been in existence for decades.  Of the five 
cases of doctrinal change that I examine, two of the five - the pentomic construct and the 1973 
Active Defense doctrine (discussed in the next section) - were jettisoned by the Army before they 
were ever validated in combat.  While I don’t think that this fact disqualifies the changes from 
being true innovations, it does suggest that the deeper the innovation, the more susceptible it will 
be to getting replaced when policies or the leaders that shepherded the innovations are replaced.  
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3.1.2. Active Defense Doctrine     
 After the Vietnam War, the Army faced tremendous challenges with respect to soldier 
discipline and unit morale.  Military and civilian analysts criticized the Army for its performance 
during the war.  Soldiers returning to the United States were looked down upon.  The Army was 
an institution in crisis.  The 1973 decision to transition to an all-volunteer military worried Army 
leaders who were concerned that eliminating the draft would result in lower quality admits.  The 
same year, the Army established the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to begin a 
process to professionalize its training, doctrine, and education programs. 
 In 1976, in the context of these challenges, the Army developed the first defense-oriented 
keystone doctrine in its history.  The doctrine, known as Active Defense, required Army units to 
fight from defensive positions.  Contrary to all doctrine that preceded it, Active Defense focused 
on defensive operations, not as a precursor to offensive operations, but as the organization’s 
primary effort.  After a period of extensive analysis by Army leaders, the Active Defense doctrine 
was published in the Army’s keystone manual in 1976, and integrated in Army schools and across 
the force. 
   Despite a major effort by the Army to develop, publish, and implement Active Defense, 
there was significant resistance to a defensive doctrine.  By the late 1970s, new Army leaders 
initiated another doctrinal change process which eventually led to the jettison of Active Defense.  
In hindsight, it is clear that an Army culture that valued offensive operations was at odds with the 
defensive Active Defense doctrine.  Yet, Army leaders promoted Active Defense as the only viable 
doctrine to defeat a numerically superior Warsaw Pact force in Europe.  The purpose of this section 
is to explore the sources of Active Defense. 
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3.1.2.1. The Final Years of the Vietnam War (1973-1975) 
 In 1973, as the Vietnam War came to a close, three events - one political, one internal to 
the Army, and one external to the United States - influenced the Army’s quest to develop a new 
keystone doctrine in the post-war period.  They were the military’s transition to an all-volunteer 
force (AVF), the establishment of TRADOC, and the Arab-Israeli War.  Though the Army resisted 
it at first, the AVF was an important step in the organization’s effort to repair itself after the 
Vietnam War.  The establishment of TRADOC marked the formalization of the Army’s doctrine-
writing process and linked doctrine with training and education programs.  Commanded by a four-
star General Officer, TRADOC elevated the stature of doctrine in the Army.  Finally, the Arab-
Israeli War was of great interest to the Army because Arab forces were equipped and trained by 
the Soviets.  All three developments set the stage for the formulation and adoption of the Active 
Defense doctrine in 1976.  I discuss them each, below. 
A Political Development - The Establishment of the All-Volunteer Force 
 On January 27, 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said, “With the signing of the 
peace agreement in Paris today…I wish to inform you that the Armed Forces henceforth will 
depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. Use of the draft has ended.”  
With that, the U.S. military embarked on a transition to an all-volunteer force.105  The rationale for 
the AVF was five-fold.106  First, a volunteer military had been the norm for much of American 
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history.107  Second, the Vietnam War draft was perceived as unfair because the eligible pool was 
so much larger than the military’s personnel requirements.  Third, the unpopularity of the Vietnam 
War meant that some draftees were fighting for reasons that they did not support.  Fourth, the 
disciplinary problems in the military were proof to some leaders that the draft had been ineffective.  
Finally, some questioned the moral obligation of military service.108 
 The transition to the AVF required a paradigm shift for the Army.  The draft was the 
mechanism that the Army used for the mass mobilization of manpower in the event of war.  With 
the draft, the U.S. was able to maintain the small standing Army that the Founders envisioned.  
When the draft was abolished, the Army had to make service in the Army attractive in order to 
appeal to volunteers.  Like the other services, the Army needed to develop an effective capacity to 
recruit.  The Army would now have to rely on the National Guard and the Reserves to an extent 
that it never had before in order to mobilize quickly during war.       
 Before the Army realized that a workforce of volunteers could be an important element for 
the professionalization of the force, some leaders thought that eliminating the draft would lead to 
a less effective organization.  According to Army Lieutenant General William DePuy in 1973, 
“We don’t have the high quality as we had coming in through the draft.”109  Over time, Army 
leaders realized that the elimination of conscription actually made the organization a more 
professional force.110  These leaders hoped that the AVF would be a remedy to address low morale 
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and the lack of discipline.  The AVF was a mechanism that the Army could use to establish 
standards of conduct for a professional force.111  The Army eventually embraced the AVF concept, 
spending more money in 1972 to support the transition than all three of the other services 
combined.112  
An Internal Development - Establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
 Operation Steadfast113 - an effort to reorganize the U.S. Continental Army Command 
(CONARC) under the direction of Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. in 
1971-1972 - resulted in the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC).  Established in 1955, CONARC’s span of control had become too large.  With the 
establishment of TRADOC, the Army inactivated the Combat Developments Command (CDC) 
which had existed since 1962.  TRADOC would be responsible for the Army’s doctrine, its 
military education schools, training, and combat developments.  Lieutenant General William E. 
DePuy, the assistant vice chief of staff of the Army at the time, led Operation Steadfast and was 
named the first commander of TRADOC.  DePuy commanded TRADOC from 1973-1977. 
 As the TRADOC commander, DePuy was responsible for all of the Army’s schools and 
training centers except for West Point and the U.S. Army War College.114  Part of the justification 
for TRADOC was the contention that the Army had failed to modernize during its 10-year war in 
Vietnam.  The combat development responsibility empowered TRADOC to focus on weapons and 
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equipment.  TRADOC was expected to accelerate weapons development to transform the Army 
into a “modernized, trained, and ready force” capable of defending Europe and balancing against 
the Warsaw Pact buildup.115 
 TRADOC was the lead agency for producing and publishing doctrine, developing the 
Army’s force structure, and training and educating officers and soldiers.  Designating one 
organization with responsibility for these tasks, meant that for the first time in its history, the Army 
signaled doctrine’s importance to the institution and recognized the explicit link between doctrine 
and education in Army schools.  The link between doctrine and schools was clearly present 
throughout the Army’s history, but the establishment of TRADOC formalized that link and it 
empowered the leader of the organization with the ability to have a deep effect on the Army.   
 DePuy also created a Tactical Doctrine office which was distinct from TRADOC’s training 
and combat development functions.  This accorded the doctrine development process an equal 
footing with TRADOC’s other functions, and marked the elevation of the Army’s keystone 
doctrine - Field Manual 100-5 Operations - to a “central role in defining Army doctrine.”116  DePuy 
also moved the task of writing FM 100-5 from the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas to the Concepts Branch of TRADOC Headquarters.117  By moving the 
doctrine-writing process to his headquarters, DePuy not only underscored the importance of the 
new FM 100-5, it also helped his effort to link doctrine to acquisition - specifically, the 
development, analysis, and procurement of new weapons systems.118  
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 DePuy directed TRADOC to create the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 
which prescribed required missions and articulated standards of performance for those missions.  
For each critical task listed in the ARTEP, there was a detailed checklist that specified the 
supporting tasks for every level of the Army from squad through battalion.119  This enabled DePuy 
to force Army units to comply with doctrine.120   
An External Development - The 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
 On October 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian troops attacked Israeli forces in the Golan 
Heights and the Sinai Peninsula.  The purpose of the attack was to reclaim territory lost to Israel 
in the 1967 Six-Day War.  Israel was unprepared for the sudden attack.  Many Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) were celebrating Yom Kippur when the Egyptian and Syrian forces initiated the 
attack and it took them a few days to adequately mobilize for war.  Egyptian and Syrian troops 
fought with Soviet weapons and equipment.  After suffering high casualties in the initial battles of 
the war, the IDF, supported by an airlift of American weapons, crossed the Suez Canal on October 
16th and seized the initiative from the Egyptian and Syrian forces.  On October 25 th, due in part to 
a U.S. decision to upgrade its nuclear posture to an alert status which put pressure on the parties 
to negotiate, United Nations Security Council Resolution 340 led to a ceasefire.  As I discuss in 
detail in the next section, this war had an important influence on General DePuy, other leaders in 
TRADOC, and Army doctrine writers in the period immediately preceding the formulation of the 
Active Defense doctrine. 
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Theory of Victory Prior to Active Defense 
 In the midst of the Army’s transition to the AVF and before the organization had a chance 
to learn from the Arab-Israeli War, Secretary of the Army Howard Callaway and the Army Chief 
of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams ordered analysts at the War College to produce a report on 
the Army’s role in the post-Vietnam War world.  The report121 envisioned the deployment of Army 
forces for the purposes of assurance and deterrence.  The U.S. would use its “strategic nuclear 
retaliatory capability, made credible by forward deployments of conventional forces” to provide 
assurance to its allies.122  Deterrence of the Soviet Union and China would be accomplished by 
achieving “sufficient conventional capability to deter limited…conventional attacks, and to control 
such attacks without resorting to nuclear weapons.”123  The purpose of forward deployed Army 
forces would be to reassure allies in Western Europe and Japan.   
 The report also emphasized the importance of the deployment of conventional forces for 
deterrence.124  Cognizant of the American public’s war-wariness, its negative perception of 
military force after the war, and the increasing “euphoria of detente,”125 the report recognized that 
appeals to defend Western Europe from the threat of “communist hordes”126 would be a hard sell.  
The Army recognized that its theory of victory could not succeed without the support of the 
American people.  That theory was bolstered by the Nixon Doctrine which reduced U.S. 
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commitments in Asia and the Middle East but reinforced an American commitment to the strategy 
of flexible response.  The Nixon Administration promised to “maintain U.S. forces [in Western 
Europe] at existing levels through ‘at least’ mid-1971.”127  
 The Army’s vision of warfare in the early 1970s was similar to its vision in the early 1960s 
after the abandonment of the pentomic construct and before the Army escalated its involvement in 
the Vietnam War.  The 1968 Field Manual 100-5 was its keystone doctrine.  The manual 
emphasized that the Army would maintain the ability to fight effectively across a spectrum of war 
- cold war, limited war, and general war - but its central purpose was to reassure American allies 
in Europe that the Army still possessed the ability to defeat the Soviets in Europe, despite the 
Army’s engagement in Vietnam. 
3.1.2.2. The Active Defense Doctrine 
 From 1973-1975, TRADOC focused on the formulation of a new Army doctrine.  In 1976, 
TRADOC published the 1976 Field Manual 100-5 Operations manual.  Upon publication, 
TRADOC distributed over 170,000 copies of the manual to individuals and units across the 
Army.128   The 1976 FM 100-5 formalized what became known as the Army’s Active Defense 
doctrine.129  The new manual required a significant doctrinal shift for the Army.  First, the manual 
diverged sharply from its predecessor which emphasized operations across a spectrum of war.  
Cold War operations, stability operations, and unconventional warfare were removed from the 
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Army’s keystone doctrine.  Second, for the first time in its history, the Army focused its doctrine 
on defensive operations rather than offensive operations.   
 Given the post-Vietnam U.S. policy shift away from foreign intervention and the 
conclusion that the greatest threat to America and its allies was the Soviet Union in Europe, the 
Army changed its doctrine to focus almost entirely on conventional operations.  According to the 
1976 FM 100-5, “The Army’s primary objective is to win the land battle - to fight and win in 
battles, large or small, against whatever foe, wherever we may be sent to war.”130  This mandate 
differed from the 1968 FSR which stated, “The fundamental purpose of U.S. military forces is to 
preserve, restore, or create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities 
of government can function effectively under a code of laws.”131  According to Birtle, “Gone were 
all references to counterinsurgency, nation-building, civil affairs, and psychological operations, 
replaced by a single-minded emphasis on the conduct of conventional combat operations in a major 
war.”132  The nuclear superiority that the U.S. maintained over the Soviets in the 1950s and 1960s 
was replaced with parity by the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Under conditions of nuclear parity 
and conventional inferiority, the Army made the case that it needed to improve technology and 
change doctrine to defend NATO.   
 The Army’s new theory of victory leading to the publication of the 1976 manual is well-
summarized by Herbert: “Future warfare would entail conventional battle against a numerically 
superior enemy with comparable equipment, which could break out at any moment…”133  Two 
slogans that originated from this new theory had a major effect on the drafting and publication of 
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the 1976 FM 100-5 Operations manual - “Fight outnumbered and win” and “Win the first 
battle.”134  This new theory of victory demanded that the Army innovate doctrinally.  Although the 
Army was in a period of tremendous pressure on its budget, DePuy determined that the benefits of 
doctrinal innovation outweighed the costs.  A systems-based approach to weapons acquisition that 
was cost-effective would keep costs relatively low.  The defense-oriented 1976 doctrine could be 
executed with the Army’s existing manpower and would be more effective against a numerically 
superior enemy.  An offense-oriented doctrine would have required a personnel increase that was 
not feasible in the existing budget climate.    
 The defensive orientation of the 1976 FM 100-5 Operations manual stemmed from the use 
of force ratios as the primary factor used to determine how best to employ Army units.  Successful 
offensive operations required an Army unit to achieve a 6-to-1 manpower superiority whereas a 
successful defense required smaller than a 1-to-3 ratio.135  Achieving the force-ratio necessary for 
a successful attack was impossible, since the Soviets already had numerical superiority over the 
American military.  The defensive orientation of the 1976 manual - termed “active defense” - was 
DePuy’s way of coping with the Soviets’ numerical superiority and the fact that the USSR would 
have the initiative in any major war to defend West Germany.  In DePuy’s own words, “The ‘active 
defense’ is designed to fight successfully against greatly superior numbers of attacking armored 
vehicles with mounted or dismounted infantry, heavily supported by artillery, protected by mobile 
air defense weapons and also supported in varying degrees by armored helicopters and fighter 
aircraft.”136 
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 An “active defense” is one in which defensive forces fight in a “covering force area” in 
front of their main defensive positions to force the enemy to commit his main attack.137  Once the 
enemy commits, the defensive forces seek to defeat the enemy’s main attack by deploying 
elements that move “laterally from other sectors of the battlefield where the defender would accept 
a certain degree of risk.”138  The defender cedes some ground to the attacker and uses these lateral 
operations to maximize his force ratio at the point of battle.  The net effect of the operation is to 
“wear down” the enemy attacking force through “combined arms” teams fighting from mutually 
supported battle positions.139  For the first time in the history of its doctrine, the Army did not view 
defensive operations as merely a precursor for offensive operations.140  Defensive operations were 
prioritized because of their favorable combat power ratio.  
 Herbert provides convincing evidence that the Army’s active defense concept mirrored 
German doctrine.141  At the heart of German doctrine was a forward defense concept that derived 
from NATO’s position as a defensive alliance.  Given West Germany’s geographical location in 
Europe and NATO’s defensive mission, it is unsurprising that German doctrine would emphasize 
defensive operations.  The U.S. Army drew heavily from Germany’s approach.  Similar to active 
defense, forward defense emphasized weakening the enemy attack through fire initially, and then 
displacing laterally to disrupt and eventually defeat enemy formations.142   
 Correspondence between the United States and West Germany on the Active Defense 
doctrine was extensive since any Soviet attack in Europe would transverse through Germany.143  
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The Germans only mission - defending NATO Europe - was the Army’s primary mission.144  
Herbert describes the U.S. Army’s collaboration with Germany.  First, General DePuy established 
a close working relationship with the German High Command.  Second, the Army engaged with 
the Germans in a series of talks about doctrine and training, and the results of those exchanges 
were consolidated in joint papers.  Finally, there was a deliberate exchange of doctrine between 
the U.S. Army and the Germans.  Not only did DePuy use the German manual HDv 100/100 
Command and Control in Battle to draft American doctrine, he also sent drafts of the 1976 manual 
to the German Army for feedback.145  The Army also spoke to the Germans about how to interpret 
lessons learned from the use of armored and mechanized infantry and the suppression of air 
defense weapons that came out of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.  DePuy not only used engagements 
with the Germans as a way to improve the doctrinal concepts that he codified in the 1976 FM 100-
5, he also used German support of those concepts to his advantage as a way of convincing leaders 
in the U.S. Army that the concepts were sound.146   
3.1.2.3. Understanding the Sources of the Active Defense Doctrine 
Environmental Shifts 
 Two factors affected the Army’s theory of victory in the early 1970s and led to the Active 
Defense doctrine.  They were: (1) a shift in the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union and (2) the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.   
 In the early 1960s, before the Soviets advanced their nuclear capability, the U.S. 
commitment to extended deterrence in Europe was credible.  However, U.S. nuclear superiority 
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over the Soviets was replaced with parity by the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Increased Soviet 
nuclear weapons capability rendered the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence in Europe less 
tenable.147  The Army was aware of the change in strategic balance because it paid close attention 
to Soviet capabilities and Soviet military doctrine through intelligence reports developed internally 
and from national intelligence agencies.148  The Active Defense doctrine was the Army’s response 
to this shift in the strategic nuclear balance.  The forward deployment of Army forces in Europe 
was a critical element of U.S. strategy.  The Active Defense doctrine was thought to be the most 
effective method of defeating a numerically superior Warsaw Pact in the event of an attack on 
Europe. 
   The 1973 Arab-Israeli War also had a major effect on the Army’s theory of victory because 
it demonstrated the increased lethality of combat, the importance of winning the first battle of a 
war, and the limitations of American technologies and tactics when confronted with Soviet 
technologies and tactics.  The TRADOC commander, General DePuy, organized Army 
conferences that focused on Soviet doctrine and the Arab-Israeli War.149  DePuy’s goal was to 
write a doctrine that prepared the Army for a conventional operation to defend U.S. allies in 
western Europe from a Soviet attack.  Given the Army’s challenges in the post-Vietnam period, 
most analysts assumed that the Army did not have the capability to defeat a numerically superior 
Soviet force in Europe. The Army’s tactical experience in the Vietnam War was believed to be of 
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little use on a European battlefield.150  DePuy was determined to use the 1976 FM 100-5 as the 
primary tool in his broader effort to change the Army.  
 The 1973 war had a major influence on DePuy’s approach to the 1976 manual151 and the 
Active Defense doctrine.  The Army was interested in the war because the Arab forces were 
equipped and trained by the Soviets and the Israeli forces used American equipment and had 
similar mobilization requirements.  The Yom Kippur War was a “microcosm of potential conflict 
in Europe…”152  Compared to the low-intensity, counter-guerrilla operations of the Vietnam War, 
the 1973 war was mid-intensity and the weapons used by both sides were modern and 
sophisticated.  The war illustrated the lethality of armored warfare and the importance of winning 
the first battle.  In regard to the latter, though Israel won the war, the IDF’s unpreparedness when 
the war started led to heavy Israeli casualties.  The emphasis on winning the first battle reinforced 
the lessons the Army learned from two previous American first battle defeats - Kasserine Pass in 
World War II and Task Force Smith in Korea.153  With the increased lethality of new weapons, 
Army planners assumed that a loss in the first battle would mean a loss of the war.154  Planners 
also believed that the older mobilization concept in which forces could be mobilized and trained 
in time for an impending war was obsolete.    
 DePuy was deliberate in documenting lessons learned from the Arab-Israeli War and using 
those lessons to change Army doctrine and equipment.  In a letter to the Chief of Staff, General 
Abrams, on January 14, 1974, DePuy discussed lessons learned and emphasized the importance of 
using those lessons to reform Army tactics, techniques, training, equipment performance, and 
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weapon systems acquisition.155  In a letter two years later to the next Army Chief of Staff, General 
Fred C. Weyand, DePuy noted that “the implication of the Middle East War and our review of our 
status involved problems and challenges at every echelon…TRADOC therefore embarked on a 
program to reorient and restructure the whole body of Army doctrine from top to bottom…the key 
would have to be the substantial revision of FM 100-5 - Operations, the basic statement of our 
solutions to the challenge of modern weapons across the whole integrated battlefield…”156 
 Though Israel won the war, Syrian and Egyptian forces caught the Israelis by surprise and, 
using Soviet technology, were successful in destroying American armor.157  In a report on the 
implications of the Arab-Israeli War for the U.S. Army, DePuy listed three major lessons: (1) 
“modern weapons are vastly more lethal than any weapons we have encountered,” (2) “[the Army] 
must have highly trained and highly skilled combined arms teams of armor, infantry, artillery, and 
air defense,” and (3) “the training of the individual as well as the team will make the difference 
between success and failure on the battlefield.”158  In the same report, DePuy concluded that 
existing tanks were ten times more lethal than World War II tanks, and he talked at length about 
the tremendous tank losses that both sides experienced in the war.159  DePuy intended to use the 
combat development arm of TRADOC to enhance the Army’s technological capability through 
the weapons acquisition process.160  
 DePuy’s plan to modernize the Army and to improve its training faced one major obstacle 
- a reduced Army budget after the Vietnam War.  The postwar Army was reduced to 785,000 
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soldiers, and compared to the Navy and the Air Force, the Army’s budget was low.161  General 
DePuy was aware of the link between the Army’s budget and its doctrine, and he believed that 
doctrine could be used as justification in the weapons and technology acquisition process.  Before 
taking command of TRADOC, DePuy watched two of the Army’s major procurement programs 
get cut - the MBT70 main battle tank and the Cheyenne advanced attack helicopter.162  DePuy was 
convinced that the Army needed to do a better job linking technology to doctrine.  New 
technologies included drones, night-vision devices, an attack helicopter, the M1 main battle tank, 
and the M2 Bradley (mechanized infantry combat vehicle).  
 Taking a systems-approach to the budget process (in the style of Robert McNamara in the 
1960s), DePuy’s effort to link doctrine to weapons acquisition was more oriented on efficiency 
(minimizing costs and maximizing capabilities) than effectiveness (selecting the best weapons for 
the most likely future mission-sets).163  This systems-based approach was unusual for the Army - 
a service that traditionally focused on soldiers rather than equipment.  An emphasis on systems 
had the unintended consequence of prioritizing weapons over tactics and leadership in the new 
doctrine.  This would be a major factor in the replacement of the Active Defense doctrine in the 
early 1980s.164 
 The eventual rejection of DePuy’s systems-oriented approach notwithstanding, the 
technological acquisitions that the Army made during the 1970s and the 1980s were integral to the 
Army’s renaissance after the Vietnam War and the Army’s performance during the 1991 Persian 
Gulf war.  The “Big 5” - the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache 
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attack helicopter, the Black Hawk utility helicopter, and the Patriot air defense missile system - 
were acquisitions made by the Army in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and in response 
to the Soviet threat in Europe.165  The consensus in the Army today is that this five-pronged 
acquisition was a major component in the development of the U.S. Army’s preeminence in ground 
combat.  The Big 5 provided the Army with the tools it needed to defeat a numerically superior 
Soviet force in conventional, mid-intensity warfare.166   
Role of Civilians 
 There is no evidence of civilian intervention to compel the Army to change its doctrine in 
the years leading up to Active Defense.  The most significant civilian action during the period was 
the 1973 Congressional decision to abolish the draft.  While this action had a major effect on the 
Army’s approach to recruiting, training, and mobilizing in the event of war, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the AVF was a source of Active Defense.  Nixon’s reduction of forces in Asia and 
his administration’s focus on the defense of Western Europe through flexible response were 
welcome policies for the Army.  The preferences of civilian elites matched the preferences of Army 
leaders who were eager to transition their focus from the Vietnam War to Europe.   
 The Nixon Administration’s 1970 National Security Decision Memoranda 95 argued that 
it was “vital that NATO have a credible conventional defense posture to deter and, if necessary, 
defend against conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces.”167  The civilian emphasis on the 
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defense of NATO gave Army Chief of Staff General Abrams the support he needed to establish 
United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC - organizations that would 
prioritize Army force readiness and training/education, respectively.  When Abrams boldly, and 
without analysis from his staff, declared in March 1974 that the Army would establish a 16-division 
force even though it was only budgeted for 13 divisions, civilian policymakers did not intervene 
to stop him.168  In fact, the Nixon Administration supported his plan by promoting the integration 
of the National Guard and Reserves into the total Army force posture.169  As the Army historian 
Davis notes, “the Army’s turn to Europe fell in sync with the proclaimed foreign policy agenda.”170 
 In recent years, some scholars have criticized the Army for jettisoning lessons learned 
related to counterinsurgency in the post-Vietnam War period.  In 1979, Secretary of Defense Laird 
proposed a 1-and-1/2 war concept whereby the Army would split its force structure into a 
conventional warfighting force and an unconventional warfighting force for the Europe and Korea 
theaters, respectfully.171  Laird’s proposal fizzled out and was not implemented.  Davis argues that 
high civilian turnover which enabled military autonomy is the primary reason why the proposal 
was abandoned.172  If Laird had pushed his proposal, then there would have been a direct conflict 
between civilian elites and Army elites, since the latter were already in the process of reducing the 
Army Special Forces and purging military school curricula of lessons related to counterinsurgency.   
Interservice Rivalry 
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 Interservice rivalry did not have a major effect on the Active Defense doctrine, but the 
avoidance of interservice rivalry did.  The Army of the early 1970s believed that interservice 
cooperation with the Air Force was critical.173  This was an interesting development given the 
historic rivalry between these services in the preceding years.  Part of the emphasis on increased 
cooperation with the Air Force stemmed from the Army’s realization that the constrained budget 
environment required a very clear separation of missions and roles between the two services.  The 
1973 Arab-Israeli War also demonstrated that the nature of mid-intensity warfare had changed - 
both sides in that war used their air force in a battle to dominate the airspace.  Air operations were 
critical to ground operations so it was imperative not only that the Air Force control the sky, but 
also that the military as a whole could execute a comprehensive and effective air defense system.174  
 The 1976 manual stated, “…the Army cannot win the land battle without the Air Force.” 
In fact, the Army consciously avoided the development of weapons or equipment to perform 
functions which the Air Force could perform more effectively.”175  The doctrine noted that the 
requirement for the Army and the Air Force to work together on the battlefield under joint 
commanders meant that the services needed to develop an air-ground communications system and 
a mutually, agreed-upon employment concept.  The Army saw five roles for the Air Force: defeat 
enemy air forces, provide intelligence on the enemy, battlefield interdiction (attacks against enemy 
targets on the ground), close air support (tactical fighters attack targets on the ground that are 
designated by Army commanders), and tactical airlift (the movement of troops and supplies).176    
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Cooperation between the Army and the Air Force would be a major feature of the Army’s next 
doctrinal innovation in the early 1980s - AirLand Battle.   
Budgets 
 Decreasing budgets in the aftermath of the Vietnam War should have forced the Army to 
innovate to maintain its influence and to justify requests for an increase in the allocation of 
resources.  Budgetary famine in the 1970s did indeed play a role in shaping the Army’s effort to 
innovate doctrinally.  Sheehan argues that the budget cuts were due to: a reduction in the perception 
of external threat due to detente, reduced executive authority as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, 
a decreased willingness to use force, and a perception of Army incompetence.177  General DePuy, 
recognizing the constrained budget environment, spent considerable effort prioritizing needed 
weapons systems and “demonstrat[ing] the Army’s need for each budget item by explaining its 
role in an over-arching concept of how the Army would fight.”178  A defense-oriented doctrine like 
Active Defense was predicated on Soviet numerical overmatch, which was itself a byproduct of a 
constrained Army budget which prevented personnel growth beyond 785,000 soldiers.   
  The Army also focused on weapons acquisition to increase its budgetary outlays.  The 
Army made a strong argument in favor of a deliberate focus on technology and weapons, claiming 
that it “lost a generation of modernization” during its “preoccupation with the Vietnam War.”179  
According to DePuy, “The next decade will see virtually every major weapon or piece of 
equipment replaced by a much more capable but more costly and complex counterpart.”180   
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Organizational Culture 
 The Active Defense doctrine was at odds with an Army organizational culture that 
emphasized offensiveness, aggressiveness, and seizing the initiative.  These cultural characteristics 
should have caused deep resistance to DePuy’s efforts to publish the doctrine.  Because DePuy 
wanted to implement the doctrine as quickly as possible, he did not share it with units or attempt 
to gain buy-in from other headquarters normally involved in the doctrine-writing process.  There 
is no evidence to confirm or deny whether DePuy did this because he anticipated resistance or 
because such a centralized approach was his preferred style of leadership.  Herbert suggests a 
combination of both: “Centralization of decision making, isolation of opponents, command 
attention to priority projects, strict adherence to a demanding time schedule, and an aggressive 
(sometimes abrasive) campaign of persuasion all reflected a command style nurtured since World 
War II and best described by DePuy himself in 1969: ‘Decide what has to be done, tell someone 
to do it, and check to be sure that they do.’”181   
3.1.2.4. Conclusion 
 In the budget constrained environment of the post-Vietnam War period, as the Army 
struggled to adjust to the all-volunteer force, the changing strategic nuclear balance and the war in 
the Middle East were the catalysts for the Army’s Active Defense doctrine.  The establishment of 
TRADOC - a four-star headquarters with direct access to the Chief of Staff of the Army - afforded 
doctrine a prominent position within the Army, and gave General DePuy the mechanisms he 
needed to quickly formulate and publish a new keystone doctrine.  However, in his haste to publish 
Active Defense, DePuy underestimated the criticism that he would receive from across the Army.  
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Almost as soon as Active Defense was published, a new commander of TRADOC - General Donn 
A. Starry - started drafting its replacement.   
 The Army jettisoned Active Defense because its defensive orientation was a radical 
departure from long-standing cultural norms reinforced again and again in the Army’s doctrine.  
All twelve prior keystone doctrines published in the twentieth century were offensive.  Senior 
Army leaders such as General Alexander M. Haig, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), believed that the manual over-emphasized defensive operations.  Like many of his 
contemporaries, he thought offensive operations were superior in defeating an enemy force.182  As 
soon as Army leaders updated their assessment of Soviet capabilities and doctrine, and concluded 
that the Soviets were unlikely to attack with a massed armored breakthrough, they took action to 
replace Active Defense.  Rather than replacing it with a revised defensive doctrine that could 
account for a more mobile Soviet attack, the Army scrapped the defensive orientation and created 
an offensive one.   
 General DePuy’s systems-based approach and its emphasis on force ratios ignored the 
psychological components of war.183  The emphasis on weapons and technologies was at odds with 
an organizational culture that was people-centric.  Kretchik explains it best: “Since the 1779 
Regulations, the American soldier had been upheld as a cultural icon. Despite changes in 
technology since the American Revolution, no manual advocated subjugating people to 
technology, armor and mechanized infantry included. Although the 1855 rifle-musket and the post-
World War II tactical nuclear weapon had affected army doctrine, the Regulations and field 
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manuals of those eras accommodated technology as a tool for enhancing soldier performance in 
battle.  In seeking to regulate the chaos of war through technology, DePuy’s 1976 doctrine tore at 
the very fabric of the Army’s cultural beliefs.”184  Also, the way in which DePuy viewed tactics - 
as “the application of new weapons to military problems” - was a fundamental divergence from 
historical conceptions of the term which viewed tactics as the movement or maneuver of soldiers 
on the battlefield.185  DePuy believed that the Army had shifted from “an organization of people 
with weapons to an organization of weapons with crews.”186   
 Had the Active Defense doctrine been employed against the Soviets on the battlefield, it 
only would have worked if the Soviets employed a major armored concentrated breakthrough at 
one point in the American defense, rather than smaller attacks at vulnerable points in the American 
(or allied) front.187  The Active Defense doctrine also had two other tactical problems.  First, a unit 
conducting defensive operations as specified in the manual would lack a critically needed reserve 
force at the tactical level.  Second, the overemphasis on winning the first battle predisposed the 
Army to ignore related or subsequent operations that might be fundamentally different. 
 Though the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority was a factor in DePuy’s decision to 
develop a defense-oriented doctrine, estimating the size of the Soviet force was difficult.  The 1958 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) determined that the Soviet force consisted of 175 combat-
ready divisions, with an additional 125 divisions available in 30 days.  Four years later, the 1962 
NIE determined that the Soviet force consisted of 80 combat-ready divisions, with an additional 
65 divisions that could be combat-ready with augmentation.  With 30 days of advance notice, “the 
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Soviets could expand their total forces to about 100 combat-ready divisions and 125 others less 
well prepared.”188  A 1963 assessment ordered by Secretary of Defense McNamara concluded that 
the Soviet force consisted of 115-135 divisions, “including 22-45 cadre (skeleton) divisions…”189   
 The U.S. Army was the primary contributor, with the new Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), to these assessments.190  By the early 1970s, intelligence community analysts adjusted their 
estimates of the Warsaw Pact force again.  Accounting for the manpower differences between 
Warsaw and NATO divisions, their analysis showed greater parity between sides.  A 1971 RAND 
report noted that the Warsaw Pact had 46 combat ready divisions compared to NATO’s 28, but 
concluded that in terms of manpower, NATO forces held a slight edge.191   
 Given the Army’s contribution to the Warsaw Pact assessments of the 1960s, it is not 
surprising that DePuy referenced those assessments when making the case for Active Defense as 
the best doctrine to fight a numerically superior Soviet force.  By the time that Active Defense was 
published in 1976, numerical parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces was the new 
consensus of intelligence analysts.  This set the conditions for the Army’s transition from the 
defense-oriented doctrine back to an offensive doctrine. 
 Recently released information by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on clandestine 
reporting shows that the U.S. intelligence community had considerable insight on Warsaw Pact 
war plans in the 1970s.192  Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski of the Polish General Staff, began providing 
clandestine information to the U.S. as early as 1972.  Kuklinksi’s reporting provided important 
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insights on Soviet logistics, training, and readiness, and these insights formed the basis of the 1979 
National Intelligence Estimate.193  While it is not clear the degree to which Army leaders were 
informed of Kuklinski’s reporting, it is likely that intelligence on Soviet war plans was shared with 
senior Army leaders.  This intelligence supported the Army’s transition from Active Defense to an 
offensive doctrine, once intelligence confirmed limitations in Soviet capabilities and the numerical 
parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces by the mid- to late-1970s. 
 In regard to the doctrine formulation process itself, DePuy’s micromanagement of the 
process boxed out the Army’s Infantry School and its Combined Arms Center, meaning that the 
final version of the manual was the result of only a “select group of generals and staff officers 
from the U.S. Army Armor School and Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command.”194  DePuy employed an ad hoc group of mid-level officers as his doctrine-writing 
team at TRADOC.  The “boathouse gang” (as they were called because their office was in a former 
yacht club), received DePuy’s direct guidance and produced drafts of the 1976 manual much faster 
than he could have if he had employed traditional doctrine-writing protocol which was centralized 
and slow.195   
 In the literature on the post-Vietnam Army, much is made of DePuy’s role in developing 
the Active Defense doctrine.  It is worth considering the counterfactual: in the absence of DePuy, 
would the Army have developed the same defense-oriented doctrine or would it have developed 
something different?  Given the Army’s weakness in the post-Vietnam War period, the relative 
decline in resources, and the difficulty of defending Europe from what was believed to be a 
numerically superior Soviet Union, it is not clear that another TRADOC commander in DePuy’s 
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shoes would have pushed for a doctrine different from Active Defense.  However, it certainly is 
odd that for the first time in its history, the Army adopted a defense-oriented approach that 
privileged technology over the soldier.  If these dynamics truly are at odds with the Army’s culture, 
one can argue that it took the effort of a leader like DePuy to force the Army to adopt the doctrine, 
particularly since there is no evidence of a cultural change in the Army at this time.  Many point 
to the fact that General Starry, DePuy’s replacement at TRADOC, immediately moved to replace 
the Active Defense doctrine with AirLand Battle.  It isn’t clear if this transition happened because 
of Starry - a leader with new priorities and a different approach - or because the Army as an 
organization was defaulting back to its traditional emphasis on the offense and the soldier.  
3.1.3. AirLand Battle Doctrine  
 The Army replaced the 1976 Active Defense doctrine with the AirLand Battle doctrine in 
1982.  Major consternation in the Army over the defense-oriented Active Defense doctrine and a 
growing belief that interservice cooperation between the Army and the Air Force would be critical 
in combat against the Soviets, led to the development of AirLand Battle.196  While Active Defense 
was a doctrine that focused mainly on defensive tactics, AirLand Battle was an operational concept 
that integrated combat power in both the land and air domains.   
 The AirLand Battle doctrinal innovation differed from the pentomic and the Active 
Defense doctrines in two fundamental ways.  First, AirLand Battle was the only doctrine of the 
three to be employed in combat.  Following a minor revision to the doctrine in 1986, the Army 
employed AirLand Battle and validated the concept in the 1991 Gulf War.  Second, once AirLand 
Battle was finalized in 1986, it enjoyed the resounding support of Army leaders at all echelons.  
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AirLand Battle restored the Army’s preference for an offensive doctrine oriented on maneuver.  
The purpose of this section is to explore the sources of the AirLand Battle doctrine. 
3.1.3.1. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle (1976-1986) 
 Active Defense doctrine assumed that the Soviet Army was inflexible.  Army intel analysts 
thought Soviet doctrine only focused on the use of the “massed armored breakthrough.”197  Active 
Defense envisioned a “structured ‘central battle’ to be fought methodically and aggressively 
against attacking heavily armored forces…this central battle would focus on a firepower battle 
along the forward edge of the battle area…”198  The 1976 FM 100-5 manual stated,  
The Soviet Army…attacks on very narrow fronts in great depth, with artillery massed at 
70 to 100 tubes per kilometer in the breakthrough sector.  Against a US Division in Europe, 
Warsaw Pact forces might throw as many as 600 tanks into the leading echelon, followed 
by an equal number shortly thereafter.  This doctrine had its origins in World War II.  It is 
deeply ingrained in the Soviet Army and if we should go to war in Europe these are exactly 
the tactics we would face.199 
 
 However, like the U.S. Army, the Soviet Army drew many lessons from the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War.  The Soviets modified their tactics and doctrine to add “multi-pronged attacks” and 
“meeting engagement’s” (i.e. fighting on the move) to their repertoire.200  A major, armored 
concentrated breakthrough at one point in the American defense was no longer the Soviet’s only 
option.  The U.S. Army’s V Corps commander in Europe in 1976 (and the next TRADOC 
commander), Lieutenant General Donn A. Starry, recognized this and led the charge to replace 
Active Defense.  
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 Most analysts correctly point to the major role that Starry had on the new AirLand Battle 
doctrine.201  Based on his experience in Germany from 1975-1976, Starry developed an operational 
concept known as Central Battle which later became Integrated Battle, followed by Extended 
Battle.  The synthesis of all three manifested itself in the AirLand Battle concept as it was specified 
in the 1982 FM 100-5 Operations manual.202  Starry thought that “the commander’s view of the 
battlefield had to be wider and deeper.”203  There was also a strong desire to return to a doctrine 
that was centered on offensive operations.  AirLand Battle doctrine writers thought that defensive 
doctrine sacrificed “maneuver and initiative” and “minimized the human dimension.”204  Facing 
pressure from General Edward C. Meyer, the Chief of Staff of the Army from 1979-1983, who 
wanted the Army to possess the ability to deploy globally, Starry paved the way for a major 
revision to Army doctrine.  AirLand Battle was based on a philosophy known as “deep attack,” 
whereby American forces would disrupt a Soviet attack by striking and destroying enemy tanks 
behind the Soviet’s lines.205 
The 1982 Field Manual 100-5 Operations 
 Written by Lieutenant Colonels Huba Wass de Czege and L.D. Holder, the 1982 Field 
Manual 100-5 Operations formalized the AirLand Battle doctrine.  AirLand Battle would persist 
as the Army’s keystone doctrine throughout the remainder of the Cold War and into the 1990s.  
Many would credit the Army’s success in Panama in 1989 and the Gulf War in 1991 to the concepts 
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in the 1982 manual.  AirLand Battle was a doctrine that focused on the operational level of war.  
According to the 1982 manual, “An Army’s operational concept is the core of its doctrine. It is the 
way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tactics, procedures, organizations, 
support, equipment, and training.”206  The manual was the first to describe an operational level of 
war that existed between the tactical and the strategic.  This addition was important because it 
added much-needed resolution to the way in which battles and campaigns fed into the 
accomplishment of strategic objectives.   
 Envisioning the battlefield as three-dimensional (depth, frontage, and altitude), AirLand 
Battle prioritized “deep attack.”  In a deep attack, ground forces focused on the Soviet’s first 
echelon while helicopters, aircraft, and rockets were employed to strike the Soviet’s second 
echelon.207  U.S. forces would hit the Soviets’ attacking force while simultaneously disrupting or 
delaying his follow-on echelons.  For the first time in its history, the Army developed a doctrine 
that placed great value on coordination with another service - the Air Force.      
 The 1982 manual also highlighted the deterrent effect of the AirLand Battle doctrine.  In 
the first sentence of the manual (in the preface), it stated, “The fundamental mission of the United 
States Army is to deter war.”208  The Army believed that the offense-oriented readiness posture 
that it maintained under AirLand Battle, along with the ability to conduct operations at great depth, 
would deter the Warsaw Pact from conducting any aggressive actions against NATO.209  However, 
deterrence is only mentioned three more times in the manual.  It is not afforded the prominence 
given to it in the manual’s preface.210    
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 AirLand Battle brought the Army’s emphasis back to offensive operations and the fighting 
spirit of the soldier.  Though the doctrine still placed great value on firepower, it was the Army’s 
first ever maneuver doctrine.  According to the manual, “The object of all operations is to impose 
our will upon the enemy…To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow 
from an unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery, and continue operations 
aggressively…these operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting.”211  
Harkening back to an earlier era in the Army’s history, the manual stressed the value of the 
individual fighting soldier as the key to victory (not technology).  The manual emphasized 
initiative, flexibility, violent execution, surprise, and momentum in the attack.  The basic tenets of 
AirLand Battle - initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization - were defined in detail with direct 
and indirect references to Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Liddell Hart.  These references 
illustrated the authors’ attempt to ground the new doctrine in the philosophy of war.  The principles 
of war, which were left out of the 1976 manual, were added back to the 1982 manual.212   
 The writers of the 1982 manual tried to transition the Army’s focus away from war against 
the Soviets in Europe.  The manual stated, the Army “must be prepared to fight highly mechanized 
forces typical of Warsaw Pact or Soviet surrogates in southwest or northeast Asia” (emphasis 
added).213  However, the manual did not address low-intensity conflict and it only allocated four 
pages to contingency operations.214  Contingency operations were viewed primarily as nonmilitary 
operations.  This lack of detail on contingency operations had immediate consequences because 
the Army engaged in a contingency operation in Grenada shortly after the manual’s publication.  
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Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 was a multi-service operation.215  It revealed many 
challenges in the joint capability of the services and the Army’s lack of preparedness for operations 
in low-intensity conflict.  The operation was not an application of the AirLand Battle doctrine 
because the manual hadn’t even reached the Army’s units or schools yet.  Most of the Army leaders 
who fought in Grenada were more familiar with the Active Defense doctrine.  
The 1986 Field Manual 100-5 Operations 
 While the 1986 Field Manual 100-5 Operations216 did not specify a fundamental change 
to Army doctrine, it is important because it not only reinforced the Army’s support for AirLand 
Battle but it also expanded a few of its central concepts.  The manual is noteworthy less for its new 
concepts and more for its validation of already-published concepts.  One of its authors 
characterized the manual as, “a second edition of current doctrine.”217  Continuing the trend since 
the controversial publication of the 1976 manual, there was intense engagement amongst the 
community of Army officers after the AirLand Battle concept was published in 1982.  A quick 
scan of Military Review - the Army’s primary journal during the 1980s - reveals numerous articles 
about AirLand Battle before and after the publication of the 1982 manual.  The 1986 FM 100-5 
Operations manual addressed some of the elements of criticism that arose in that professional 
dialogue.   
 Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, the former deputy commander of the 
Combined Arms Command (CAC) and the new TRADOC commander, took the lead on the 
manual and he wrote an article in Military Review in 1986 that explained the changes made to 
AirLand Battle and the rationale for those changes.  Richardson was a major proponent of doctrine 
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and he encouraged officers to engage in productive debates regarding AirLand Battle’s 
components.  Richardson believed that AirLand Battle was enormously important: “Only a leader 
well-grounded in the AirLand Battle can exploit opportunities to fix the enemy and to attack at the 
decisive point in battle.”218  While this might have been an overstatement, in his role as the 
commander of TRADOC it was important for Richardson to act as an ambassador for the new 
doctrine to reinforce its concepts inside the Army and to explain the manual’s importance to 
stakeholders outside of the organization.   
 The 1986 manual further refined the operational level of war concept, provided more 
balance between offensive and defensive operations, and synchronized the various components of 
the deep extended battle concept.219  The new manual also placed a stronger emphasis on the 
human dimension of warfare.  Factors such as leadership, cohesion, morale, courage, and skill 
were “raised to an equal footing with the ‘physics’ of war - weapons, lethality, time, distance, 
space, speed, and material quality.”220  While an emphasis on these psychological components of 
combat was not unique in the Army’s history, the 1976 doctrine focused instead on technology 
and systems.  The 1986 manual stressed that the Army needed to be ready for “strategic challenges 
across the full-range of threats from terrorism through low- and mid-intensity operations to high-
intensity and nuclear operations.”221  That said, the manual barely addressed low-intensity 
operations.222 
 While the 1982 manual defined the operational level of war, the 1986 manual further 
explained the concept.  Battles and engagements were fought at the tactical level; campaigns and 
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major operations were fought at the operational level.  Armies, joint, and allied commands fought 
at the operational level.  Divisions, brigades, and regiments fought at the tactical level.  According 
to Richardson, the corps was the only level of command that “can and will operate at both the 
tactical and operational levels.”223  Distinguishing between the levels of war in the 1986 manual 
was important because some analysts erroneously conflated the 1982 tactical and operational 
doctrine with NATO and allied strategic objectives.224  In fact, the Germans were particularly 
worried that the 1982 version of AirLand Battle was too aggressive.225  To address that concern, 
the 1986 manual stated that the new doctrine was “compatible with…NATO land forces tactical 
doctrine…[but] more general so as to meet U.S. needs in other theaters.”226 
 In addition to providing more nuance on the operational level of war, the manual also 
clarified confusion resulting from the 1982 manual’s emphasis on “deep battle.”  Renaming this 
concept “deep operations,” the new manual emphasized that operations in depth must be well 
integrated with the close fight.  Deep, close, and rear operations should be mutually supportive.  
The new manual also made the air-ground link between the Air Force and the Army more explicit 
by acknowledging the joint element of future campaigns and major operations.  
 The manual’s attempt to restore balance between offensive and defensive operations 
derived from criticism of the 1982 manual which argued that it over-emphasized the offense.  To 
address this, the 1986 manual explained how offensive operations nested within defensive 
campaigns in a new chapter on defensive operations.227  The new manual defined defensive 
operations in greater depth, but still emphasized the superiority of the offense.  It stated, 
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“commanders undertake the defense only when the strategic, operational, or tactical situation 
makes it impossible to conduct offensive operations or to economize forces to permit and attack 
elsewhere.”228   
3.1.3.2. Understanding the Sources of the AirLand Battle Doctrine 
Environmental Shifts 
 The Soviet adjustment in doctrine in the mid-1970s was the catalyst for the U.S. Army’s 
replacement of the Active Defense doctrine with AirLand Battle - a doctrine that gave the Army 
the ability to maneuver on the battlefield against a new style of Soviet offensive operations.  In 
1977, senior Army leaders conducted an assessment of the Soviets and determined that Active 
Defense was not sufficient for countering the Soviets’ newly developed ability to conduct attacks 
using maneuver rather than overwhelming firepower concentrated at one point.  As Wilson notes, 
“If the Soviets did not rely on the massive armored attacks that they employed in World War II but 
instead used flexible, probing attacks, then the thin, mobile defense defined by the new American 
doctrine might be overwhelmed.”229   
 Though he supported the Active Defense doctrine and played a role in its publication, 
Starry’s experience as the V Corps commander gave him a “new appreciation of up-to-date Soviet 
doctrine and capabilities.”230  Starry believed that the Soviets would conduct a penetration of the 
NATO defense and then employ “operational maneuver groups231 to strike deep into NATO rear 
areas.”232  In 1982, two of the authors of the AirLand Battle doctrine wrote, “[Army] commanders 
believe they could beat the leading Soviet echelons using the “active defense” but that the initial 
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battles would render our units ineffective while leaving Soviet follow-on forces intact with 
complete freedom of action.”233  AirLand Battle was the Army’s solution to address that. 
Role of Civilians 
 There is no evidence of civilian intervention into the development of AirLand Battle by 
any officials in the chain of command.  The only civilian interest in the doctrine came from 
civilians in the 1970’s military reform movement.234  Their proponent in government in 1981 was 
Senator Gary Hart.  Two prominent members of this group - William S. Lind and Edward Luttwak 
- were outspoken on the limitations of the Active Defense doctrine, but there is no evidence that 
they caused the Army’s rejection of that doctrine or the creation of AirLand Battle.235  Members 
of the reform movement promoted concepts like maneuver, agility, and the human element of war 
- concepts that appeared in the 1982 manual.  However, many of the concepts that the reform 
movement proposed were already rooted in Army doctrinal manuals that were published in the 
final years of World War II.236  In fact, General Starry ordered doctrine writers to consult the 1941 
keystone manual for inspiration for the AirLand Battle doctrine.237  Long notes that there was also 
substantial divergence between the preferences of reformers and Army doctrine writers in the area 
of technology.  AirLand Battle doctrine promoted sophisticated weapons technologies; most 
reformers were dubious of new technological solutions.238   
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Interservice Rivalry 
 In the 1940s and 1950s, the emergence of nuclear weapons increased the prominence of 
the Air Force and threatened the Army’s organizational survival.  In the 1970s, the Army avoided 
rivalry with the Air Force by focusing instead on clearly separating roles and missions between 
the two services.  In the case of AirLand Battle, an unprecedented degree of interservice 
cooperation between the Army and the Air Force defined the character of the doctrinal innovation.  
 Theories that argue that interservice rivalry is the primary cause of innovation (see Cote 
(1996) and Sapolsky (1972, 1996, and 2000)) cannot account for why the reverse happened with 
AirLand Battle.  The absence of interservice rivalry is a more feasible explanation for this 
particular innovation.  These authors argue that innovation “comes from competition among 
organizational rivals for resources and standing, who overcome the costs of implementing change 
through their concern about the greater costs of losing to a competitor.”239  Concerns over 
resources, budgets, and standing were still present in the Army and the Air Force in the late 1970s, 
but the Army’s interest in making the doctrine functional outweighed the costs of “losing” to the 
Air Force on the budget front.  In fact, part of the reason that the Army cooperated with the Air 
Force on the concept was because the equipment that it needed to execute AirLand Battle’s “deep 
attacks” behind Soviet lines - missiles, radars, and computers - had not yet been requisitioned.240  
The 1982 doctrine represented the “fusing of air and land battle into closely concerted operations 
of air power and ground forces.”241   
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Budget 
 In the early 1980s, defense budgets steadily increased as a result of the Reagan 
administration’s emphasis on national security.  In 1981, the total Department of Defense (DOD) 
service appropriations increased 10.9 percent; in 1982 it increased 12.7 percent, and in 1983 it 
increased 13.2 percent - a total increase of 21.6 percent in real terms during the three-year 
period.242  At first glance, the formulation of this new doctrine seems to be at odds with the budget 
hypothesis - the Army developed a doctrine during a period of increasing budgets (budgetary 
feast).  However, two factors make this a more nuanced story.  First, much of AirLand Battle was 
a return to doctrinal concepts that had been previously emphasized in the Army’s history prior to 
the establishment of Active Defense.  It is possible that the Army used this period of budgetary 
feast to prioritize the types of operations (and the associated training and procurement) that it 
preferred - it’s organizational essence.  Second, while the early 1980s was a time period of absolute 
increase in the DOD budget, the Army experienced a relative decline in budget share compared to 
the other military services.  
Organizational Culture 
 The Army’s organizational culture was anathema to a defense-centric, technology-oriented 
doctrine like Active Defense and so Army leaders focused on ensuring that the new AirLand Battle 
doctrine was centered on offensive operations designed to restore a spirit of “aggressiveness” to 
the force.  AirLand Battle’s concept of deep-strike would disrupt the Soviet’s ability to reinforce 
its front-line forces.  Rather than waiting in a defensive posture to respond to a Soviet attack, 
AirLand Battle was an offensive doctrine that allowed the Army to seize the initiative.  The Active 
Defense doctrine was abandoned in part because it was a sharp departure from an organizational 
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culture that valued soldiers over technology.  De Czege and Holder noted that the 1976 doctrine 
“paid insufficient attention to the human element in battle.”243  Kretchik contends that Starry was 
influenced deeply by history whereas DePuy was focused almost entirely on the future.244  The 
former included numerous historical vignettes in the 1982 manual - including a detailed discussion 
of the Battle of Vicksburg and the Battle of Tannenburg.  DePuy did not include any historical 
references in the 1976 manual, filling it instead with numerical analysis, charts, and graphs.245  
3.1.3.3. Conclusion 
 AirLand Battle was a revolutionary change from Active Defense.  As Long writes, 
“AirLand Battle derived from maneuver theory, not attrition theory; it focused on maneuver rather 
than firepower; it stressed the human dimensions of war instead of the technical, and it favored the 
offense over the defense.”246  Starry recognized that Active Defense could not account for “the 
enemy’s massive second-echelon forces, which, according to Soviet doctrine, would roll through 
the first echelon and exploit any advantages the [Soviet] first echelon might have gained.”247  
Starry’s assessment was confirmed by the results of a study that he ordered at the Field Artillery 
School in Fort Sill, Oklahoma.  The study made the case for the interdiction of Soviet targets “deep 
in the enemy rear to disrupt the Soviet second echelon during an assault.”248  This concept 
demanded close cooperation between the Army and the Air Force.  The AirLand Battle doctrine 
also reflected a renewed emphasis on offensive operations, mission-type orders (a method of 
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decentralized execution at the small-unit level), and a focus on the human and psychological 
dimension of warfare. 
 As Chief of the Armor branch, Starry worked very closed with DePuy to develop the Active 
Defense doctrine, but he led the effort to replace the doctrine shortly after taking command of 
TRADOC.  Though Starry had a different leadership style than his old boss, General DePuy, he 
was vocal in his support for Active Defense during the drafting process and in the period 
immediately following the publication of the 1976 manual.  Starry’s support for the doctrine is 
informative because it demonstrates that the source of Active Defense was more than just the 
interests of the highly ambitious, DePuy.  If Starry had been against Active Defense from the 
beginning, then we could say that his replacement of it once he was in charge was the natural 
extension of his early resistance.  The fact that he defended Active Defense suggests that he truly 
believed in the theory of victory that the Army had in the early 1970s which led to the doctrine.  
Only when Active Defense proved impractical in training, and the Army’s new intelligence 
assessment of the Soviet Army indicated more sophisticated Soviet capabilities, did Starry take 
action to replace Active Defense with AirLand Battle.   
 In a letter to DePuy in September 1976, Alexander M. Haig, the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe, wrote that the 1976 manual’s focus on Europe “may induce too narrow a 
focus on defense for its own sake.”  He thought that this was a dangerous byproduct of a doctrine 
that “focus[ed] on a particular contingency.”249   The fact that doctrine-writers addressed this 
fixation with Europe in the AirLand Battle doctrine illustrates a recognition of the hazards of 
focusing a keystone doctrine on one particular geographic terrain.  De Czege and Holder wrote, 
“A doctrine based solely on European requirements would place us at a disadvantage when called 
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on to fight in another area.”250  It also suggests that Army leaders recognized that combat against 
Soviet surrogates outside of Europe was a possibility.   
3.2. Conclusion 
 The three doctrines for conventional warfare studied in this chapter - pentomic, Active 
Defense, and AirLand Battle - occurred after environmental shifts that shifted the balance of threat.  
In the 1940s and 1950s, the advent of nuclear weapons led to the pentomic doctrine.  When the 
Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons capability advanced considerably in the 1960s, threatening the 
U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, the Army developed the Active Defense doctrine.  
Finally, changes to Soviet doctrine in the 1970s was the catalyst that led to the Army’s development 
of AirLand Battle. 
 Contra Posen, civilian intervention was not necessary to compel doctrinal change in any of 
the three innovations.  Though the civilian emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons in the 1950s 
threatened the Army’s standing in the national security establishment, the decision to reorganize 
infantry divisions into battle groups and to develop a doctrine for the employment of tactical 
nuclear weapons was one made by elites in the Army.  It is likely that the Army anticipated civilian 
intervention in its doctrinal processes if it did not take nuclear weapons seriously.  A nuclear 
weapons doctrine preempted intervention, and it afforded the Army the opportunity to revise 
doctrine on its own terms.  In the case of Active Defense, the preferences of Army leaders matched 
the preferences of civilian elites.  Both sets of actors wanted to transition focus from the Vietnam 
War to the defense of Europe from the Warsaw Pact.  Finally, civilian officials did not intervene to 
compel the replacement of Active Defense with AirLand Battle in 1982.  The Army adopted some 
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ideas on maneuver from civilian defense reformers and intellectuals, but those civilians were 
outside of the official chain of command.   
 Contrary to the literature which predicts minimal innovation during periods of peace, all 
three of the doctrinal innovations occurred during periods of peace after war.  Posen argues that 
military organizations are unlikely to initiate doctrinal change in the absence of conflict because 
they seek to minimize uncertainty.  Change processes are inherently uncertain.  This argument does 
not hold for the pentomic, Active Defense, or AirLand Battle doctrines.  Murray also argues that 
innovation is unlikely during peace because decreasing military budgets constrict the processes 
necessary to vet new ideas and develop new doctrines.  This argument also falls short in explaining 
these three innovations.  Sharp budget decreases in the aftermath of World War II had the reverse 
effect.  Pressure on Army budgets led to innovation and the realization that new doctrines could 
be used as justification for more funding.  The Army used the Active Defense doctrine in the 
constrained budget environment of the post-Vietnam War period to justify new weapons 
acquisitions tied to the overarching doctrine.  The Army also experienced budget decreases relative 
to the other services during the years leading up to the adoption of AirLand Battle. 
 Contra Rosen, who argues that military innovation is most likely when advocates for 
change compete with rivals in the organization, intraservice rivalry did not play a role in any of 
the doctrinal innovations in this chapter.  There is no evidence of competition between the Army’s 
combat branches during the formulation of these doctrines.  Similarly, Jensen’s argument on the 
necessity of incubators and advocacy networks to compel doctrinal change is not relevant for these 
cases. 
 The interservice perspective, which argues that innovation is the result of competition 
between military organizations that are subordinate to the same state for resources, standing, and 
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prestige, is the most difficult dynamic to unpack in these three cases.  While the pentomic 
innovation was clearly the result of a major rivalry between the Army and the Air Force, both 
Active Defense and AirLand Battle were shaped by cooperation between those two services.  In 
the case of the pentomic doctrine, Sapolsky’s prediction is accurate.  When the Army calculated 
that a loss in budgets and prestige to the Air Force was costlier than innovation, it innovated.  A 
new mission area emerged between the two services, and they competed for scarce resources to 
establish jurisdiction in that area.  Fears of organizational extinction after the advent of nuclear 
weapons also drove innovation.  As Downs’ theory predicts, the Army had to demonstrate that its 
services were still worthwhile.  The Army developed a tactical nuclear weapons doctrine to explain 
its comparative advantage within the domain to establish autonomy and ensure the organization’s 
relevance.  The Army was so worried about its survival during the 1950s that it was willing to 
promote a tactical nuclear weapons doctrine that surely would have failed if it was put to the test 
in combat.  The Army abandoned the pentomic doctrine as soon as the Army’s survival was no 
longer in jeopardy, in part because it recognized the doctrine’s impracticality.   
 Contrary to the pentomic doctrine, the formulation of Active Defense and AirLand Battle 
was shaped by cooperation between the Army and the Air Force.  The two services worked together 
to develop a coordinated air-ground concept.  AirLand Battle was the embodiment of interservice 
cooperation.  While the two services still competed with each other for limited resources, the 
careful delineation of responsibilities separated between the land and air domains minimized 
interservice rivalry.  Both services recognized that they could gain from AirLand Battle.  In both 
cases, competition with the Air Force was not substantial enough to cause the Army to worry about 
its survival.  
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 The quick abandonment of the Active Defense doctrine can be explained through the lens 
of organizational culture.  Culture didn’t lead to the innovation because culture was static over the 
time period, but it did shape the urgency of the Army’s efforts to jettison the doctrine as soon as 
the external environment changed.  The defensive doctrine was in friction with the Army’s 
offensive-oriented culture.  Once the balance of power shifted, the Army moved quickly to ditch 
the defensive doctrine, replacing it with AirLand Battle.  Army elites capitalized on the opportunity 
to transition away from a doctrine that was at odds with the organization’s culture.  The pentomic 
and Active Defense doctrines demonstrate that the Army will innovate doctrinally in ways that are 
counter to the organization’s cultural imperatives in order to ensure survival and maintain 
relevance.   
 One source of criticism of these three doctrinal innovations is the charge that the Army 
only innovated to defeat a potential Soviet invasion of western Europe.  Wilson argues that though 
the Army fought in Korea, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada, “None of these actual 
or likely wars produced the same degree of rethinking and experimentation that was induced by 
the possibility of a war in Europe.”251  If military organizations innovate based on a rational 
assessment of the most dangerous threat to American vital interests as my theoretical framework 
suggests, it is not surprising that the Army oriented its doctrinal innovations on the greatest threat 
of the period - the Soviets.  I test this hypothesis in the next chapter on doctrinal innovations for 
irregular warfare.  
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Chapter 4. Doctrinal Change for Irregular Warfare in the U.S. Army 
 The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an analysis of U.S. Army doctrine with respect to 
irregular warfare.  With the transition of the presidency from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to 
President John F. Kennedy in January 1961, a new policy of Flexible Response replaced the 1950s 
New Look and the concept of massive retaliation.  Consequently, the Army was tasked with 
expanding its repertoire from one purely focused on operations against conventional militaries to 
one also focused on operations against irregular forces.  First, I examine the absence of doctrinal 
innovation with respect to counterinsurgency operations prior to, during, and after the Vietnam 
War.  Second, I analyze the factors leading to two keystone doctrines developed by the Army in 
the 1990s - Full-Dimensional Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations.  The stated purpose of 
these two doctrines was to enable the Army to operate effectively in low-intensity conflict.  
However, the doctrines were incremental rather than innovative and their adoption had a negligible 
effect on the Army as a whole.  Army leaders continued to demonstrate an unwillingness to change 
doctrine for irregular warfare based on the dubious contention that effectiveness in conventional 
warfare would enable effectiveness in irregular warfare.  The cases in this chapter illustrate what 
happens when civilian elites promote doctrinal change that is at odds with the Army’s preferences.   
 Irregular warfare refers to a certain type of fighting defined by combat between a state 
military organization and non-state armed groups1 involving competition for legitimacy and 
influence over a civilian population.2  In the last century, the U.S. military referred to irregular 
warfare (and efforts to counter it) as: unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, counterterrorism, 
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low-intensity conflict, asymmetric operations, Military Operations Other than War, (counter) 
insurgency, and small wars.3  While it would be easiest to refer to irregular warfare as 
unconventional warfare as a way of contrasting it directly with conventional warfare, I deliberately 
do not do so because in the parlance of today's U.S. military, unconventional warfare (UW) refers 
to operations conducted by Special Forces with or through irregular forces in support of a 
resistance movement or insurgency.  From the military’s perspective, UW must be conducted with 
or through surrogate forces who are irregular.4   
 While the state military will often engage in low- to mid-intensity combat operations 
against armed groups in these types of wars, the military will also need to prioritize political, 
economic, diplomatic, and social actions designed to maximize the degree of governmental control 
(or influence) over the population.  Sometimes these operations take on a quasi-police nature 
during periods that are relatively peaceful.  In some instances, civil measures require establishing 
working relationships with local security forces and in other cases they require complete martial 
law and significant efforts to “reshape the subject society.”5  When a state military participates in 
an irregular war it needs to coordinate extensively with other agencies of the state to accomplish 
broad strategic objectives.  The degree to which this actually occurs is affected by the nature of 
the security threat.  State militaries often do not have the resident expertise to carry out some of 
the necessary civil measures in irregular warfare, but the inherent danger in the security 
environment might prevent or dissuade other non-military agencies of the state from intervening 
to assist.  
                                                           
3 Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 2011), pp. 203-208. 
4 See Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008. 
Accessed online at: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf. 
5 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 
(Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), p. 5. 
 186 
 In this chapter, I use the same theoretical framework and structured, focused case study 
approach that I used to assess Army doctrine with respect to conventional warfare in the previous 
chapter.  The Vietnam case is the first (and only) case that I analyze in which the Army was engaged 
in war.  Full-Dimensional and Full-Spectrum Operations were doctrinal changes that were made 
during periods of relative peace.  Analysis of the most recent doctrinal change - Full-
Dimensional/Full-Spectrum Operations - draws from primary source materials that have been 
understudied until now.6  In my analysis, I am also attentive to evidence of organizational structural 
change.  We see organizational change immediately prior to the Vietnam War and during the war 
itself.  In the chapter’s conclusion, I compare the absence of doctrinal change vis-à-vis 
counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War with the doctrinal changes made in the 
1990s after the Gulf War.  
4.1. The Major Doctrines 
4.1.1. Counterinsurgency Doctrine  
 The Army entered the Vietnam War with a doctrine and a force structure that were designed 
for conventional operations against another state’s organized military.  However, in the war, the 
Army was confronted with a conventional enemy force and a guerrilla force.  Its doctrine was ill-
suited for counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations.  The Army’s reliance on 
overwhelming firepower during the war inflicted numerous casualties on North Vietnamese 
soldiers, but this approach often came at the expense of the degradation of U.S. pacification efforts.  
During the war, at the behest of civilian officials, the Army made a number of adjustments to its 
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doctrine with respect to counterinsurgency operations, but those changes fell short of being 
innovative.  The purpose of this section is to examine the factors which influenced the absence of 
doctrinal innovation during the lead-up to and execution of the Vietnam War.   
4.1.1.1. Lead-up to U.S. Escalation in the Vietnam War (1960-1963) 
 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, immediately prior to U.S. escalation in the Vietnam War, 
the Army replaced its pentomic structure and transitioned its keystone doctrine to a focus from 
nuclear warfare to conventional.  Below, I discuss the organizational change and the publication 
of the Army’s 1962 keystone doctrine.  I also briefly examine the state of the Army’s 
unconventional warfare doctrine immediately prior to the war.   
A New Organizational Construct - ROAD   
 By 1961, President Eisenhower’s New Look and the concept of massive retaliation were 
replaced by President John F. Kennedy’s strategy of “Flexible Response.”7  Flexible Response 
called for the U.S. to respond to any aggression with “suitable, selective, swift, and effective 
means.”8  President Kennedy directed the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George H. Decker, 
to change the Army’s organizational structure to improve effectiveness on a nonnuclear 
battlefield.9  For the reasons discussed in the previous chapter, the Army quickly discarded the 
pentomic structure and its doctrine.  According to Bacevich, “Battle groups, Pentomic divisions, 
the emphasis on dispersion and non-linearity, the quest for light formations, the commitment to 
fighting with tactical nuclear weapons: all quietly were shelved or unceremoniously dumped.”10   
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 The new organizational structure - called Reorganization Objectives Army Division 
(ROAD) 1965 - was a transition back to a division oriented on maneuver and the physical 
destruction of an enemy force through offensive operations and overwhelming firepower - a return 
to the Army’s doctrinal roots.11  The ROAD division took four forms: airborne, infantry, 
mechanized, and armored.12  Airborne units remained stateside as a quick response force for 
contingency operations.  Infantry units deployed to Korea based on their ability to function 
effectively in constrained terrain.  Armor and mechanized forces deployed to Europe since they 
could maneuver effectively on the open terrain.13  While these units were organized to fight in 
nonnuclear environments, in theory they were supposed to be able to convert to a nuclear-ready 
force if necessary.14  Army leaders claimed the ROAD construct was flexible and adaptable and 
therefore capable of making such a transition.15 
 The Kennedy administration approved the ROAD reorganization for implementation in 
early 1962.  The administration recognized the limitations of a force only capable of employing 
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore emphasized the importance of the 
development of a powerful conventional force.  The Army was happy to oblige since this aligned 
with the organization’s preferences.  The first two divisions that were reorganized were the 1st 
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Armored Division (activated in February 1962 and operational under the ROAD construct in 
August 1962) and the 5th Infantry Division (activated in February 1962 and operational under the 
ROAD construct in October 1962).  The remaining divisions in the Army were reorganized to the 
ROAD construct from January 1963 to May 1965.16  
 When compared to the pentomic construct, it is striking the degree to which the Army 
allocated resources and time to fielding, testing, and validating the ROAD construct.  Not only 
was comprehensive testing done in the field, but there was a clear attempt to solicit feedback from 
subordinate commanders and to integrate lessons learned in military educational curricula.  Under 
the pentomic construct, the exercises that were used to validate the concept were artificial and 
unrealistic.  Under ROAD, Army leaders had no trouble creating realistic live-fire exercises at 
multiple echelons of command and then using preexisting assessment mechanisms to evaluate and 
certify units in those exercises.  Validation of ROAD proceeded through a sequence of individual, 
small-unit, and large-unit training exercises which culminated at the division-level.  Every type of 
unit was evaluated and questionnaires were distributed to units in the field.  Lessons learned from 
training exercises were captured in formal reports and sent to the branch schools and the Command 
and General Staff College.17  Units reported no significant difficulties with the ROAD construct. 
Similar to previous configurations, the ROAD construct initially suffered from a lack of critical 




                                                           
16 Combat Studies Institute, “Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend Analysis,” Combat 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1999, p. 23. 
17 Combat Studies Institute, 1999, p. 24. 
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A New Manual - 1962 FM 100-5 Operations 
 The Army published the 1962 Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 Operations manual in 
conjunction with its transition to ROAD.18  In this manual, the Army signaled an intention to be 
prepared to fight in a range of different types of conflicts.  According to the manual, “At one end 
of the spectrum are those conflicts in which the application of national power short of military 
force is applied. This type of war is termed cold war.  The other end of the spectrum represents 
unrestricted application of military force termed general war.  The center portion…is defined as 
limited war…”19  The doctrine explicitly ended the debate between nuclear and nonnuclear 
operations, declaring the requirement for Army forces to operate effectively in both types of 
operations.20  The manual also defined the new division construct with a section on each type of 
division - infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, and airborne.21   A section of the manual focused 
on airmobile operations - the “employ[ment] [of] aviation, infantry, artillery, cavalry and 
reconnaissance units” through “rapid shifts of combat forces within the combat zone with little 
regard to intervening obstacles.”22  The Army experimented with these types of operations after 
the Korean War and increasingly valued airmobile operations as a way to quickly deploy infantry 
units for the purposes of seizing objectives, conducting raids, or outflanking enemy positions.23 
 Although the Army had participated in multiple irregular (or unconventional) campaigns 
throughout its history, for the first time the Army discussed these types of operations in its keystone 
doctrinal manual.  Most of the principles specified in the manual were a rehash of concepts already 
                                                           
18 Field Service Regulations Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, 1962). Hereafter, 1962 FSR. 
19 Ibid., p. 5. 
20 The manual affirmed the requirement for the Army to maintain a dual capability.  See 1962 FSR, p. 30. 
21 1962 FSR, pp. 31-32. 
22 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 
23 Kretchik, 2011, p. 183. 
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printed in the 1961 FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces24, but the inclusion of these 
concepts in FM 100-5 elevated their standing in the Army.  Unconventional warfare was believed 
to include guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape of friendly military personnel, and subversion 
against hostile states.  The Army defined irregular operations as “guerrilla, insurgent, subversive, 
resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and military personnel, organizations, and methods.”25  The 
manual described irregular operations at some length but there was much less in the way of 
prescribing Army operations to counter irregular activity.  
Unconventional Warfare Doctrine Before the War 
 In his graduation speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point in June 1962, 
President Kennedy warned the soon-to-be U.S. Army officers of “another type of war, new in its 
intensity, ancient in its origin - war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, [and] assassins...[which] 
requires a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and 
wholly different kind of military training.”26  One of the aims of Kennedy's speech was to pressure 
Army leaders to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine.  Indicative of a belief that guerrilla warfare 
(or insurgency more broadly) could easily be countered with soldiers trained only for interstate 
war between uniformed militaries, General Decker pushed back against Kennedy's directive to 
modify existing doctrines for fighting, remarking that "any good soldier can handle guerrillas.”27  
Decker was not alone in his assessment; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Lyman L. 
                                                           
24 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 
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27 As quoted in D. S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present 
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 192 
Lemnitzer, General Maxwell D. Taylor (the president’s military advisor and future chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs), and Marine Corps General Victor H. Krulak concurred with Decker.28   
 While a number of senior Army leaders did proclaim a commitment to building a capacity 
for effective unconventional warfare operations, the Army Chief of Staff General Decker did not 
see eye-to-eye with President Kennedy on the best way to conduct special warfare operations.  
Rather than train Army units to counter guerrillas through the execution of low- to mid-intensity 
operations by small units, most senior Army leaders believed that Army units capable of 
successfully conducting conventional operations with large-scale formations and high levels of 
firepower could also defeat guerrillas with the right leaders and the right training.29  General 
Decker, as late as October 1961, was chiefly concerned with balancing the Army’s ability to 
conduct nuclear and nonnuclear operations.  The Army remained focused on the most dangerous 
threat to the United States - the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forces - rather than guerrilla 
elements functioning as proxies for the Communists.  Counterinsurgency operations were not a 
priority for Army leaders.30 
 The Army was unwilling to overhaul its organization for the purpose of counterinsurgency.  
The editor of Army magazine in 1962, John Spore, and a co-author, Lloyd Norman, characterized 
the Army’s fear well: “[concentrating on guerrilla warfare] could have meant an active Army of 
500,000 or less and an Army without the modern weapons and equipment the exploding 
technology of war was capable of developing.”31  The Army thought it was critical that it make a 
case for operations across the entire spectrum of war (from guerrilla warfare on the low end to 
                                                           
28 Birtle, 2006, pp. 226-227. 
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30 George H. Decker, “Where Stands a U.S. Soldier, There Stands the U.S.A.,” Army 12, no. 3 (October 1961): 
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nuclear warfare on the upper end), in order to guarantee its organizational survival and to make a 
claim for the budgets and resources necessary to modernize its weapons and other technological 
systems.   
 Kennedy recognized the Army’s unwillingness to fundamentally change its structure or 
doctrine for counterinsurgency operations and so he appointed a committee to determine if the 
Army really was “making excellent progress in Special Warfare,” as General Herbert B. Powell, 
commander of Continental Army Command (CONARC) claimed.32  Though the Army had 
established the Special Forces in 1952, and codified Special Forces doctrine in the 1962 FSR, the 
new branch was small and incapable of conducting and winning a small war on its own.  Though 
the 1962 FSR included operations against irregular forces, it did not elaborate on many critical 
aspects of counterinsurgency.    
 Counterinsurgency operations were not in the Special Force’s repertoire.  The Special 
Forces were designed to train guerrilla forces (not defeat them) and to conduct psychological 
operations behind enemy lines in support of Army conventional forces.  The North Koreans 
employed guerrillas in the Korean War but traditional defensive efforts had proven successful 
against these forces so there was little impetus for the Army to change its doctrine or to develop a 
comprehensive counter-guerrilla doctrine.33  However, by 1961 the Special Forces embraced the 
new counter-guerrilla mission and worked to develop and disseminate the necessary tactics and 
doctrine.34  In 1962, the Special Forces only consisted of about five-thousand men, so it was not 
practical to assign them to a wide-ranging counterinsurgency operation without significant 
augmentation from another military organization.  Therefore, the U.S. military really only had 
                                                           
32 Kretchik, 2011, p. 185.  The Powell quote comes from Norman and Spore, 1962, p. 28. 
33 Doughty, 1979, p. 25. 
34 Walt W. Rostow, “Countering Guerrilla Attack,” Army 12, no. 2 (September 1961): 53-57. 
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three options: assign the counterinsurgency mission to the Army as its primary mission, assign it 
to the Army as a secondary mission, or assign it to the Marine Corps as a primary mission.35   
4.1.1.2. Doctrine During the Vietnam War (1964-1972) 
 The Army entered the Vietnam War with the ROAD force structure and the doctrine 
specified in the 1962 Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 Operations manual.  Of the various 
types of divisions under ROAD, the Army selected the infantry division of 13,500 soldiers as its 
primary fighting element based on the Army’s experiences in the constrained terrain of the Korean 
War and after-action reports of the French who failed to employ their tanks effectively in support 
of the infantry in Vietnam.36  The 1962 FSR included a chapter on fighting unconventional wars 
and fighting against irregular forces but the reality was that the only component within the Army 
that was even close to being organized and trained for this type of combat was the Special Forces 
(and the Special Forces represented a very small slice of the Army’s overall strength).   
 As the Army bolstered its presence in the Vietnam War in 1965, the 82nd Airborne Division 
(in addition to a contingent of Marines) intervened in the Dominican Republic under the orders of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson in response to a coup.  This tiny war might be looked at as a dry run 
for some of the activities that the Army would have to perform in Vietnam that were traditionally 
perceived as outside the Army’s domain.  These included election support, engagement with host-
nation civilians, and training host-nation security forces.  The Army did not collect and distribute 
lessons learned in the Dominican Republic, even though doing so might have prepared Army 
forces for the unconventional operations they would conduct in Vietnam. 
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 By 1965, the U.S. Army was deeply engaged in the conflict in Vietnam and its primary 
source of doctrine was still the 1962 FSR.  While the manual covered airmobile operations, the 
path that the Army took to develop, train, and employ that capability was a long one and it is worth 
recounting briefly here because it reflects another organizational change that is often overlooked - 
the establishment of the Army’s Air Assault Division.  In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara pushed the Army to expand its conception of the role that helicopters might play in 
combat.  The Secretary accused the Army of moving too slowly to develop the airmobile concept.37  
Believing that the Army’s previous efforts to review aviation’s potential were too limited, 
McNamara wrote, “I shall be very disappointed if the Army’s re-examination merely produces 
logistically oriented recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for 
employment of fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in 
mobility.”38   
 The Army assigned Major General Hamilton H. Howze to serve as the president of the 
Army’s board dedicated to studying the airmobile concept.  The board - colloquially known as the 
Howze Board - recommended the establishment of an air assault division of 450 aircraft under a 
construct similar to the existing ROAD division structure.39  In 1961 and 1962, the Army studied 
the airmobile concept and in February 1963 it established the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) at 
Fort Benning, Georgia.  After two phases of training, the 11th conducted a training operation against 
the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg to test the final concept.40  Given the escalation of the 
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Vietnam War and the urgency to modify Army tactics in that environment, the Army tested 
airmobile concepts in theater and then codified effective practices in doctrine.41  The road to 
airmobile operations led to the activation of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in July 1965.  The 
concept was put to the test in the 7 th Cavalry’s battle with approximately 2,000 North Vietnamese 
soldiers in the Ia Drang Valley42 - a battle that demonstrates that the Army was deeply engaged in 
a conventional fight requiring mobility, firepower, air support, and artillery.  Helicopters were a 
major asset for U.S. forces in Vietnam. The Army used helicopters in offensive operations and for 
the purposes of mobility, reconnaissance, and intelligence.  The ability of the Army to develop, 
field, test, and employ helicopters improved drastically from the Korean War to the Vietnam War 
and serves as an example of a technology which increased the effectiveness of the Army in 
profound ways. 
 Army offensive operations in the Vietnam War were aligned with the 1962 manual and its 
emphasis on terrain and enemy forces.  Search-and-destroy operations - not explicitly covered in 
the manual - were developed to hunt North Vietnamese conventional forces and Viet Cong 
guerrillas.  A 1965 study on search-and-destroy operations entitled the Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) revealed considerable 
inefficiencies in the operation but the Army continued to use it.  Eventually, by April 1968, the 
Army stopped using the term, “search and destroy,” because it came with the connotation of 
purposeless operations that were too heavy-handed on the civilian population.43 
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 Under the command of General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army forces conducted 
operations against both a conventional force and a guerrilla force.44  By 1968, Westmoreland 
executed a strategy of attrition based on finding and defeating Vietcong guerrilla forces and North 
Vietnamese conventional forces.  According to Westmoreland, “[the enemy] had to be pounded 
with artillery and bombs and eventually brought to battle on the ground if they were not forever to 
remain a threat.”45  The logic was that once the North Vietnamese forces were destroyed, the South 
Vietnamese government would be able to police the rest of the country, restore order, and defeat 
or neutralize any remaining irregular threat.  When searching for and fighting guerrilla forces, the 
Army employed small, portable radar units designed to pick up the smell of human urine, 
computers programmed to determine the likely time and location of enemy attacks, herbicides to 
eliminate terrain that the Vietcong might use as cover, Agent Orange to destroy acres of land, and 
retaliatory bombing against villages suspected of providing safe haven for Vietcong.46   According 
to General William DePuy, “The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more 
napalm…till the other side cracks and gives up.”47  The challenge of finding enemy forces plagued 
the Army throughout the war, leading to constant emphasis on the maxim - “find, fix, and finish” 
- a phrase still used in the U.S. Army today.  
 Most Army leaders emphasized the destruction of enemy forces as the primary goal of 
operations against irregular forces and conventional forces.48  Such an orientation is not surprising 
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given the Army’s predilection for firepower and given the fact that the Army’s doctrine (and most 
of its training) before the war focused on defeating the Soviets in Europe.  The focus on attrition 
warfare meant that the “body count” was the most measurable way to assess progress.  Body counts 
were unreliable since it was difficult to distinguish between guerrilla fighters and the 
noncombatant, civilian population.49  Body count accuracy notwithstanding, the military inflicted 
tremendous losses on the enemy and this contributed to the erroneous perception that the 
Americans were winning.50  One of the clearest examples of the Army’s emphasis on attriting the 
enemy through overwhelming firepower was the concept of “piling-on,” whereby units would fix 
the enemy with direct fire, encircle him, and employ tremendous volleys of artillery and close air 
support to destroy him.51 
 Westmoreland did not have sufficient forces to defeat the conventional Vietnamese threat 
while also controlling areas where the Vietcong operated.  The enemy could easily hide within the 
civilian population or seek refuge in Laos, Cambodia, or North Vietnam.  In a speech given in 
1967, William DePuy, then a Major General, illustrated not only the tremendous challenge of 
defeating guerrillas but also the heavy-handed approach that units took in counter-guerrilla 
operations - “it takes a lot of artillery shells, a lot of bombing, a lot of patrolling, a lot of attacking, 
and a lot of broadcasting, leaflets and talks.”52  It is interesting to note that in this 1967 lecture, 
DePuy felt as though the tide had turned in the war and his assessment of the prospects for U.S. 
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success was optimistic.53   After the Tet Offensive in 1968, the Nixon administration initiated a 
massive troop buildup in South Vietnam and increased pressure against the North Vietnamese 
from 1969-1973.  After four more years of costly war, the Americans finally reached a peace 
settlement that enabled their withdrawal in 1973 (with the war ending in 1975).54   
1968 Field Manual 100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field 
 The publication of the Army’s 1968 Field Manual 100-5 is barely acknowledged in most 
accounts of the Army’s experience in the Vietnam War.  The most detailed exposition of the 
Army’s doctrinal evolution from 1946-1976 doesn’t even mention this particular field manual.55  
The absence of focus on the 1968 manual is unsurprising given the consistency of its doctrine with 
the previously published 1962 FSR.  According to Kretchik, the primary purpose of the 1968 FM 
100-5 was to reassure American allies in Europe that the Army’s focus on the Vietnam War was 
not coming at the expense of its ability to defeat the Soviets on a European front if necessary.56  
While the manual arguably did just that, it is also noteworthy for its name change, an expansion 
of airmobile operations, and the inclusion of an entire chapter on stability operations (a new name 
for operations in low-intensity conflict).  Additionally, the manual added more refinement to the 
Army’s conception of unconventional warfare and its tendency to view that type of warfare not as 
a main effort but as a supporting effort.  
 The most obvious change between the 1968 manual and its predecessors is the doctrine’s 
name change from Field Service Regulations to Operations of Army Forces in the Field.  Kretchik 
contends that this reflects a transition in the Army from viewing doctrine as regulatory (or 
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authoritarian) to viewing it more as guidance for the conduct of missions or operations.  The 
manual’s introduction confirms such an assessment: “This manual is a guide for operations of U.S. 
Army forces in the field…Military operations are actions, or the carrying out of strategic, tactical, 
service, training, or administrative military missions.”57  While I don’t think this shift in the 
Army’s approach to doctrine represents a revolutionary change, I do think that it indicates the 
further evolution of the Army’s thinking on doctrine’s purpose.  When it was first established, 
Army doctrine was prescriptive because Army leaders saw such an approach as necessary to 
formalize procedures for a new organization, not yet proven on the battlefield.   
 By the Vietnam War, the Army’s imperative to fight effectively across a spectrum of war 
- cold war, limited war, and general war in the words of the 1962 FSR - meant that the 
organization’s ability to prescribe or regulate every type of operation in explicit detail was limited.  
With the 1968 manual, the Army took another step forward to support the 1914 claim that “Officers 
and men of all ranks and grades are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to 
which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as 
they arise.”58  This is different than the explicit regulatory emphasis of the Army’s early manuals 
which included lines like, “To insure[sic] uniformity throughout the Army, all Infantry exercises 
and maneuvers not embraced in that system are prohibited, and those therein prescribed will be 
strictly observed.”59  Over time, the number of supporting manuals - non-keystone manuals that 
focused on specific subject matter (i.e. artillery, engineer operations, etc.) - became more common 
practice.  This gave more flexibility for doctrine writers to focus on big-picture issues in the 
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keystone manual rather than providing explicit details on the conduct of a variety of different types 
of operations.   
 In regard to unconventional warfare, the Army included language in the chapter devoted 
to the topic which stated that unconventional operations were done “primarily for the purpose of 
assisting and supporting the conventional military effort.”60  While this language doesn’t minimize 
the importance of unconventional warfare, it clearly establishes it as secondary to the conventional 
effort.  It also reflects the Army’s way of dealing with increasing friction between the recently 
created special warfare elements within the force such as the Special Forces and the more 
traditional services such as the infantry.  This section of the manual is impressive for its cogent 
articulation of the effect that conventional operations might have on the local civilian population 
in an unconventional war.  The 1962 FSR focused on guerrilla warfare as an element of partisan 
warfare; the 1968 FM 100-5 considered guerrilla warfare in an insurgency environment.61   
 Unique to the 1968 manual was the addition of an entire chapter on stability operations - 
“internal defense and internal development operation and assistance provided by the Armed Forces 
to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can 
function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved.”62  One reason for the use of 
this new term was to convince members of the Army that counterinsurgency was not just a Special 
Forces mission or an effort conducted by military advisors, but an operation that affected the entire 
Army.63  The manual discouraged individuals in the Army from referring to counterinsurgency 
operations, preferring instead the use of internal defense and internal development when 
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discussing the national effort to defeat an insurgency and stability operations when referencing the 
military component of that national effort.64  Terminology matters and this articulation of terms 
demonstrates the Army’s awareness of that fact.  Kretchik points out that this emphasis on 
terminology65 also reflected the Army’s attempt to clarify that its efforts were only one component 
of a much broader national (military and non-military) effort to defeat an insurgency.  It is not 
clear if this is an example of the Army recognizing the tremendous investment of resources 
necessary to defeat an insurgency such as the one in Vietnam, or if it is an example of the Army 
hedging its bets in the event that it failed in Vietnam.  Kretchik thinks it is evidence of the Army 
maturing to recognize that it is only one element within a larger joint-service66 and interagency 
system, but one might argue instead that it is evidence of the Army’s unwillingness to fight in a 
counterinsurgency based on a preference for more conventional operations.67 
 Birtle, who not only conducted detailed research on the Army’s keystone publications, but 
also analyzed all of the supporting and subordinate field manuals on numerous topics relevant to 
counterinsurgency, concludes that the 1968 manual is “most remarkable” for “how little it had 
changed after six years of doctrinal ferment and three years of warfare in Vietnam.”68  Most of the 
concepts in the manual were exactly the same as those of its predecessor.  Birtle notes that though 
the manual emphasized the importance of balancing combat and internal development operations, 
it refused to prioritize one over the other, allowing commanders in the field to use their discretion.69   
 While the 1968 manual did not fundamentally change Army doctrine, there were some 
efforts to change the organization’s educational curriculum and its training by 1968.  By that year, 
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almost half of the Infantry Officer Basic Course - a school attended by all newly commissioned 
infantry lieutenants - focused on subjects related to counterinsurgency.70  The Command and 
General Staff College increased its counterinsurgency instruction from 92 hours in 1965 to 200 
hours in 1968 and the curriculum focused on newly-created counterinsurgency doctrine, case 
studies of previous counterinsurgency operations, and current operations in Vietnam.  Efforts were 
also made to ensure that the faculty at the school had experience in counterinsurgency in 
Vietnam.71  Military schools played an important role in the inculcation of new doctrine across the 
Army.  In regard to training, Birtle notes that every infantry battalion and armored cavalry 
squadron had a cadre of four officers and twelve noncommissioned officers who were qualified in 
jungle warfare to ensure that units trained on the appropriate tasks and to the right standards.72 
4.1.1.3. The Post-Vietnam War Period 
 Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway and Army Chief of Staff Creighton W. Abrams 
created the Strategic Assessment Group to review the Army’s experience in the Vietnam War and 
to develop a roadmap for the organization’s future.  Based on the conclusion that the American 
public would no longer stomach foreign intervention except in those cases where America’s vital 
interests were at play, the Group concluded that the defense of Europe with conventional forces 
should be the Army’s primary focus.  Not only was this a logical assessment, but it also aligned 
with the institution’s organizational preference for this type of warfare.  The Army was very 
willing to jettison many of the initiatives it took during the Vietnam War to conduct more effective 
counterinsurgency operations.   
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 The Army reduced the size of the Special Forces from 13,000 men in 1971 to 3,000 men 
by 1974.  Rather than continuing a program to develop trained advisors known as the Military 
Assistance Officer Program, the Army subsumed this effort within a new specialist career field 
known as the Foreign Area Officer.  The Army formed two Ranger Battalions, but their purpose 
was to serve as an elite reaction force trained in mid-intensity operations (not in counter-guerilla 
operations).  Leaders lamented that many officers lacked “experience in conventional, mid-
intensity type tactics” and used this claim to justify a renewed emphasis on conventional training.73  
Jungle and counter-guerilla programs were replaced with programs emphasizing conventional 
drills and maneuvers.  Schools eliminated courses on counterinsurgency.  Even the Army War 
College reduced the scope of its curriculum on insurgency and counterinsurgency to two days by 
1975.74  
 The 1967 edition of Field Manual 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations remained the 
Army’s sole doctrine on counterinsurgency until 1982 when it was rescinded and not replaced.  
When the Army published its 1976 FM 100-5, it was General DePuy’s intention to produce a slate 
of subsidiary manuals - one of which was to be devoted to counterguerrilla operations - but this 
did not happen.75  In 1981, the Army issued FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, but the manual 
was overshadowed by the Army’s transition to AirLand Battle.  The Army would not expend 
significant organizational energy on the topic of counterinsurgency again until 2006 when it found 
itself engaged in another attempt to quell an insurgency, this time in Iraq.   
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4.1.1.4. Understanding the Absence of Innovation for Counterinsurgency 
Environmental Shifts 
 When President Kennedy replaced Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation with flexible 
response, the Army sensed an opportunity to discard the pentomic innovation not for a new 
innovation but for a return to a more traditional structure and doctrine.  The Army, organized and 
trained to fight under the pentomic construct, was less prepared to fight conventionally than the 
pre-pentomic (immediate post-World War II) Army.  Apart from an improvement in the Soviet 
Union’s tactical nuclear weapons’ capability which played a role in the U.S. transition back to a 
focus on non-nuclear operations, there was no environmental shock which necessitated a shift in 
the Army’s theory of victory.  Even the Vietnam War did not demand a fundamental change in 
Army doctrine, since the Army saw its primary mission to be the defeat of the Soviet Union on a 
European battlefield.  American casualties in the Vietnam War were horrific, but a stalemate there 
was not viewed as an existential threat to the United States.   
Role of Civilians 
 President Kennedy’s emphasis on counterinsurgency operations and the corresponding 
pressure that he put on the Army in 1961 and 1962 to change doctrine and structure for those 
operations is well-documented.  Though Kennedy’s directive to the Army was clear, Army leaders 
resisted.  On the eve of American involvement in the Vietnam War, the doctrinal preferences of 
Army elites and civilian elites did not align.  Army leaders argued that overhauling doctrine or 
creating counterinsurgency-specific units would render the organization incapable of conducting 
conventional operations against the Soviets.  Secretly, some leaders worried that a 
counterinsurgency focus would deprive the organization of the personnel, weapons, and equipment 
that it believed it needed to defeat a Soviet incursion against NATO allies.   
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 When civilian elites favor doctrinal change but military elites do not, I expect to see 
evidence of military doctrinal change in anticipation of civilian intervention as a way of warding 
off civilian influence and preserving the military’s first-mover advantage.  Rather than major 
change, I expect to see evolutionary or cosmetic changes to Army doctrine and/or force structure.  
Army leaders should use formal doctrine as a tool to minimize civilian interference.  In the period 
immediately preceding the Vietnam War, the Army did just that.  In addition to the creation of the 
Special Forces - an innovation in its own right but not one that I cover in-depth here - the Army 
taught counterinsurgency concepts to its eight stateside combat divisions, it incorporated classes 
on counterinsurgency into its military school curricula, and it codified doctrine related to irregular 
warfare and the role of the Special Forces in the 1962 FSR.76  However, the Special Forces branch 
was small, the doctrine said little about countering irregular enemies, and the updated curricula 
lacked the depth that could have been achieved if the organization had incorporated lessons learned 
from the numerous irregular engagements that occurred in its past.  As Wilson writes, “When 
President John F. Kennedy called for an improvement in the army’s ability to fight guerrilla wars, 
the task was given (reluctantly) to a new ‘special forces’ unit that, owing to strong leadership and 
presidential support, acquired its own sense of mission but that for many years was treated as a 
peripheral (and trivial) activity in the army as a whole.”77  The problem with innovation at the 
periphery in a very large military organization is that it can easily be abandoned or reversed, 
especially when the innovation only occurred at the behest of civilian actors.  
 It is beyond the scope of this study to catalog the nature and extent of civilian intervention 
in Army operations during the Vietnam War itself, but I will focus briefly on civilian involvement 
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with respect to airmobile operations and the design of the Air Assault Division.  In the context of 
interservice competition with the Air Force over the role of helicopters in combat, the Army used 
Defense Secretary McNamara’s interest in airmobility for its own gain.  Though some have 
mischaracterized McNamara’s involvement as purely one of pressuring the Army to innovate, 
Rosen’s comprehensive analysis of the innovation demonstrates that the preferences of Army elites 
and civilian elites regarding air mobility were fairly well aligned.  Rosen makes the compelling 
point that the Army initiated the process of innovation in the 1950s when “there was a conscious 
effort on the part of a group of senior officers to restructure career paths in army aviation.”78  Rosen 
argues that rather than causing the innovation, McNamara’s statements “helped a group of senior 
officers win the endgame in their struggle to create combat units utilizing helicopters.”79   
 McNamara’s intervention did more than pressure the Army to innovate with respect to the 
employment of helicopters in combat.  More importantly, it officially placed airmobile operations 
under the jurisdictional domain of the Army and it empowered Army leaders to expand ongoing 
attempts to develop a combat aviation capability.  In the Army’s official account, the institution 
notes that without McNamara’s interference, the Army would not have been able to overcome 
competition with the Air Force.80  Given that airmobile operations straddled the boundary between 
the jurisdiction of the Army and the Air Force, interservice rivalry played a role in shaping the 
innovation.  McNamara’s intervention broke the deadlock between the services, empowering the 
Army to own the concept.   
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Interservice Rivalry 
 Even though the Army was unwilling to innovate to develop a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency doctrine prior to, during, and after the Vietnam War, it was also unwilling to 
cede jurisdiction over that type of warfare to another service.  The Army fought to gain jurisdiction 
over counterinsurgency to prevent it from going to the Marine Corps.81  Jurisdiction over the 
mission “meant the promise of additional funds, men, and equipment, [and] an increase in the 
Army at the expense of the other Services.”82  Coming off a decade of interservice rivalry with the 
Air Force in the post-World War II period, the Army perceived Marine claims of jurisdiction over 
“small wars” as a threat to Army survival.   
 Given that the primary mission of the Marines had been amphibious warfare, the Army 
pointed out that counterinsurgency operations were land-based and therefore firmly within the 
realm of the service with the responsibility for combat on land - the Army.  The Fleet Marine Force 
(FMF), created in 1933, was trained and equipped for “the seizure or defense of advanced naval 
bases and for the conduct of limited amphibious or land operations essential to the prosecution of 
a naval campaign.”83  Though the Marines operated on land extensively throughout the Korean 
War, it was not difficult for the Army to contend that it was the nation’s preeminent organization 
for ground combat.  According to the Secretary of the Army at the time, Cyrus Vance, 
“…counterinsurgency is in effect a responsibility for which the Army can and should become the 
tacitly recognized…primary agent…the Army will be the basic source of doctrine, the source of 
most equipment, the provider of the great bulk of the military know-how and forces, the originator 
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of most of the new ideas on equipment, tactics, techniques, and organizations, the source of most 
of the personnel who occupy key military positions in counterinsurgency worldwide…”84  For 
these reasons, and the Army’s dogged pursuit of the mission despite an organizational culture 
predisposed more to conventional operations, counterinsurgency was given to the Army as a 
secondary mission. 
Intraservice Rivalry 
 Intraservice rivalry during the 1960s was minimal, though it did present itself in the form 
of friction between the newly created Special Forces and the more traditional branches such as the 
infantry. While this affected how Army leaders prioritized mission sets in the 1968 FM 100-5, 
intraservice rivalry did not cause doctrinal innovation.  The establishment of the Special Forces 
branch was a military innovation, but rather than being caused by a competition between different 
political actors in the Army, the innovation was more of a response to a new mission requirement.  
That new requirement - irregular warfare - was not one that actors representing the existing 
branches actually wanted.  
Organizational Culture 
 When Army culture (fear of unpreparedness, emphasis on worst-case scenarios, penchant 
for deliberate planning, aggressiveness, seizing the initiative, and heterogeneity) intervenes in a 
doctrinal process, we expect to see doctrines that are offensive, firepower-centric, oriented 
primarily on the role of the infantry and the armor, and focused on mid-intensity operations.85  An 
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Army culture oriented on centralized operations, large-scale maneuver, and validation through 
live-fire exercises was particularly well-suited for the ROAD construct - a design focused on 
conventional operations.  The construct was also familiar.  According to General Harold K. 
Johnson in May 1961, “The basic fighting structure to which we are returning is one with which 
most of us have a reasonable degree of familiarity.”86   
   The Army’s assessment of the Soviet threat as the most dangerous threat aligned with the 
Army’s cultural preferences for war and its supporting doctrine.  Krepinevich argues, this “‘worst-
case’ threat…was also the ‘preferred’ threat, and it contributed to [the Army’s] persistent ignorance 
of counterinsurgency warfare.”87  While I think Krepinevich’s point is a good one, one could argue 
that the Army’s resistance to counterinsurgency might have been born not out of ignorance but out 
of a rational prioritization of threats.  If the adoption of counterinsurgency doctrine would have 
degraded the Army’s ability to defeat the Soviet Union in Europe, it would be hard to contend that 
the Army should adopt such a doctrine. 
4.1.1.5. Conclusion  
 The Army’s hasty termination of the pentomic division and its doctrine in the early 1960s, 
and its transition to the ROAD organizational construct, did not occur in the context of a shift in 
the distribution of military power in the system, the nature of the enemy threat, or the availability 
of military technologies.  All three of these environmental conditions were relatively stable and 
the Soviet threat in Europe was still perceived as the most dangerous threat to the American state.  
The balance of threat perspective suggests that the Army should have oriented its doctrine on the 
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most dangerous threat to the state in the absence of any other environmental shifts.  In reality, that 
is what the Army did, but it came at the expense of the organization’s preparedness for the 
counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations that it ended up conducting in the Vietnam War.   
 According to the Army Chief of Staff from 1960-1962, General Decker, securing Europe 
was critical to the survival of the United States.  Decker noted, “we could lose in Asia without 
losing everything.”88  Even as late as 1968 when the Army was engaged in a critical period of the 
Vietnam War, Army leaders viewed the defense of allies in Europe as the primary mission.89  The 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of that year, the stress on the Army in Vietnam, the 
withdrawal of France from NATO military activities, and the decrease of U.S. forces in Europe all 
combined to amplify the Army’s concern regarding the security of Europe.   
 The Army’s organizational transition to the Reorganization Objectives Army Division 
(ROAD) 1965 and the publication of the 1962 Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 Operations 
were substantial changes to structure and doctrine, but neither were changes that originated with a 
drastic modification to the Army’s theory of victory.  The ROAD structure was similar to the 
Army’s division structure in the aftermath of World War II.  The 1962 FSR retained the Army’s 
focus on conventional war with the Soviets in Europe.  For the first time in its history, the Army’s 
keystone manual discussed irregular operations such as guerrilla warfare, but these types of 
operations were given the Army’s lowest priority.  Although there was growing interest in 
counterinsurgency operations in the Army in the early 1960s,90 Army leaders did not change their 
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theory of victory to focus on counterinsurgency.  Many senior Army leaders believed that an Army 
that could successfully conduct conventional operations could also succeed at counterinsurgency.  
 It is not clear why the Army could not train counterinsurgency-specific forces that could 
transition back to a conventional orientation if necessary.  Giving the counterinsurgency mission 
to the Marine Corps was a logical option given the extensive experience that the service had in 
small wars throughout its history.  The Marines were also the only service to have developed a 
counterinsurgency doctrine in its now-famous, Small Wars Manual.  The option of giving the 
counterinsurgency mission to the Marine Corps was proposed but dismissed when the Army made 
a strong claim to jurisdiction over this type of operation.91  After a decade of interservice rivalry 
with the Air Force and the Navy under the Eisenhower administration, the Army saw the allocation 
of the counterinsurgency mission to the Marines as another threat to its own survival.  Adding the 
counterinsurgency mission to its plate would enable the Army to be the recipient of additional 
funding, men, weapons, and equipment.92  
 While it is easy to criticize the Army’s counterinsurgency performance in the Vietnam 
War, one should recognize the changes the Army did make in less than four years’ time to 
implement Kennedy’s vision (particularly given the fact that many senior Army leaders disagreed 
with that vision).  Between 1961-1965, the Army reorganized under ROAD, expanded the Special 
Forces, and developed an airmobility concept.  In the report of the special commission formed by 
President Johnson in 1965 to review the state of the nation’s counterinsurgency program, the Army 
was commended as “the only agency that had developed a cogent, written doctrine for 
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counterinsurgency.”93  Additionally, only the Army and the Marine Corps created training 
programs to distribute counterinsurgency doctrine to their units.    
 As was the case after every previous war that it fought, the Army faced the challenge of 
determining what lessons learned in Vietnam should be codified in its doctrine and which lessons 
should be abandoned.  The Army did not have much of an incentive, at least in the short-term, to 
devote more effort to counterinsurgency in its keystone doctrine.  While many analysts have 
criticized the Army’s abandonment of counterinsurgency after the Vietnam War, a close look at 
the political, social, and military environment in the post-war period suggests that the Army’s 
decision to do so was logical.  Potential reasons for moving away from counterinsurgency include: 
(1) the Army and the nation were weary of the topic, (2) there was a distinct policy shift away 
from foreign interventions, (3) the Army believed it had already incorporated counterinsurgency 
lessons learned into the 1968 FM 100-5, and (4) the Army believed that its counterinsurgency 
doctrine was adequate and not in need of change.94  However, it is startling that the Army did not 
conduct a comprehensive review of lessons learned from the Vietnam War, since a review would 
have captured the Army’s historical experience in such a way that it might have been useful for 
the numerous counterinsurgency and contingency operations that the Army would conduct in the 
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4.1.2. Full-Dimensional Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations 
 By 1989, the U.S. Army was a modern force organized and trained to defeat the Warsaw 
Pact in Europe.  Compared to its troubled state at the end of the Vietnam War, the Army now had 
a comprehensive doctrine (AirLand Battle), a new slate of weapons and vehicles (the Big 5), a 
command responsible for training, education, and doctrine (TRADOC), and two combat training 
centers where units could be evaluated (the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness 
Training Center).96  According to Kretchik, the AirLand Battle doctrine “represented the service’s 
transition from a World War II army to a modern fighting force.”97  The Army purged itself of the 
drug and discipline problems that pervaded its force during the Vietnam War, and it developed 
effective methods to attract high-quality recruits under the all-volunteer force.   
 The collapse of the Soviet Union signaled a transition from a bipolar order to a unipolar 
order.  While the prospects of war against another state were reduced, in its role as the world’s 
only superpower, the U.S. could expect the possibility of crisis response or contingency operations 
on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict to increase.  The Army published new keystone 
doctrine in 1993 and 2001.  Both doctrines retained most of the tenets of AirLand Battle but 
included a newfound emphasis on crisis response and contingency operations.  While the doctrines 
officially sanctioned operations on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, they were more of a 
response to a civilian requirement for Army operations in those types of conflict rather than due to 
the Army’s preference.  The purpose of this section is to examine the factors which influenced 
these two doctrines. 
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4.1.2.1. The Gulf War 
 In 1988, Army officers watched the Soviet Union closely as the Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
regime signaled its intent to unilaterally reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces and to remove 
certain types of units from eastern Europe.  In December 1988, in a speech at the United Nations, 
Gorbachev announced that he would reduce the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men and 10,000 
tanks.98  At the time, Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono knew that the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship was changing, but he warned, “we should not lose sight of the fact that Soviet 
capabilities are still improving all the time.”99  Vuono likely said this to keep soldiers focused 
because it was clear to most that Gorbachev’s actions signaled a reduction in Soviet capability by 
December 1989.100 
 When the Cold War ended and war against the Warsaw Pact was no longer the most 
significant threat that the Army faced, there was considerable uncertainty among Army officers 
regarding the organization’s future.101  The AirLand Battle doctrine as published in the 1982 and 
1986 Field Manual 100-5 Operations remained the Army’s keystone doctrine, and that doctrine 
focused almost entirely on defeating a Warsaw Pact force in Europe.  While the Army confronted 
the question of how the collapse of the Soviet Union would affect its theory of victory (and its 
doctrine), Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait gave the Army an opportunity to employ AirLand 
Battle for the first time in combat.  In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, under the 
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command of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Army used bombers, helicopters, and ground 
attack aircraft to conduct a deep attack to destroy Iraqi air-defense systems and other targets prior 
to the initiation of a U.S. ground attack.102  As has been well-documented, it only took U.S. forces 
one-hundred hours of ground operations to defeat Iraqi forces.  As Kretchik notes, “Desert Storm 
was what the Army’s 1986 doctrine had prophesized: a fight against a symmetrical enemy using 
maneuver and firepower.”103   
 For many proponents of AirLand Battle, General Schwarzkopf included, Desert Storm 
confirmed the effectiveness of the AirLand Battle doctrine.  The impressive synchronization of the 
air and ground effort in Iraq - a central tenet of AirLand Battle - validated the doctrine.104  The 
effectiveness of new technologies, weapon systems, and vehicles confirmed the value of the Big 5 
acquisition program.  Though AirLand Battle was initially designed to defeat the Warsaw Pact in 
Europe after a Soviet attack against Army and NATO forces, the success of the doctrine in Iraq 
against an enemy that was on the defensive confirmed for many that the doctrine was appropriate 
for future combat even after the end of the Cold War.105  In other words, AirLand Battle was an 
effective doctrine for a war involving an attack or a defense of allies abroad.  Though the Iraqi 
military fought with Soviet equipment, it was a third-world force that was untrained and 
incompetently led.106  Iraq had the world’s fourth largest army but was overmatched by the power 
of a U.S. force that was bolstered by support from numerous allies.  Unfortunately, many analysts 
overlooked these facts and instead viewed the quick Iraqi defeat as validation of the Army’s theory 
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of victory.   In their eyes, the Persian Gulf War legitimized AirLand Battle as an effective doctrine 
for conflict between great powers.107   
 In the midst of the Army’s hubris in the post-Gulf War period, some Army leaders worried 
that the overwhelming effectiveness of the air campaign in the war, which instilled a tremendous 
level of confidence in civilian leaders and the American public regarding the utility of precision 
bombing, was a threat to the Army’s relevance.108  Air power was critical at the outset of the Gulf 
War because it provided a “shield” that gave General Schwarzkopf time to buildup combat forces 
in the Arabian Peninsula.109  The Gulf War exposed weaknesses in the strategic mobility of the 
Army since it took weeks to move two Army heavy corps to the region.110  The 82nd Airborne 
Division - the only Army unit that got to the region quickly - secured airports while coalition 
airpower conducted 24-hour defensive air patrols.  In the glow of victory, some observers 
concluded that the integration of advanced reconnaissance systems and precise munitions signaled 
a revolution in warfare.111  As had been the case after the nuclear explosions that ended World War 
II, the success of airpower led some to question the necessity of a large ground force capability.  
The American public was fascinated with the effectiveness of the Air Force’s precision bombing 
effort during the Gulf War, and much less aware of the Army’s performance on the ground.112  
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These concerns would drive the Army’s modernization effort throughout the 1990s, and appear 
again during the Kosovo War.  
 At the end of the Cold War and after its experience in the Gulf War, the Army struggled to 
define a new theory of victory.  Army leaders knew that the organization would face budget cuts 
and force reductions which would be compounded by the United States’ new position as a unipole 
without a well-defined enemy.113  The Central Front scenario in Europe had been the Army’s 
central focus since the end of the Vietnam War.  More than the other American services, the 
elimination of that scenario caused the Army to face “existential questions about its future roles 
and missions.”114  Army leaders knew that the budget and force reductions common in post-war 
periods represented a fundamental threat to unit readiness.  These leaders sought to avoid the 
catastrophic consequences of a lack of readiness for the first battle of the next war.115 
4.1.2.2. The 1993 FM 100-5 Operations Manual and Full-Dimensional Operations (FDO) 
 In the early 1990s, in the face of strategic uncertainty and bureaucratic competition for 
increasingly limited resources, the Army focused on readiness and limited exploration of new 
technologies to address limitations exposed during the Gulf War.116  The Army Chief of Staff in 
1991, General Gordon R. Sullivan, directed General Frederick M. Franks, the new TRADOC 
commander, to initiate a revision of the AirLand Battle doctrine.  Sullivan wanted a doctrine that 
would enable the Army to fight in what he viewed as the “post-industrial era.”117  This new era 
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would be defined by advanced computer technologies rather than by “raw industrial might and 
manpower-intensive armies.”118  Sullivan believed that a new keystone doctrine would be the 
engine of change for the Army in the post-Cold War world.119  The substantial reduction of U.S. 
Army presence in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the Army would need 
to be able to project power quickly from the U.S. for the purpose of responding to regional crises.  
Sullivan saw a need for the Army to be able to function effectively “across the entire continuum 
of Army operations.”120  AirLand Battle - a linear war-fighting doctrine - needed to be modified 
for a nonlinear, open battlefield; one in which Army forces could succeed in “war and operations 
short of war.”121   
 Franks assigned the mission to draft the new version of FM 100-5 to the director of the 
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Colonel James R. McDonough.  McDonough 
argued that the new doctrine should retain the “ideas, tenets, imperatives and battlefield framework 
found in current AirLand Battle doctrine,” while also incorporating “evolving missions in areas 
such as stability operations, nation assistance and contraband flow.”122  These “evolving missions” 
were referred to as either “operations other than war (OOTW)” or “low-intensity conflict (LIC).”  
Though the Army had recently engaged in two such operations - Panama (1989) and Operation 
Provide Comfort in Iraq (1991) - some senior Army leaders argued against the incorporation of 
LIC in FM 100-5.123  The debate over the degree to which FM 100-5 would focus on these types 
of operations was a major point of contention in the Army’s debate over the new doctrine. 
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 After Colonel McDonough circulated drafts of the new FM 100-5 to Army commanders in 
the field, he received feedback from some that “the draft manual had shifted too far away from 
warfare to nonwar operations.”124  An aversion to LIC led Generals Franks and Sullivan to select 
“operations other than war” as the terminology that would be used in the new manual.  The Army’s 
performance in two such operations in 1992 - Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki - led General Sullivan 
to conclude that “[t]he Army’s warfighting focus and robust doctrine provide a sound basis of 
disaster relief operations.”125  Sullivan convinced skeptical Army commanders that the inclusion 
of OOTW in the new FM 100-5 would not invalidate the tenets of AirLand Battle which he argued 
were still relevant for these types of operations.   
 The Army released the 1993 Field Manual 100-5 Operations manual on June 14, 1993, and 
in December 1993, the Army focused on the new manual in its professional journal, Military 
Review.  In the journal, Colonel McDonough noted that the new doctrine, “is no longer just 
AirLand Battle, a doctrine steeped in the Cold War assumptions of a forward defense…it is now a 
doctrine of full-dimensional operations for a force-projection Army whose units will normally act 
in conjunction with air, naval and space assets and seldom be involved in operations outside the 
United States separate from the forces of allied nations.”126  The phrase “full-dimensional 
operations” - never actually defined in the manual itself - became shorthand for the 1993 manual.   
 Rather than representing a transformative doctrinal change, the 1993 manual retained many 
of the tenets of the 1986 AirLand Battle doctrine. The manual focused on three environmental 
states - war, conflict, and peacetime - but doctrine writers were clear that the Army’s primary 
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purpose was “to win the nation’s wars.”127  The most significant change was the inclusion of a 
separate chapter on OOTW, but that chapter was only eight pages long and lacked detail on the 
planning and execution of OOTW.128  Force projection - “the ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, 
deploy, and operate anywhere in the world” - was a major focus of the manual.  That chapter 
included historical vignettes on the projection of forces in Desert Shield/Storm and the 1950 war 
in Korea.  Finally, the manual recognized the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act by emphasizing 
“stronger joint operations.”129  The manual noted, “A key member of the joint team, the Army 
serves alongside the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to protect the nation’s vital security 
interests.”130 
 The first real test of the 1993 doctrine occurred when the Army deployed to Haiti in 1994.  
In Haiti, the Army planned for a combat operation to restore Haitian president Jean Bertrand 
Aristide to power but ended up having to conduct an “operation other than war.”131  According to 
Kretchik who interviewed many of the commanders involved in the operation, “Conventional 
forces followed the warfare aspects of FM 100-5, not OOTW….[whereas] Special Forces 
units…followed the OOTW precepts established within FM 100-5 and FM 100-25, Doctrine for 
Army Special Operations Forces.”132  The phrase “operations other than war” was ambiguous.  
Army leaders struggled to understand the distinction between war and OOTW.  As Kretchik notes, 
“While some believed that war and OOTW were distinct intellectual constructs, others saw too 
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much commonality among Desert Storm, northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, as all five 
operations attempted to change an adversary’s behavior.”133   
 The new Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, initiated another doctrinal 
revision process which would eliminate the OOTW terminology, align Army doctrine with 
ongoing Force XXI initiatives (explained in the next section), and eventually lead to the 
publication of the 2001 Field Manual 100-5 Operations manual.  This effort was informed by a 
1994 publication named TRADOC Pam 525-5 Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution 
of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century.134  
According to the publication, “the 1993 version FM 100-5 provided the Army a short lead on the 
future…525-5 [and the 2001 FM 100-5] represents the continuation of change, continuity, and 
growth, enabling the Army to continue as a relevant, strategic force capable of decisive victory 
into the twenty-first century.”135 
4.1.2.3. Force XXI and the Army After Next (AAN) 
 Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, initiated a program called Force XXI which aimed 
to test new information technologies by integrating those technologies into the existing division 
structure.136  While this was not a doctrinal or organizational structural innovation, Force XXI, and 
its successor, the Army After Next (AAN), are important because they were priorities of Army 
senior leaders and they illustrate the Army’s theory of victory in the 1990s.  According to Sullivan 
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in June 1992, “a defining characteristic of this new era is the microprocessor’s effect on 
warfare…our ability to exploit the power of the computer will be critical to mobilization and 
sustainment of forces.”137  A belief in the capacity of new information technologies to enable real-
time situational awareness on the battlefield through sensors and networks shaped the Army’s 
theory of victory throughout the 1990s.  
 General Sullivan introduced the Force XXI concept to the Army at the Association of the 
United States Army (AUSA) Institute for Land Warfare on January 14, 1994.  He outlined three of 
the program’s characteristics: (1) command and control of units based on “shared, real-time 
situational awareness,” (2) “a networked organization,” and (3) “connections by electronic 
means.”138  In layman’s terms, Sullivan wanted to connect units on the ground with each other 
through the use of sophisticated computers.  By providing commanders with increased information 
about their location and status relative to that of other friendly units, commanders would be able 
to make quicker, more accurate tactical decisions on the battlefield.  In 1995, the Army 
experimented with digitization by fielding and testing digital equipment on the Army’s 4th Infantry 
Division at Fort Hood, Texas.139  Though there were major challenges with the new digital 
technologies, the Army believed that the Force XXI experiment was a success because it allowed 
units to disperse maneuver forces more widely than ever before based on the ability of these forces 
to see each other “virtually” with the new technologies.140 
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 Sullivan’s Force XXI concept set the conditions for a more expansive technological 
program under his successor, General Dennis Reimer.  General Reimer initiated the Army After 
Next (AAN) program to prepare the Army for 2020-2030 through the use of wargaming exercises 
based on different projected futures.141  According to Reimer, the purpose of the AAN program 
was to predict what the Army would be required to do in the future.142  Reimer assigned the project 
to Major General Robert Scales.143  Scales focused on one of the Army’s most significant 
limitations in the Gulf War - strategic mobility.144  In that war, it took a month after the deployment 
of the 82nd Airborne Division for the first heavy units from the 24 th Infantry Division to arrive.  
Compared to the Air Force’s rapid projection of combat power, the Army’s deployment was slow 
and cumbersome.  The Army worried that unless it could build a more rapidly deployable force it 
would find itself assigned to “constabulary missions and peacekeeping.”145  To build a force that 
could deploy quicker, Scales focused on smaller, lighter brigades that could be easily transported 
by air.  According to Scales, the Army would replace its historical reliance on heavy armored units 
with light, high-technology units equipped with sensors and connected through networks.  Scales 
stated, “All advanced ground vehicles would rarely be required to face main battle tanks head on, 
which makes it possible to limit their weight by reducing the need for heavy armor…They will 
survive through a combination of speed, agility,…comprehensive situational understanding, 
terrain masking, deception, and indirect fire.”146 
 The AAN program was based on a theory of victory focused on firepower-intensive, 
limited wars.  The next Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, continued the implementation 
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of AAN through “three major initiatives - the Stryker Interim Force, the Future Combat Systems, 
and modularity.”147  Though outside the case study window of this study, it is interesting to note 
that this Army theory of victory persisted for a period even after the Army struggled through 
stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  According to Jackson, “The post-9/11 era would be 
dominated by tension between heavy demand for the Army manpower in counterinsurgency and 
the service’s attachment to a modernization program that provided high technology solutions to 
future conventional wars.”148  
4.1.2.4. The Army in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) 
 While the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations manual included operations other than war (OOTW), 
the AAN concept under General Reimer envisioned Army participation in short, decisive wars.  
Long, protracted operations in low-intensity conflict environments or peacekeeping missions were 
in the Army’s keystone manual, but Jackson argues that these types of operations were not aligned 
with the preferences of Army leaders by the mid-1990s or with the technological components of 
Force XXI or AAN.149  However, in 1995, the Army found itself in a peacekeeping operation when 
it deployed 20,000 troops to Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accords.  Major General Scales 
believed that “engagements below the threshold of physical violence” - like the peacekeeping 
mission in Bosnia - would degrade the Army’s ability to fight conventional operations.150  Scales 
pointed to the ineffectiveness of Army units at the outset of the Korean War.  Many of those units 
endured years of “constabulary service in Japan” prior to fighting in the Korean War.151   
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 Scales’ position conflicted with the official position of the Army as codified in the 1993 
doctrine in the chapter on operations other than war.  That manual discussed the importance of 
OOTW, but it viewed those operations as secondary to the primary mission of full-scale combat in 
wars with well-defined, limited objectives.  In Scales’ view, an Army unit that could win in a 
firepower-intensive limited war could easily succeed in “less demanding contingencies” like 
peacekeeping operations.152  Scales believed that the Korean War signaled a “new age of warfare” 
marked by Army participation in limited wars - “wars fought for limited ends with equally limited 
means…”153   Scales argued that the Army’s ability to perform well in peacekeeping and other 
“constabulary missions” was validated in operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo.  The more 
pressing concern was that these troops would not be as effective in fighting full-scale wars.   
 The Army thought it would have a chance to fight a firepower-intensive, limited war in 
Kosovo in 1999 when NATO initiated operations against Serbia.154   General Wesley Clark, the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and an Army officer, developed two courses of 
action for the Army in the war.  The Army could deploy attack helicopters and long-range missiles 
to Macedonia,155 or it could conduct a manpower-intensive, ground invasion.  Military leaders 
across the force resisted both of Clark’s plans based on concerns regarding high casualties and the 
risks of escalation.156  Much of the sensitivity regarding American casualties stemmed from the 
death of eighteen Army Rangers in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu which led to the withdrawal of 
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U.S. forces from Somalia.157  President Bill Clinton rejected the use of attack helicopters in 
Kosovo.158  The Army task force that was assembled - Task Force Hawk159 - was a large force 
consisting of mechanized and armor forces.  In the end, the large, ponderous force package was 
not employed in the NATO campaign.  Instead, the Air Force executed an extensive air campaign 
which was ultimately successful.  The Army’s participation in the war was minimal.  The 
organization’s inability (or unwillingness) to present an effective course of action to policymakers 
during the war, combined with the Air Force’s success, led Army leaders to worry again about 
perceptions of Army obsolescence.   
4.1.2.5. The 2001 FM 100-5 Operations Manual and Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO) 
 After the Army’s experience in Somalia in 1993 and the Balkans in 1995 and 1999, senior 
Army leaders thought it was necessary to update the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations manual to reflect 
lessons learned from those experiences, to clarify ambiguity regarding military operations other 
than war (OOTW), and to align Army doctrine with joint doctrine.  The primary emphasis in the 
new 2001 FM 3-0 Operations manual was on a concept termed, Full Spectrum Operations.160  
According to the manual, “Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and 
support operations. Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any 
combination of these operations.”161  Stability operations were those that required “a combination 
of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities, and coercive actions in response to a crisis.”162 
Support operations were those that required “Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign and 
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domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.”163  Rather than 
consolidating operations into two distinct categories - war and OOTW - the new manual 
emphasized overlap between the categories and acknowledged that the Army would often have to 
conduct multiple types of operations in the same conflict (as it had done in Bosnia).  Army doctrine 
writers would have preferred to leave out the term OOTW entirely in the new manual, but they 
couldn’t because the phrase still officially existed in joint doctrine.164 
 Participation in conflicts that straddled the border between war and peace throughout the 
1990s illuminated confusion on the ground regarding the mechanisms and modalities that Army 
forces were expected to employ in those types of operations.  After interviewing some of the Army 
officers who wrote the 2001 manual, Davidson concluded that the “full-spectrum theory was 
intended to rectify the conceptual ‘trap’ that doctrine writers and military leaders felt the artificially 
dichotomous ‘war-MOOTW’ distinction created.”165  Before the 2001 manual was drafted, one 
senior Army leader noted, “Army doctrine…currently addresses conventional operations in Field 
Manual (FM) 100-5 - with a focus on the violence of heavy combat - and “operations other than 
war” with a focus on the logic of low intensity conflict and peace operations…A revolution in 
military doctrine would be one that bridges this dual track into a single unified approach…”166  
The 2001 Full-Spectrum Operations manual was the Army’s attempt to articulate such a unified 
approach.  For those who bemoaned the lack of a “conceptual bridge” between the Army’s 
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keystone warfighting doctrine and peace operations, the 2001 manual provided the link between 
the two that they wanted.167    
 Published before the 9/11 attacks, the 2001 FM 3-0 Operations manual was intended to 
transition Army doctrine from “a Cold War ‘heavy or legacy force’ dominated by mechanization 
to an ‘interim force’ containing both mechanization and more modernized forces by 2007.”168  The 
Army’s intent was to restructure its organization by 2005 under the new Chief of Staff, General 
Shinseki’s, modularity program (which was an outgrowth of General Reimer’s Army After Next 
program).  Two modernization programs - Future Combat Systems (FCS) and the Stryker Interim 
Force - were integral components of Shinseki’s program.  The rediscovery and promulgation of 
counterinsurgency doctrine after 2003 in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq complicated the Army’s 
modernization efforts.  The Army’s inability to stabilize both countries after invading is telling in 
that it suggests that the Army was incapable of conducting the stability operations that were 
emphasized in both the 1993 and 2001 keystone doctrines.  While these developments are outside 
the scope of this study, I mention them because they help explain the transitional nature of the 
2001 manual. 
4.1.2.6. Understanding the Sources of FDO and FSO 
Environmental Shocks 
 The Army Chief of Staff in 1992, General Sullivan, argued that the Army needed to change 
its doctrine due to three changes in the security environment.  First, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union rendered superpower rivalry less relevant in the post-Cold War world.  The transition from 
a bipolar to unipolar order concerned Sullivan because he believed the latter to be less stable and 
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more dangerous.169  Second, though some thought the new world order would be more benign and 
peaceful, religious, ethnic, and political rivalries persisted in many areas of the world.  Third, the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact signaled a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe and an associated decline 
in the resources allocated to national defense.170  According to Sullivan, “the new military strategy 
will move the United States from the old focus on forward defense through forward deployments 
directed against the Soviet Union to a strategy of forward presence and crisis response with a 
greater concern for contingencies and peacetime activities throughout the world.”171  Sullivan saw 
three requirements for the Army in the post-Soviet Union world: (1) retain quality people, (2) 
develop a doctrine that enables a fast response to crisis, and (3) pursue technological solutions that 
provide high payoff given the constrained budget climate.172  Sullivan viewed doctrine as the 
“catalyst for change across the Army.”173 
 General Franks, the TRADOC commander responsible for writing the 1993 Full-
Dimensional Operations doctrine, identified five stimuli that required the doctrinal change: (1)” 
threats and unknown dangers,” (2) “national military strategy,” (3) “history and lessons learned,” 
(4) the “changing nature of warfare,” and (5) changing “technology.”174  Fears regarding the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, and a new 
U.S. national military strategy focused on force projection and crisis response were two external 
shocks that Franks credited with causing the Army to reexamine its theory of victory after the Cold 
War.   
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 Army leaders in the 1990s also believed that military technology had changed significantly.  
Scales compared the time period to the interwar years between the world wars when mechanization 
fundamentally altered the nature of warfare.175  Although Scales was cognizant of the risks 
associated with putting too much faith in the capabilities of the precision targeting exhibited in the 
Gulf War, the Army After Next (AAN) program and its associated exercises and war games were 
based on sophisticated information technologies that promised to alter the nature of combat.176  In 
his book, General Sullivan stated, “We believe that information technologies can enable the Army 
to achieve quantum improvements in speed and precision - enhancing tempo, lethality, and 
survivability to new levels.”177 
 The catalyst for the doctrinal revision that led to the 2001 Full-Spectrum Operations 
doctrine was the Army’s experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  Conceptual and practical 
confusion regarding military operations other than war (OOTW) plagued the Army during those 
operations.  Recognizing this reality and acknowledging the need to continue the transition from a 
Cold War heavy force to a lighter, rapidly deployable force, Army leaders thought a doctrine 
revision was necessary.   
Role of Civilians 
 General Sullivan, the proponent behind Full-Dimensional Operations doctrine, aligned the 
Army’s doctrinal revision with the priorities of senior civilians in the national security 
establishment.  In a speech on August 2, 1990, President George H.W. Bush identified four 
priorities for the national defense strategy: nuclear deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, 
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and the capability to reconstitute U.S. military forces when necessary.178  The President’s National 
Security Strategy (1993) and the National Military Strategy (January 1992), written by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, both reiterated these priorities.179   
 There is no evidence that civilians intervened directly in the Army’s doctrinal revision 
process between 1989 and 1993.  Rather, the preferences of senior Army leaders matched those of 
senior civilian leaders.  There is also no evidence that Army leaders pushed back against civilian 
directives to reduce the size of the Army.  Army leaders recognized that the force would have to 
downsize.  Rather than fight over personnel end-strength, the Army accepted the force structure 
decrease, focusing energy instead on maintaining the readiness of existing forces.180  In a letter to 
the Army’s General Officers, Sullivan stated, “we will become a smaller, more predominantly 
CONUS-based and contingency oriented force…[and we will] achieve greater efficiencies in how 
we provide resources for the force.”181  In another letter to mid-grade officers at the Command and 
General Staff College, Sullivan noted, “Our fundamental policy is that we will trade force structure 
for readiness…Conditions in the world dictate that the nation spend less on defense.”182 
 By 1995, in conjunction with the progression of Force XXI and its successor, the Army 
After Next (AAN), a divergence manifested itself between the operational requirements for the 
Army demanded by civilian policymakers and the Army’s own vision of how and when it should 
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be employed.  An Army preference for firepower-intensive wars with limited objectives contrasted 
with a civilian requirement for Army operations in humanitarian operations, peacekeeping 
missions, and low-intensity conflict.  The Army’s deployment to Bosnia in 1995 typified the type 
of operation that the Army wished to avoid.  While there isn’t evidence that civilians intervened 
directly in the process of writing the Full Spectrum Operations doctrine, it is clear that civilian 
officials pressured Army leaders to be prepared for these other types of wars.  In 1999 after the 
end of the war in Kosovo, Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Hamre, noted “If the Army holds 
onto nostalgic versions of its grand past, it is going to atrophy and die.”183  The Army modified its 
keystone doctrine to account for operations in low-intensity conflict in anticipation of civilian 
intervention. 
Interservice Rivalry 
 Interservice rivalry and concerns regarding organizational survival played a role in shaping 
the character of Full-Dimensional and Full-Spectrum operations.184  The prestige of the Air Force 
surged after the success of the precision bombing campaigns in Desert Shield/Storm and the 1999 
war in Kosovo.  Though later analysis would reveal limitations in the effectiveness of airpower 
during those wars, throughout the 1990s many observers perceived precision guided munitions as 
the preferred military instrument in war.  Similar to Army leaders during the atomic era after World 
War II, Army leaders in the mid- to late-1990s were concerned with maintaining the organization’s 
relevance in the broader national security establishment.  While the organization’s survival wasn’t 
necessarily in jeopardy, some leaders worried about functional obsolescence.  According to 
General Scales, “If the Army is to remain relevant to the security needs of the nation we must begin 
                                                           
183 As quoted in David Jablonsky, “Army Transformation: A Tale of Two Doctrines,” Parameters (Autumn, 
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now to accelerate the speed with which we can project legitimate, powerful, and balanced forces 
to threatened regions overseas.”185  Crisis response and rapid deployability were concepts that 
Army leaders emphasized repeatedly after the slow and cumbersome movement of Army forces in 
the months leading up to combat operations in the Gulf War.  Army leaders were cognizant of the 
fact that had Saddam Hussein escalated the conflict prior to the arrival of Army mechanized and 
armor forces, the U.S. effort to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait might have been in jeopardy.  
Only the 82nd Airborne Division - a light, airborne unit - got to the region quickly.   
 Despite the interest in fixing this problem, the Army experienced similar issues in the 
Kosovo War in 1999.  Task Force Hawk consisted of an initial force package of 1,800 soldiers with 
helicopters and artillery weapons.  By the time Army planners finished their analysis, this force 
package tripled in size to 5,500 soldiers with tank and mechanized infantry companies.186  It took 
forty-four days for Task Force Hawk to reach full operational capability - over a month longer than 
initially projected.187  The Army’s other course of action - the deployment of a ground invasion 
force - was heavily resisted by Army leaders who feared a protracted war with high American 
casualties.  Logistical challenges and the protestations of Army leaders rendered both courses of 
action untenable, and neither was executed.  The inability of the Army to quickly deploy a 
contingency force was exacerbated by the Air Force’s ability to execute a successful airpower 
campaign.  The end result was an Army worried about its organizational survival at the turn of the 
new century.  Rather than embracing its singular ability to dominate the jurisdiction of low-
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intensity conflict, Army cultural preferences for mid-intensity conflict in decisive, limited wars 
overpowered concerns related to organizational survival.   
Organizational Culture 
 Though General Sullivan always cautioned against replacing people with technology, his 
vision of what information technologies could do for the Army was expansive and unique for a 
senior Army leader.  Sullivan believed that information technology could provide commanders 
with a virtual view of the battlefield, reduce fraternization, improve unit synchronization, and 
enhance intelligence collection.188  The digitization of the Army through the Force XXI program 
(and the Army After Next) was a first-of-its-kind effort to reorganize the entire organization around 
highly sophisticated technologies, most of which had not yet been tested and validated by units in 
the field.  Although this technological emphasis was deeper than previous Army modernization 
efforts, I did not find evidence of resistance to Force XXI or the AAN programs based on 
organizational cultural concerns.  
 In more recent years, some senior Army leaders have criticized the 1990’s focus on 
digitization.  The most prominent example is Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster.  In 2008, 
McMaster noted that the information technology approaches of the 1990s were: “firmly rooted in 
a widely accepted yet fundamentally flawed conception of future war: the belief that surveillance, 
communications and information technologies would deliver ‘dominant battlespace knowledge’ 
and permit US forces to achieve ‘full spectrum dominance’ against any opponent mainly through 
the employment of precision-strike capabilities…Concepts with such labels as network-centric 
warfare, rapid decisive operations…embraced what increasingly appeared as a faith-based 
argument that future war would lie mainly in the realm of certainty…”189  The challenges that the 
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Army faced in Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-) illustrated the limitations of many of the 
information technologies that Generals Sullivan and Reimer promoted in the mid- to late-1990s.  
Real-time situational awareness had certainly improved, but this capability did little against 
insurgents who easily blended into local populations.   
 Where organizational culture played a role was in regard to the organization’s preference 
for mid-intensity, firepower-intensive wars, rather than low-intensity conflict.  Throughout the 
mid- to late-1990s, there was constant tension between the operational requirement to deploy 
troops to missions that were “below the threshold of physical violence” and the organizational 
preference for conventional wars with limited, clearly defined aims.  As it had in the past after 
participation in low-intensity conflict, the Army made minor edits to keystone doctrines to reflect 
lessons learned from these missions, but these edits were cursory and superficial at best.  The Army 
spent considerable organizational energy trying to define low-intensity conflict with terms like 
military operations other than war (MOOTW) and stability operations.  The MOOTW designation 
is illustrative of the organization’s view of peace operations.  By labeling these operations as 
something other than war, the Army not only downgraded their importance, but it also 
demonstrated the organization’s contention that the Army should not be engaging in them.  
4.1.2.7. Conclusion  
 In 1989, the Army viewed itself as a modern fighting force that had moved beyond its 
troubled post-Vietnam War state.  In the uncertain post-Cold War environment when there was no 
easily-identifiable enemy threat, the Army’s theory of victory consisted of two strains of thought 
that were in tension with each other.  Army leaders identified a need to be able to project Army 
power globally to conduct a wide array of missions along the entire spectrum of conflict.  This 
spawned Full-Dimensional Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations.  Both of these doctrines 
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recognized the necessity for the Army to be able to function effectively in low-, mid-, and high-
intensity warfare.  Operations on the lower end of the spectrum were secondary in importance to 
mid-intensity and high-intensity operations, but their inclusion in the manual at least officially 
sanctioned the Army’s requirement to operate in those environments.  As the Army learned 
repeatedly throughout the 1990s, most prominently in Bosnia in 1995, civilian policymakers 
intended on employing the Army in operations other than war.  Ignoring doctrine for these types 
of operations would have been detrimental to the Army’s standing during a time that it sought to 
demonstrate the continued relevance of ground combat after the Soviet Union’s collapse. 
 In tension with the full-spectrum approach was the idea that Army leaders favored a vision 
of future warfare that centered on “firepower-intensive, limited war” over “manpower-intensive 
and firepower-limited, internal war” such as counterinsurgency.190  Army leaders such as Reimer 
and Scales and other futurists during the mid- to late-1990s believed that an Army unit competent 
in mid-intensity warfighting would also be competent in low-intensity operations such as 
counterinsurgencies or peacekeeping operations.  As Jackson points out, these leaders believed 
that they could apply a theory of victory oriented on firepower-intensive wars to both types of 
operations.191  This way of thinking would prove problematic in the Army’s deployment to Bosnia 
in 1995 and in post-invasion operations in Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-).  Scales published 
his book after the initial combat operations of those later wars but before the Army engaged in 
post-invasion stability operations in both countries.  His “ten principles for the future” focus on 
the application of technologies - “stealth, power, and information” - to deliver “killing power” 
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quickly and decisively in limited wars.192  His theory of victory provides little insight on Army 
operations when a war’s objectives are ambiguous or when they change during the course of a war.   
 While the 1993 doctrinal manual did address conflict on the lower end of the spectrum, 
coverage on these topics was limited and underdeveloped.  Army leaders limited coverage on low-
intensity conflict in their doctrine for two reasons.  First, Army leaders believed that a theory of 
victory oriented on mid-intensity warfare could easily be adopted for low-intensity warfare.  
Soldiers trained in the former would do well in the latter.  According to these Army leaders, the 
reverse did not hold true - soldiers trained in low-intensity conflict would be unprepared for mid- 
to high-intensity combat.  Second, some leaders hoped that minimal coverage in doctrine would 
reduce the likelihood that policymakers would deploy the Army in operations other than war 
(OOTW).  Voluminous doctrines on methods of fighting in low-intensity conflict could compel 
civilian policymakers to employ the Army in this type of conflict more frequently.   
 In the 2001 manual, the Army took a step forward with regard to operations in low-intensity 
environments by providing insight on stability193 and support operations.194   Doing so provided 
the institutional support necessary for the development of institutions like the Army’s 
Peacekeeping Institute (API) and the publication of supporting manuals.  However, the extent to 
which coverage on these areas went beyond the Army’s keystone doctrine to its schools and 
education centers is less clear.  There is no evidence of these doctrines having substantial influence 
on the Army’s performance in stability operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.  
 An institution that embraced AirLand Battle and experienced an overwhelming victory in 
Desert Shield/Storm using elements of that doctrine was unwilling to fundamentally overhaul 
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doctrine in the early 1990s.  Sullivan recognized that “new doctrine must accommodate the 
changing environment,” but he eased the concerns of Army leaders by basing the doctrine on “the 
widely acknowledged strengths of AirLand Battle.”195  Sullivan’s approach was practical.  He 
knew that the Army would experience a significant reduction of forces after the Soviet Union’s 
collapse.196  Fundamentally overhauling doctrine in the early 1990s would have added further 
turbulence to an Army in the midst of a major drawdown.  Instead, Sullivan built on “the battle-
tested AirLand Battle doctrine, expanding its scope across the operational continuum and shifting 
its focus toward power projection from the United States.”197  He viewed the 1993 manual as the 
stimulus that would transition the Army “from the Cold War to a principally CONUS-based 
contingency force, prepared to perform a variety of combat operations and operations other than 
war.”198   
 The 2001 FM 3-0 was the next step in the Army’s transition from a Cold War force to a 
lighter, more rapidly deployable force.  Like the 1993 manual, it is hard to argue that the 
establishment of Full-Spectrum Operations represented a doctrinal revolution, but we should not 
underestimate the magnitude of officially sanctioning operations on the lower end of the spectrum 
of conflict, particularly given years of resistance to these operations since the Vietnam War.  That 
said, while low-intensity conflict was an element of Full-Spectrum Operations, it is clear that the 
Army was not prepared to execute operations in that type of conflict when it was required to do so 
in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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4.2. Conclusion 
 The absence of counterinsurgency doctrine prior to, during, and after the Vietnam War, and 
the Army’s half-hearted attempt to develop doctrine for low-intensity conflict in 1993 and 2001, 
shed light on the sources of Army doctrinal innovation.  First, in each case, Army leaders 
rationalized their decision not to innovate based on a prioritization of security threats.  The Army 
is predisposed to innovate doctrinally to defeat those threats that it perceives as most dangerous to 
U.S. national security.  Irregular warfare does not pose an existential threat to the United States, 
and therefore, Army doctrine with respect to irregular warfare is always secondary to doctrine for 
the most dangerous threat.  This logic is consistent with the balance of threat perspective of military 
innovation. 
 Of course, the problem with only innovating doctrinally for the most dangerous threat is 
that it leaves the organization less prepared (or entirely unprepared) for wars that are less 
threatening to American interests, but more likely to actually occur.  The central focus on a 
conventional fight with the Soviets in the late 1950s and early 1960s had a major effect on the 
Army’s unwillingness to develop counterinsurgency doctrine that might have enabled greater 
effectiveness in the Vietnam War.  In the post-Cold War environment, the Army struggled to 
develop a theory of war in the absence of a clearly identifiable most dangerous enemy threat.  FDO 
and FSO included a secondary focus on doctrine for low-intensity conflict, but it is clear that the 
institution remained focused on firepower intensive war with limited objectives.  Another 
implication of only focusing on the most dangerous threat is that you will incur substantial costs 
in terms of life and treasure in wars against secondary threats.  If counterinsurgency is always a 
secondary threat because it is not existential, then you can expect to face mission failure (or at least 
a stalemate) in those types of operations.   
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 Second, in both cases, Army leaders argued that units capable of conducting mid- to high-
intensity warfighting would also be competent in low intensity conflict.  A part of this argument is 
logical; many low-intensity conflicts often involve episodes of mid-intensity combat.  For an Army 
unit to function effectively in a low-intensity conflict, if often does have to be effective at higher 
levels of violence.  But, that is only part of it.  That unit must also be skilled at a whole host of 
other requirements that are not inherent to mid- and high-intensity conflict.  Ignorance of this fact 
can be attributed to one of three causes: hubris on the part of Army leaders, a hesitancy to innovate 
for low-intensity conflict based on a fear that doing so will sign the Army up for operations which 
it perceives as outside of its warfighting domain, or a (rational) focus on mid- to high-intensity 
warfare based on the fact that armies normally experience higher numbers of casualties in that type 
of warfare.199   
 Some analysts claim that the absence of comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine 
stemmed not from the intransigence of Army leaders but instead from the fact that organizing, 
training, and conducting these operations was tremendously difficult to do in the first place.200  
President Kennedy and his group of counterinsurgency experts - the Special Group (C-I) - 
developed policies and transmitted them to the Army through the Secretary of Defense and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it was still a challenge for Army leaders to rapidly implement new 
doctrines and organizations given the general absence of recent experience in counterinsurgency 
operations.  It is not clear that different (or improved) doctrine would have led to a different end-
state; some argue that failure in the Vietnam War was the result of failed American strategy, not 
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tactics.201  It is worth considering whether any type of doctrinal innovation for irregular warfare 
could have ensured Army success in a counterinsurgency. 
 While the Army’s adoption of Full-Dimensional and Full-Spectrum Operations was an 
incremental doctrinal change, the change was more substantial than any adjustments made with 
respect to counterinsurgency operations after the Vietnam War.  While the Army’s negative 
experience in Vietnam likely played a role, it is also clear that the Army’s doctrine-writing 
apparatus was sufficiently more robust in the 1990s than it was in the post-Vietnam War period.  
The existence of TRADOC professionalized doctrine creation in the Army.  The existence of such 
an institution compelled doctrinal change even when such change was superficial. 
 Posen’s argument on the necessity of civilian intervention to compel military innovation 
during periods of high threat is insufficient for explaining the doctrines discussed in this chapter.  
As his theory predicts, we do see civilian pressure on the Army prior to and during the Vietnam 
War and in the mid- to late-1990s, but Army leaders anticipate intervention and change doctrine 
just enough to ward off any further civilian interference.  This is not to say that they mislead 
civilian actors about the organization’s priorities, but like any political actor, a military 
organization seeks to develop its own operating practices without intrusion from external actors.  
Prior to the Vietnam War, the Army used formal doctrine as a tool to minimize interference.  In the 
1990s, the Army saw doctrine for firepower-intensive wars as the priority, but civilian 
requirements for Army operations in peacekeeping missions and low-intensity conflict demanded 
that the Army account for those types of mission in its keystone doctrine.  FDO and FSO expanded 
the range of operations that the Army expected to operate in, but behind the doctrines there was 
very little in the way of substantial organizational change to improve competency on the lower end 
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of the conflict spectrum.  When civilian elites favor change and military elites do not, we see 
evolutionary or cosmetic changes to Army doctrine. 
 244 
Chapter 5. Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Marine Corps   
 The analysis of Army doctrine with respect to conventional and irregular warfare in the 
preceding two chapters produced a series of conclusions on doctrinal innovation.  In order to test 
whether or not those conclusions are applicable to other military organizations, I apply the same 
theoretical framework to the U.S. Marine Corps.  Rather than conducting an analysis of the Marine 
Corps over the entire period from the end of World War II to 2001, I focus on two doctrinal 
innovations - the vertical envelopment doctrine of the 1940s and 1950s and the maneuver warfare 
doctrine of the 1980s.   
 The vertical envelopment and maneuver warfare innovations occurred during periods of 
peace following war.  Both innovations happened in the context of major challenges to the Marine 
Corps’ organizational survival.  The vertical development doctrine was developed in response to 
the advent of nuclear weapons.  Studying this case allows me to assess whether or not the Marine 
Corps changed in ways similar to the Army when exposed to similar external stimuli.  The 
maneuver warfare doctrine was implemented in the 1980s - right around the same time that the 
Army established AirLand Battle.  This case also allows for a service-to-service comparison.   
 In the sections that follow, I use a balance of power approach to explore the cause of the 
doctrinal changes and an organizational approach to understand why the changes happened in the 
way that they did.  I rely heavily on primary source materials located in the Marine Corps Archives 
in Quantico, Virginia.1  In the chapter’s conclusion, I compare the results to the Army cases and I 
discuss implications for understanding military doctrinal change. 
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5.1. The Major Doctrines 
5.1.1. The Vertical Envelopment Doctrine 
 The Marine Corps’ development of a helicopter-oriented vertical envelopment doctrine in 
the late 1940s can be attributed to the effect that nuclear weapons had on the Marines’ amphibious 
assault mission.  The Corps codified the vertical envelopment doctrine in two formal, doctrinal 
manuals - one in 1948 called Amphibious Operations - Employment of Helicopters2 and one in 
1955 called Landing Force Bulletin Number 17.3  Interservice competition between the Marine 
Corps and the Army and Air Force played a major role in this doctrinal innovation.  The doctrine 
was also the result of a direct threat to the Marine Corps’ existence in the political battle over 
military unification that led to the 1947 National Security Act. 
 The vertical envelopment doctrine is interesting on three accounts.  First, studying this 
innovation allows me to analyze how another service responded to the advent of nuclear weapons.  
This enables comparisons to the Army’s pentomic doctrine.  It turns out that the Army wasn’t the 
only service that worried deeply about its survival in the post-World War II period.  Second, while 
the vertical envelopment doctrine involved a major technological development in the form of the 
helicopter, the existence of that technology did not drive the innovation.  The requirements of the 
vertical envelopment doctrine greatly exceeded the existing capabilities of the helicopter.  Contrary 
to the arguments of some that new technology is the cause of new doctrine, in this case, the vertical 
envelopment doctrine was the concept that drove the acquisition of new technology.  Third, vertical 
envelopment occurred during a time when the Corps had not yet established a formal tradition of 
keystone doctrine.  Though neither the Army nor the Marine Corps had a cohesive doctrine 
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producing institution in the 1940s and 1950s, the Army published keystone doctrinal manuals on 
routine intervals since the beginning of the twentieth century.  The Marine Corps did not.  
5.1.1.1. The Post-World War II Period 
 Prior to World War II, recognizing increasing friction between the United States and Japan, 
the Marine Corps determined that in the event of a future war with Japan, the Corps would need 
the capability to “successively seize island bases and eventually land an expeditionary force in the 
Japanese home islands in order to achieve a full unqualified victory.”4  In 1915, the Corps 
published Landing Force Manual - the organization’s first official doctrine.5  The Corps continued 
to refine advanced base doctrine (also known as amphibious assault doctrine), releasing the 
Tentative Manual on Landing Operations6 in 1935 and the Landing Operations Doctrine7 in 1938.  
A Marine force dedicated to advanced base operations known as the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) 
was formed in 1933.8  The Marine Corps validated amphibious warfare doctrine in the landings at 
Guadalcanal, Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and North Africa in World War II. 
 The period immediately following the end of World War II was a challenging time for the 
Corps.  Like the other services, the Corps faced the daunting task of a large-scale demobilization 
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which was based on a controversial and politically charged point system9 that determined which 
Marines would be sent home from the war and discharged first.10  The Marine Corps post-war 
demobilization reduced the organization’s personnel strength from a wartime high of 475,604 
Marines in 1944 to 74,279 Marines in 1950 - a major decrease but still one that left the Corps 
substantially larger than its pre-war size of 19,432 Marines.11  Like the Army, the Corps faced 
tremendous domestic pressure to demobilize quickly.  Though it was done hastily, the Corps 
reorganized itself logically into two Fleet Marine Forces - one responsible for the Atlantic and one 
for the Pacific - each consisting of one division and an aircraft wing.12  Amphibious operations, 
validated in the Pacific during the war, remained the organization’s primary mission.   
 Aside from demobilization, the Marine Corps’ experience in the post-war period was 
defined by two events - the dawn of the atomic era and President Harry Truman’s effort to unify 
the U.S. military.  Both events put enormous pressure on the Marine Corps, causing Marine senior 
leaders to fight for the organization’s survival.  While much has been written about the Army’s 
pentomic doctrine, the Marine Corps’ response to nuclear weapons is understudied.  In the sections 
that follow, I analyze the Corps’ response to the advent of nuclear weapons and argue that it led to 
a doctrinal innovation known as vertical envelopment by helicopter which was codified in Marine 
Corps formal doctrine in 1947.13  In the helicopter, the Marines saw a way to evolve their historical 
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amphibious operations mission to one more appropriate for a modern-day, nuclear battlefield.  
Today we associate helicopter insertions with the Army, but in the context of the threat to 
organizational survival that it faced in the 1940’s and 1950’s, the Marines developed the first 
helicopter doctrine and employed that doctrine in the first-ever airmobile operation in Korea in 
September 1951.14   
 Previously, I argued that interservice competition between the Army and the Air Force 
played a major role in shaping the character of the Army’s pentomic doctrine.  While the Army of 
the 1950s did have to contend with those who argued that a ground force was obsolete in the atomic 
age, the Marine Corps’ battle for survival was even more intense.  The Department of the Navy - 
the service overall responsible for the Marine Corps - was preoccupied with preserving carrier 
aviation in the face of the increasing prominence of the Air Force,15 and so it did little to support 
the Marines.  In its own fight for survival, the Army used the emergence of nuclear weapons as 
justification for the irrelevance of the Marine Corps in the political battle over military unification.  
Rather than addressing the advent of nuclear weapons and the battle over unification sequentially, 
the Marines were forced to contend with both events simultaneously.  
5.1.1.2. Marine Corps in the Atomic Era - Innovation and the Helicopter, 1946-1948 
 While the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 signaled a fundamental 
reassessment of the nature of warfare for the Corps, it was not until a well-respected Marine officer 
named Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 
viewed a series of atomic bomb tests in the summer of 1946, that the Corps realized the profound 
effect that nuclear weapons would have on the organization.  A month after the World War II 
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nuclear attacks, Senator Brien McMahan (D-Conn), asked for an atomic bomb test to identify “the 
destructive powers of the atomic bomb against naval vessels…”16  President Truman approved the 
nuclear test on January 10, 1946.  The official purpose of the test was to determine “the effects of 
atomic explosives against naval vessels in order to appraise the strategic implications of atomic 
bombs including the results on naval design and tactics.”17   
 The atomic test - named Operation Crossroads - was conducted on the island of Bikini 
Atoll in the Pacific on July 1st and 25th in 1946.  The operation consisted of two, 23-kiloton nuclear 
detonations - one at 520 feet above sea level and one 90 feet underwater.  In total, the blasts 
completely destroyed thirteen U.S. Navy ships.18  Lieutenant General Geiger, assigned by the 
Marine Corps Commandant as a “U.S. Navy Non-Participating Observer,” witnessed Operation 
Crossroads and sent a detailed report back to Marine Corps Commandant, General Alexander A. 
Vandegrift, on August 21 1946.19  Geiger wrote, “It is quite evident that a small number of atomic 
bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now organized, embarked, and landed…I cannot 
visualize another landing such as was executed at Normandy or Okinawa…[the Marine Corps 
must] use its most competent officers in finding a solution to develop the technique of conducting 
                                                           
16 W. A. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation Crossroads, Prepared Under the 
Direction of the Commander of Joint Task Force One (New York: W. H. Wise, 1947), p. 10, quoting Senator 
McMahan. 
17 Shurcliff, 1947, p. 14, quoting the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to the commander of the Joint Task Force 
assigned to conduct the atomic test. 
18 “Operation Crossroads Fact Sheet,” George Austin (COLL/5482) A/5/H/7/1 (Box 1), p. 1., Marine Corps 
Archives, Quantico, Virginia.  Thirteen ships contrasts with Richard S. Hodgson, “The Atom Bomb Comes into 
Focus,” Marine Corps Gazette 30, no. 10 (Oct 1946): 23, which states that 8 total ships were destroyed.  For a 
technical analysis of the blasts, see “Historical Report Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker, Operation Crossroads,” 
accessed online at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a995213.pdf. 
19 Orders to Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Roy Geiger Box 8-9: correspondence, Marine Corps Archives, 
Quantico, Virginia. 
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amphibious operations in the Atomic Age.”20  The advent of nuclear weapons was the catalyst for 
a Marine Corps effort to develop a doctrine to preserve its primary mission.   
 Though General Geiger was approaching the end of his distinguished career,21 the Marine 
Commandant trusted him explicitly because of his wartime success as the commander of III 
Amphibious Corps in operations in World War II on Guam, Peleliu, Okinawa, and Bougainville.22  
General Vandegrift responded to Geiger’s report by establishing what would become known as the 
Shepherd Board, named after Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, one of the board’s members 
and a future Marine Commandant.23  This special board’s job was to determine how the advent of 
nuclear weapons would affect Marine amphibious operations.24  The mission of the board was “to 
propose, after thorough research and deliberation, the broad concepts and principles which the 
Marine Corps should follow, and the major steps which it should take, to fit it to wage successful 
amphibious warfare at some future date…”25  The Marine Corps, eager to preserve its primary 
amphibious assault mission, was determined not to jettison amphibious operations in the atomic 
era, but to develop a way of conducting them in the face of a nuclear-armed adversary.   
 Similar to the assessment of the Army in the 1950s, the Marine Corps concluded that 
dispersion of forces on the battlefield was the most critical element for survivability and success 
in a nuclear war.  The mass of naval cruisers, destroyers, and landing craft involved in the 
                                                           
20 Rawlins, 1976, p. 11, quoting Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, letter to Commandant, Marine Corps, dated 
21 August 1946.  It is not clear where Rawlins found this document because it is not in Geiger’s Personal Collection 
at the Marine Corps Archives in Quantico, Virginia. 
21 According to Mersky, 1983, p. 124, Lieutenant General Geiger died in January 1947, a week before his 
retirement.  He was promoted to a four-star General Officer posthumously. 
22 Rawlins, 1976, p. 11. 
23 According to Rawlins, 1976, pp. 11-12, the other board members were Oliver P. Smith and Field Harris. 
Also, see Horn, 2003, p. 62. 
24 Ronald J. Brown, “WHIRLYBIRDS: U.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea,” in Charles R. Smith, ed., U.S. 
Marines in the Korean War (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 2007), p. 666. 
25 Rawlins, 1976, p. 12, quoting the Commandant’s written instructions to the Shepherd Board.  Rawlins, p. 95, 
cites, “Commandant Marine Corps, letter to Chairman, Special Board, dated 13 September 1946, Subj: Effect of 
Atomic Explosion on Amphibious Warfare.”  It is not clear where the author found this report because it is not in the 
Marine Corps Archives at Quantico, Virginia. 
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movement and support of Marines in a typical amphibious operation would be particularly 
vulnerable to nuclear attack.  To protect Marines while preserving the element of surprise in an 
attack, required that the Corps develop “a new mode of assault…as a supplement to the existing 
amphibious landing craft.”26  Dispersion of forces was the critical element but it needed to be 
achieved without sacrificing effective command and control of Marine units.27  The Board 
considered a number of alternatives to rapidly build-up Marine combat power in an amphibious 
operation.  Methods considered were: the use of gliders, airborne units, transport seaplanes, troop 
and cargo carrying submarines, and/or helicopters.28  The Board believed that helicopters were the 
best option for an assault because they would minimize the exposure of a Marine amphibious task 
force while also allowing Marines to overcome the challenges of the dispersion of forces.29 
 Though the Marine Corps experimented with helicopters as early as 1932, a comprehensive 
Marine helicopter program was not initiated until 1946.30  The 1930’s helicopter development 
effort, which centered around a helicopter called the Pitcairn Autogyro, was cancelled by the 
Marine Corps because the Pitcairn could only transport a pilot and two passengers.31  This limited 
payload provided little capability to the Marines.  In order to effectively transport Marines into 
combat, helicopters needed significantly more capability than existed in the mid-1940s. 
 By the end of December 1946, General Vandegrift approved the Shepherd Board’s 
recommendation regarding the employment of helicopters for the ship-to-shore movement of 
Marines in an amphibious operation.32  However, the Marine Corps needed a comprehensive 
                                                           
26 Rawlins, 1976, p. 13. 
27 Simmons, 2003, p. 194. 
28 Rawlins, 1976, p. 13; Mersky, 1983, p. 125.  Airborne operations were ruled out because of the challenge of 
consolidating forces after a parachute operation. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., pp. 1, 105-106. 
31 Mersky, 1983, p. 124. 
32 Rawlins, 1976, p. 14, notes that the Board also directed the parallel establishment of a program to develop the 
transport seaplane. 
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doctrine for helicopter employment, and it needed to remedy the fact that existing helicopters were 
primitive.  General Vandegrift directed the Marine Corps Schools (MCS) to “submit a tentative 
doctrine for helicopter employment.”33  The Board submitted a request to the most accomplished 
helicopter developers of the time - Igor I. Sikorsky and Frank Piasecki - for an aircraft capable of 
carrying a 5,000-pound payload at altitudes of 4,000-15,000-feet for 200-300 miles.34  Budget 
constraints in 1947 severely limited the ability of the Corps to establish a robust helicopter 
program,35 but the 1949 Navy budget allocated funds for a helicopter designed by Piasecki called 
the HRP.36  By 1951, the Marines would also receive the Sikorsky-designed HO3S-1.37  More 
importantly, the Marines established an experimental helicopter program to test emerging doctrine 
called the Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1) in December 1947.38  HMX-1’s primary 
mission was to test the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the ship-to-shore movement of 
Marine assault forces in amphibious operations.39   
 Senior Marine Corps leaders recognized that the atom bomb posed a major threat to the 
execution of traditional amphibious operations because the movement of Marines on the water’s 
surface rendered those Marines especially vulnerable.  Movement by helicopter provided a 
solution.  The logic was as follows.  An amphibious operation required the ship-to-shore movement 
of Marines at a particular location on a beachhead.  The mass of Marines and the dozens of 
destroyers, cruisers, and landing craft supporting them - all oriented on the beachhead location - 
                                                           
33 Rawlins, 1976, p. 14. 
34 Mersky, 1983, pp. 124-125. 
35 According to Rawlins, 1976, p. 15, the Chief of Naval Officer’s Air Planning Group concluded that it was 
“impracticable to set aside funds in the budget years 1947 and 1948 for the procurement of helicopters for the 
Marine Corps…” 
36 Mersky, 1983, p. 125. 
37 Rawlins, 1976, p. 105.  According to Brown, 2007, p. 666, the HO3S-1 only had a range of 80 miles and a 
payload lift capability of 1,000 pounds.  While this was way below the Shepherd Board’s desired specifications, it 
was a critical first step in the progression of the helicopter. 
38 Brown, 2007, p. 666. 
39 Brown, 2007, p. 666. 
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rendered Marine units vulnerable to an atomic attack.  While a helicopter insertion would still be 
vulnerable, the Marines believed that a vertical envelopment would enable the insertion of Marine 
units at a variety of dispersed, inland locations simultaneously.  In theory, a successful atomic 
attack on numerous, dispersed units on land would be less likely than one atomic attack on a 
concentrated group of Marines and landing craft on a beachhead.  Before the Corps could fully 
develop a comprehensive doctrine to support the burgeoning concept, its very own organizational 
survival was at stake in the political battle over military unification.  
5.1.1.3. The Battle Over Military Unification, 1946-1952 
 While the Marine Corps reacted to the atomic explosions that ended World War II, an 
intense political battle over military unification presented a real threat to the Marine Corps’ 
existence.  Concerns regarding organizational survival had an important effect on the Corps’ 
adoption of the vertical envelopment doctrine.  Military unification was the reorganization of the 
military into three, distinct branches - the Army, Navy, and Air Force - each represented by a chief 
and under the direction of a single Chief of Staff and a civilian Secretary.  As early as 1944, Marine 
Corps Commandant Lieutenant General Vandegrift expressed his concern that a military 
unification effort that viewed the services “on the basis of separate air, separate sea, and separate 
ground forces” would lead to calls for the abolition of the Corps.40  The Army claimed that the 
Corps encroached on its wartime jurisdiction during World War II, and it sought to prevent that 
from happening in the future by either dissolving the Corps or absorbing it.41  Sensitive to the post-
war interest in reducing the size of the military, the Army argued that the Corps was duplicating 
                                                           
40 “The Marine Corps - An Essential, Integral Element of the Naval Service,” Statement of Lieutenant General 
A. A. Vandegrift, U.S.M.C., Commandant of the Marine Corps, House Select Committee on Post-War Policy, May 
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the Army’s effort.  The Army was very uncomfortable with the Marines role as a second land 
army.42   
 While the House of Representatives and the Senate worked through three, different 
unification bills in 1947, elements of a secret session of the Joint Chiefs of Staff leaked to the 
public.43  A collection of papers entitled the Series 1478 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) papers 
(specifically Papers 10 and 11)44 - provided strong evidence of the Army’s desire to eliminate or 
absorb the Marine Corps.  Though the JCS papers are no longer accessible, the most critical 
elements are found in a House report from the 80 th Congress in July 1947.45  The report cites a 
memorandum by the Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight Eisenhower, dated May 16, 1946, in 
which Eisenhower proposed that the Corps be “maintained solely as an adjunct of the [Navy] fleet” 
to operate only “in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested.”46  
Eisenhower made the case for Army responsibility for “major amphibious operations in the 
future,” and argued that the Corps should be capped at “50,000 or 60,000 men.”47  The 
commanding general of the Army Air Forces (not yet a separate service), General Carl Spaatz, 
concurred with Eisenhower, proposing that the Corps should be reduced in size to “no larger than 
a regiment, to project United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior 
guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments.”48  In response, the head of the Navy, Admiral 
Chester Nimitz, noted that he viewed the 1478 papers as “a proposal on the part of the Army (a) 
                                                           
42 Ironically, the Marine Corps was also uncomfortable with this “second land army characterization because 
they knew that, if true, the duplication of effort would lead to the Marine Corps’ demise.  Also, the Army was 
already troubled by the loss of its air force that occurred with the establishment of a separate, independent Air Force. 
43 Richard Tregaskis, “The Marine Corps Fights for its Life,” Saturday Evening Post, February 5, 1949, found 
in Studies and Reports, Box 57, Marine Corps Archives, Quantico, Virginia. 
44 Caraley, 1966, p. 69. 
45 House Report Number 961, Union Calendar No. 499, “National Security Act of 1947,” 80th Congress, 1st 
Session (1947), pp. 12-14.  Caraley, 1966, p. 69, quotes this report but I drew directly from the House report, itself. 
46 Ibid., p. 13. 
47 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
48 H. Rep. No: 961, p. 13. 
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to eliminate the Marine Corps as an effective combat element, reducing it to the status of a naval 
police unit with possibly certain ancillary service functions…(b) to abolish an essential component 
of naval aviation which operates from coastal and island shore bases.”49   
 Historically attuned to public opinion and the Congress,50 the Marine Corps fought back51 
through multiple iterations of testimony to Congress between 1945 and 1947.52  The Corps 
repeatedly made the case that the National Security Act include a specification of Marine Corps 
roles and responsibilities.  In an oral presentation to President Truman, General Vandegrift 
expressed concern over proposals to limit the Marine Corps to “‘Ranger type battalions”, shore 
parties, signal detachments and to provisions of crews for landing craft.”53  He wanted the National 
Security Act to “expressly state the roles and missions which the Corps [was] expected to 
perform.”54  The Corps felt that in the absence of a clear specification of its authorized functions, 
other services would “reduce it to a role of military impotence.”55  Though the Secretary of the 
Navy supported the Marine Corps in this endeavor, his support was half-hearted when compared 
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to the Navy’s top priority which was to protect naval, fixed-wing aviation in the face of the 
establishment of an independent air force.56   
 After the Corps’ resistance, President Truman directed that the secretaries of the Army and 
the Navy meet to resolve their differences.  The joint agreement between the civilian secretaries 
of the Army and the Navy became the National Security Act of 1947.57  The specification of roles 
and responsibilities in the Act satisfied the Corps because it made clear that the Marines retained 
jurisdiction over the amphibious operations mission.  However, even after the Act’s passage, the 
Army and the Air Force still took measures to reduce the influence of the Corps in future combat.  
The Army proposed that the Corps only conduct amphibious operations “in attacks on small 
islands,” and it sought to place a cap on the maximum authorized size of the Corps.58  In October 
1949, the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. Cates, testified before the 
House Armed Services Committee that “the Marine Corps believes that the Army General Staff is 
actively pursuing the three original objectives which it advanced in 1946 as the price of survival 
of the Marine Corps: that the Marine Corps be reduced in size and effectiveness…excluded from 
amphibious operations…[and] denied the right to mobilize its strength in time of war.”59   
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 The National Security Act was amended twice - once on August 10, 1949 and again on 
June 28th, 1952.60  In its final form, the Act specified the roles and responsibilities of the Marine 
Corps and locked-in the Corps minimum size.  It read “The Marine Corps, within the Department 
of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air 
wings…”61  At the end of the long legislative process, the Corps got what it wanted - affirmation 
of its roles and missions and the protection of its survival through the establishment of a minimum 
force structure requirement.62   
5.1.1.4. Vertical Envelopment Doctrine, Phib-31, and Landing Force Bulletin 17 
 While the Marine Corps fought for its survival, it paid close attention to another three 
nuclear weapons tests.  Between 1948-1951, Operation Sandstone at Enewetak in 1948, Operation 
Ranger in Nevada in early 1951, and Operation Greenhouse on three different islands in the Pacific 
in the spring of 1951, reinforced the lessons General Geiger drew from the Bikini Atoll test.63  In 
1951, the Corps established a Landing Force Tactics and Techniques Board at Marine Corps 
Schools to study the employment of assault helicopters.  The board developed an amphibious 
operations concept based on the employment of assault helicopters that would eventually become 
known as vertical envelopment.  According to the Board’s initial report, the concept enabled 
“protection against mass-destruction weapons by dispersion of forces [and] emphasis on tactical 
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surprise, featuring a vertical envelopment by helicopter in ultimate conjunction with dispersed 
assaults capable of rapidly penetrating selected points in the beach defenses.”64 
 The establishment of the vertical envelopment doctrine was not an instance whereby the 
existence of a military technology drove a military organization to develop a method of fighting 
to maximize the use of that technology.  Rather, the Marine Corps developed the doctrine before 
helicopter technology was close to what would be required to employ the doctrine.  A February 
1951 report from the Landing Force Board noted, “…the number and type of helicopters available 
to the Marine Corps and the number and type of carriers available to lift the helicopter assault force 
limit the size of the helicopter-borne troop unit to a regimental landing team. With the delivery of 
newer improved types of helicopters and with an increase in the number of carriers, the lift 
capability can be expanded to increase the size of the troop unit to at least a division.”65  The core 
elements of the vertical envelopment doctrine exceeded the capability of the technology available.  
The creation of the doctrine was the driving force behind the development of the helicopter 
technologies needed to support that doctrine.   
 In 1947 and 1948, two Marine Corps boards led by Colonel Robert E. Hogaboom - the 
“Hogaboom Board” and the “Helicopter and Transport Seaplane Board” - developed the helicopter 
capabilities necessary for the new doctrine and the doctrine itself.66  The boards were informed by 
a major training event in May 1948 known as Packard II conducted by HMX-1.67  Though the 
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training event was limited by the low payload of existing helicopters and the lack of enough 
helicopters, Packard II consisted of an actual ship-to-shore movement of Marines in conjunction 
with a broader overall attack plan.68  By November 1948, the Marines published a formal doctrinal 
manual named, Amphibious Operations - Employment of Helicopters (Tentative) - hereafter, Phib-
31.69  The manual noted, “The helicopter…possesses certain distinctive characteristics which, if 
exploited can enhance greatly the speed and flexibility of the amphibious assault, while at the same 
time permitting a desirable increase in the dispersion of the attacking naval forces.”70  It went on, 
“The ability of the helicopter to rise and descend vertically, to hover, and to move rapidly at varying 
altitudes all qualify it admirably as a supplement or substitute for the slower, more inflexible craft 
now employed in the ship-to-shore movement.”71   
 Phib-31 included a detailed description of the phases of a vertical envelopment operation, 
the landing schedule by helicopter group, landing diagrams, and the fire and logistical support 
necessary for the operation.  The manual was ambitious because the existing helicopters - the HRP-
1 and the HO3S-1 - were not yet capable of executing some of the operations prescribed.  The 
doctrine writers were cognizant of this fact, but they deliberately prevented technological 
limitations from impeding innovative doctrinal concepts.72  Phib-31 was the first doctrine of any 
service to focus on the critical elements of an assault by helicopter.  The Army copied many of the 
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elements of the doctrine in its own doctrinal manuals in the decades following the publication of 
Phib-31.73   
 The Marine Corps’ helicopter program and its supporting doctrine accelerated during the 
Korean War and culminated in the historic, first-ever airmobile operation in Korea in in September 
1951.74  During the first year of the war, Marines in the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade under the 
command of Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, employed helicopters for “liaison, 
reconnaissance, evacuation of wounded, rescue of Marine flyers downed in enemy territory, 
observation, messenger service, guard mail at sea, posting and supply of outwards on dominating 
terrain features and resupplying of small units by air.”75  The first execution of a vertical 
envelopment operation did not occur until September 20, 1951, when the Marine Transport 
Helicopter Squadron (HMR) 161 conducted Operation Summit - an operation in which 10 
Sikorsky helicopters transported 224 Marines and 17,772 pounds of supplies for an assault on Hill 
884 near Haean, Korea.76  
 While Marines fought in Korea, back at Quantico the Development Center conducted a 
Marine Corps Atomic Warfare conference to “examine the effects of tactical atomic weapons on 
the tactics and techniques now in use by the Marine Corps and to determine what changes should 
be made.”77  Acknowledging likely future Soviet possession of tactical nuclear weapons,78 the 
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conference concluded that the Corps needed increased firepower (artillery, air support, and naval 
gunfire), increased armor (in the form of more tanks available for a landing force), increased 
mobility (using helicopter lift), and better methods of protective cover (to stop the effects of 
radiation).79  Notably, the conference report called for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons 
under the control of the tactical commander during the landing phase of an amphibious operation.  
The Marines activated a unit responsible for conducting testing with tactical nuclear weapons 
called the 2d Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade (MCPAEB) in February 1953.  
The MCPAEB executed a training exercise called Desert Rock V in Nevada that involved the 
detonation of a nuclear explosion followed by the helicopter delivery of a Marine assault force 
conducting a simulated amphibious assault.80  Newspaper reports claimed that the Marines 
deployed to foxholes that were less than 4,000-yards from the atomic blast.81  By 1955, the Marine 
Corps developed a plan to use 762-mm rockets (known as Honest John rockets) to deliver atomic 
munitions on a tactical battlefield.82 
 On December 13, 1955, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, 
approved the Marine Corps concept for conducting amphibious operations through vertical 
envelopment from ship-based helicopters.83  Marine Corps Schools codified the vertical 
envelopment concept in a formal doctrinal manual entitled, Landing Force Bulletin Number 17 
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(LFB-17).84  LFB-17 focused on the “employment, with or without nuclear support, of integrated 
Marine landing forces of ground and supporting air components, organized, trained, and equipped 
to exploit the speed and flexibility of the helicopter, for the projection of seapower deep ashore at 
any point on the world littoral without the necessity of direct assault on the intervening 
shoreline.”85  Vertical envelopment’s primary goal was the ship-to-shore movement of Marine 
assault forces by helicopter to seize dispersed inland objectives.  Similar to the Army’s dual 
capability concept,86 the Marine Corps vertical envelopment doctrine envisioned the execution of 
amphibious attack operations “under conditions of nuclear or non-nuclear warfare.”87  In nuclear 
warfare, the Marines intended to disperse forces widely and use their own tactical nuclear weapons 
to defeat enemy aircraft.  In non-nuclear warfare, wide dispersion was no longer necessary; 
Marines would use their own conventional weapons to provide the firepower necessary to support 
a helicopter assault.  The Corps was so committed to the vertical envelopment concept that LFB-
17 noted that once new helicopters attained a greater load capacity, the Corps would completely 
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5.1.1.5. Understanding the Sources of the Vertical Envelopment Doctrine 
Environmental Shifts 
 The atomic explosions that ended World War II and the nuclear weapons tests that occurred 
between 1946 and 1951 - Operations Crossroads, Sandstone, Ranger, and Greenhouse - were the 
catalysts that drove senior leaders in the Marine Corps to reevaluate their conception of 
amphibious operations.  In the immediate postwar period, a Marine staff study noted, “a single 
atomic explosion during a ship-to-shore movement such as at Iwo Jima would have destroyed the 
combat effectiveness of two divisions, inflicting at a single blow casualties many times those 
actually experienced during the entire campaign.”89  The massing of ships and Marines in 
traditional amphibious operations was a major vulnerability when facing an enemy with nuclear 
weapons capability.  The Corps recognized this issue as early as 1946 and it was the single biggest 
factor that influenced the vertical envelopment doctrine that was first employed in the Korean War. 
 The Marine Corps was cognizant that the United States’ most likely next adversary - the 
Soviet Union - was expanding its own nuclear capability.  After witnessing the Bikini Atoll nuclear 
tests, General Geiger stated, “since our probable future enemy will be in possession of this weapon, 
it is my opinion that complete review and study of our concept of amphibious operations will have 
to be made.”  While Geiger did not think that nuclear weapons had changed the principles of 
warfare, he believed that nuclear weapons would demand a fundamental change in the methods by 
which Marines conducted amphibious operations.90  A Marine Lieutenant who collected General 
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Geiger’s observations at Bikini Atoll in 1946, noted that the General believed that amphibious 
operations as they were conducted in World War II needed to be completely overhauled.91  
Role of Civilians 
 Besides the limited involvement of Secretary James V. Forrestal - Secretary of the Navy 
from 1944-1947 and the first Secretary of Defense from 1947-1949 - civilian elites played no role 
in the Marine Corps’ reevaluation of its theory of victory and eventual development of the vertical 
envelopment doctrine.  While Forrestal’s main priority was to preserve naval aviation in the face 
of the establishment of an independent Air Force, Forrestal did express Marine Corps concerns 
regarding attempts by the Army and the Air Force to use military unification to relegate the 
Marines to a minor role in future combat.  However, while Secretary Forrestal worked with the 
Secretary of the Army to resolve the two service’s differences,92 Marine leaders felt like they were 
not being consulted often enough and they were suspicious regarding whether or not the Navy 
intended to fight for the Corps’ survival.93 
 There is no evidence that civilian elites with oversight of the Marine Corps played a role 
in the vertical envelopment doctrinal innovation.  Other than having to overcome budget 
constraints to pursue the helicopter program, the Marines were not constrained by civilian elites 
with respect to the development of the new doctrine.  Military elites in the Marine Corps drove the 
doctrinal innovation.  The Advanced Research Group (ARG) - a collection of senior officers in the 
rank of Colonel whose purpose was to conduct research and development “for the purpose of 
achieving solutions to certain of the Marine Corps’ basic problems”94 - had the most significant 
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influence on the development of the new doctrine.  In numerous reports to the Marine Corps 
Commandant from 1953-1957, the ARG analyzed concepts related to the execution of future 
amphibious operations.  The ARG advanced the concept of vertical envelopment and provided 
Marine senior leaders with analysis on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in future 
operations. 
Interservice Rivalry 
 One cannot overstate the role of interservice competition in the Marine vertical 
envelopment doctrinal innovation.  Given that the Marine Corps preserved its survival in the 
interwar period in part by establishing jurisdiction over amphibious warfare,95 any shock that 
threatened the amphibious mission also threatened the organization’s continued existence.  
Nuclear weapons threatened the amphibious mission and the Corps’ existence.  In fact, a review 
of correspondence between Marine leaders in the mid- to late-1940s indicates that those leaders 
were more concerned with the threat to survival than they were with the threat of Soviet 
employment of tactual nuclear weapons on a future battlefield.   
 Friction between the Army and the Marine Corps carried over from World War II when the 
Army resisted the establishment of the I and V Marine Amphibious Corps.96  Army leaders resented 
the steep increase in the size of the Corps during the war and the Marines encroachment on what 
the Army perceived to be its jurisdiction - ground combat.  When a Marine commander relieved 
an Army General in the battle of Saipan, Army General George Marshall “declared that he would 
never again tolerate command of Army troops by Marine Officers, rejecting implicitly the whole 
principle of unity of command in the field.”97  Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, a senior 
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Army commander in the Pacific during the war, stated “You Marines are nothing but a bunch of 
beach-runners anyway. What do you know about land warfare?”98  Another Army officer, General 
F. A. Armstrong, Jr., noted, “Now for the Marines you know what the Marines are, a small bitched-
up army talking Navy lingo. We are going to put those Marines in the Regular Army and make 
efficient soldiers out of them.”99 
 Action by the Army and the Air Force to relegate the Corps to a position of irrelevance in 
combat was the clear and present danger than occupied the minds of Marine leaders.  The secret 
JCS papers were cited often by the Commandant, General Vandegrift, in testimony to Congress.  
In testimony before the Naval Affairs Committee in 1947 entitled “Army Designs on the Marine 
Corps,” Vandegrift listed ten assertions made by the Army and the Air Force that were designed to 
“restrict the employment of the Marine Corps.”100  According to General Vandegrift, the Army 
asserted that the Corps was an unnecessary duplication of the Army’s effort, and it proposed that 
the Corps only be permitted to “provide a limited number of commando type units.”101  The Army 
also claimed that it should “take over all phases of development, training and conduct of landing 
operations.”102  Admiral Nimitz of the Navy noted that the Army intended to “eliminate the Marine 
Corps as an effective combat element, reducing it to the status of a naval police unit…”103  In 
General Vandegrift’s personal papers, a paper cautioned that, “Since 1829, eight major attempts 
have been made either to abolish the Marine Corps outright, transferring its personnel to the Army, 
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or to modify the duties and structure of the Corps to such an extent that it would fall easy prey to 
eventual destruction.”104  The Corps established the Edson/Thomas Board to “protect the Marine 
Corps’s interest in the proposed unification bill.”105 
 Organizational survival concerns during the Marines fight over unification were so 
powerful that they incentivized Marine leaders to improve their political skills.  Marine leaders 
proved adept at influencing members of Congress to support Marine interests.  The codification of 
the Corps’ minimum size was tremendously important in the Marines fight for survival.  The 
Marines remain the only service in the U.S military to have a minimum size and organizational 
structure codified in law.   
Intraservice Rivalry and Organizational Culture 
 While interservice rivalry (and the threat of organizational extinction) played a major role 
in the Marines doctrinal innovation, there is no evidence that intraservice rivalry or organizational 
culture played a role.  There was some mild resistance to the vertical envelopment doctrine 
amongst Marine aviators who “wanted to fly sleek jets and dogfight enemy aces, not manhandle 
temperamental aircraft to deliver troops and supplies…”106  However, the primary Marine Corps 
cultural attributes - versatility, adaptability, and the warrior spirit - aligned with vertical 
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5.1.1.6. Conclusion 
 Like the Army, in the post-World War II period, Marine planners assumed that the next 
battle would be against the Soviet Union.107   While the Corps was confident that the amphibious 
operations mission would still be relevant in a nuclear world, other senior military leaders 
disagreed.  The first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the passage of the 1947 National 
Security Act, General Omar Bradley (U.S. Army), told the House Armed Services Committee that 
“amphibious operations were a dead letter…there would never again be another major amphibious 
assault.”108  The Corps perceived the cost of not changing its doctrine to be organizational 
extinction.109  If it could not figure out how to conduct an amphibious operation on an atomic 
battlefield, then arguments to disband or absorb the Corps would be strengthened.  After enduring 
the fight of its life in the battle for military unification, the Corps preserved the amphibious 
operations mission by innovating doctrinally to develop vertical envelopment. 
 Vertical envelopment was based on the assumption that the dispersion110 of Marines inland 
through insertion by carrier helicopter would render Marine units less vulnerable to tactical nuclear 
weapons than would a beachhead attack from aboard landing crafts.  The board charged with 
determining how the Corps should respond to atomic weapons concluded that dispersion of forces 
was the most critical characteristic necessary for effective operations.111  In theory, helicopter 
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insertion would maximize dispersion because helicopters could deliver Marines to the battlefield 
to numerous landing zones. 
 In hindsight, it is not evident that the vertical envelopment doctrine would have succeeded 
in the face of a Soviet tactical nuclear weapons attack.  While inland helicopter insertions to 
multiple, separate landing zones would indeed result in greater dispersion of Marines than would 
a standard ship-to-shore amphibious landing, helicopters still would have been vulnerable to 
tactical nuclear weapons.  As we saw in the case of the Army’s pentomic structure and doctrine, it 
is not obvious than any reorganization scheme or innovative doctrine could have preserved the 
lives of Marines facing an adversary that employed hundreds of nuclear weapons.  Regardless of 
the degree to which vertical envelopment enabled dispersion, it is unlikely that Marine units would 
have prevailed on a battlefield consisting of nuclear fallout from Soviet nuclear weapons or the 
Corps’ own tactical nuclear weapons.   
 Unlike the Army which grudgingly acknowledged the transformative role of nuclear 
weapons, the Marine Corps quickly recognized that the advent of nuclear weapons presented a 
major disruption for its theory of victory in the post-World War II world.112  The Marine 
Commandant and the Marine Corps schools moved promptly after the war to develop a new theory 
of victory to preserve the amphibious operations mission.    Even when its own existence was 
threatened after World War II, the Army still had a monopoly on the ground combat mission.  The 
Army only had to prove that ground combat was still relevant.  The Marines, however, could not 
claim sole jurisdiction over any of the physical domains of war - land, sea, or air - given the 
existence of the Army, the Navy, and the newly independent Air Force.  Instead, the Marine Corps 
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had to prove the relevance of a force that operated at the intersection of two physical domains - 
the sea and the land.  Interestingly enough, the Corps did this by developing a doctrine that 
involved the insertion of Marines in the third domain - the air.   
 Civilian intervention to compel doctrinal change was not necessary in the Army’s pentomic 
doctrine or the Marines’ vertical envelopment doctrine.  Military elites in each service initiated the 
innovation process first in the absence of civilian interference.  Interservice competition is the most 
influential cause of both doctrines.  When the introduction of a new military technology threatens 
the organizational survival of a service, that service will move quickly to preserve its dominance 
in its domain.  The Army’s case shows us that when doctrinal innovation is deemed necessary to 
maintain relevance in a particular domain, that service will innovate doctrinally even if doing so 
runs counter to the organization’s cultural imperatives.  Vertical envelopment was deemed so 
critical to the Corps’ survival that the doctrine was published before the organization had the 
technological capability to employ the doctrine.   
 Unlike the pentomic structure which was short-lived, the Marine Corps retained the 
doctrine of vertical envelopment, and helicopter insertions remain a component of Corps doctrine 
today.  The pentomic organizational structure was only relevant on an atomic battlefield.  Vertical 
envelopment doctrine was applicable, in theory, to an atomic battlefield and a nonnuclear 
battlefield.   
 Vertical envelopment, though first employed by the Marines in the Korean War in 1951, 
would end up forming the basis for the Army’s airmobile operations concept, used extensively 
throughout the Vietnam War.  Though the Army had initially resisted the use of helicopters for 
offensive operations based on interservice competition with the Air Force after World War II, it 
eventually embraced helicopters, not for the purpose of fighting in an atomic war but for moving 
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soldiers quickly into areas deep in the Vietnam countryside.  Marine doctrine on vertical 
envelopment formed the foundation for Army doctrine on airmobile operations.   
5.1.2. Maneuver Warfare Doctrine 
 The development of the maneuver warfare doctrine that the Corps codified in its first-ever 
keystone doctrinal manual - Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1) Warfighting113 - occurred in 
response to two factors.  First, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Corps sought a doctrine that would 
enable it to succeed in combat against a numerically superior and heavily armored Warsaw Pact 
force.  With pressure from a civilian group of reformers outside of the military chain of command, 
the Corps developed a maneuver warfare doctrine for that purpose.  Second, the Marine Corps 
viewed maneuver doctrine as a modification to its style of warfare and as an extension of, rather 
than a replacement for, its traditional amphibious mission.  Maneuver warfare doctrine offered the 
Marine Corps a way to demonstrate its relevance during a time when many argued that the 
amphibious assault mission was no longer viable.  As the analysis in this section will show, the 
Corps’ attempt to reconcile maneuver doctrine with its amphibious assault tradition was a 
rationalization for a move that was necessary to preserve any role at all for the Corps.   
5.1.2.1. Post-Vietnam War Period 
 The post-Vietnam War period was a difficult time for the Marine Corps.  The end of the 
draft and the 1973 establishment of the All-Volunteer Force led to major recruiting challenges.114  
The Corps experienced problems related to morale, drug use, racism, desertion, and two notorious 
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cases of abuse of recruits in basic training.115  While the Army established the Strategic Assessment 
Group to review its experience in the Vietnam War after returning to the States, the Marine Corps 
established nothing comparable.  Some Marine officers studied lessons learned from the war, but 
as an institution, the Corps deliberately avoided an immediate, comprehensive assessment of its 
performance.116  Though the Corps entered Vietnam with a long history of intervention in small 
wars, any tactical victories that the Marines managed to achieve in Vietnam did not lead to success 
at the strategic level. 
 The Marines were the first service to return home to the States, and they did so absent any 
feeling of mission accomplishment.  In World War II, the Corps achieved great renown for effective 
amphibious assaults.  Even then, after the war the advent of nuclear weapons put the amphibious 
mission in great jeopardy, and caused the Marines to fight for their life in the battle over military 
unification.  After Vietnam, the Corps returned home to an American public that was fed up with 
that war and the small-wars mission in general.117  The U.S. shift in focus to the defense of NATO 
in Europe and the possibility of a combat engagement against the Soviet Union led many to 
question the Marine Corps’ role.  Though the 1952 Douglas-Mansfield Act (also known as the 
Marine Corps Bill), had established a minimum size requirement for the Marine Corps of “three 
combat divisions and three air wings…”118, years of fighting on land during the Vietnam War had 
detached the Corps from its amphibious roots.  Once again there were calls for the disestablishment 
or absorption of the Marine Corps.   
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5.1.2.2. The Marine Corps in the 1970s119  
 Neither of the Marine Corps’ historical mission sets - amphibious operations or small wars 
- seemed relevant in the post-Vietnam world of the early 1970’s.  The primary concern of U.S. 
policymakers in the Nixon and Ford administrations was the defense of Europe.120  The Soviet 
Union was the most likely adversary and few analysts saw a role for maritime operations or the 
advanced base mission.121  While the Marine Corps possessed a robust aviation force with a well-
honed and combat-proven ability to conduct vertical envelopment, most assumed that the Soviet 
air defense capability would render helicopters especially vulnerable in any attack on Warsaw Pact 
forces.  The final combat operation involving the employment of Marine helicopters, which also 
happened to be the last American battle of the Vietnam War - the battle at Koh Tang -  illustrated 
the vulnerability of the Corps’ vertical envelopment doctrine.122  While this doctrine preserved the 
Marine Corps’ existence (and its amphibious operations mission) after World War II, the Corps’ 
reliance on it was now seen as its Achilles heel.  Additionally, by the end of the war, the Army was 
conducting airmobile operations at a much higher frequency than the Marines were conducting 
vertical envelopment operations. 
 The other services had an easier time transitioning back to their pre-Vietnam War domain.  
The Army focused on defending NATO in Europe - a mission which it codified in its 1976 FM 
100-5 Operations manual with the doctrine of Active Defense.  The Air Force returned to its focus 
on strategic air and the delivery of nuclear weapons, and its ranks were dominated by fighter pilots.  
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The Navy focused on strategic deterrence, naval presence, and sea control.123  The Marine Corps, 
however, found itself without a distinct jurisdiction in the early 1970s.124  High inflation in the 
1970s put tremendous pressure on defense budgets, leading policymakers to search for ways to cut 
defense spending.  Critics of the Corps emphasized Marine duplication of functions executed by 
the other services in the realms of infantry combat divisions, tactical aviation, and ships.125 
 The Corps spent the 1970s searching for a way to preserve the amphibious operations 
mission during a time when the military expected future warfare to involve heavy, mechanized 
forces conducting offensive and defensive operations in Europe.  Military historian Alan Millett 
sums up the criticism of the Marine Corps in the 1970s as follows: “(1) U.S. military commitments 
outside Europe and its surrounding waters were highly unlikely; (2) Marine ground forces did not 
possess adequate tanks and antitank weapons for European and Mideast warfare; (3) Marine Corps 
fixed-wing aviation duplicated Air Force and Navy tactical air and starved the ground FMF [Fleet 
Marine Force] for funds and high-quality personnel; (4) the Corps’s dependence on heavy-lift 
troop-carrying helicopters made its tactical mobility questionable on battlefields affected by bad 
weather and intense anti-air defenses; and (5) the Navy’s diminished interest in gunfire support 
ships and amphibious lift should prevent the FMF from reaching the battlefield on time and then 
landing against serious opposition.”126   
 Fortunately for the Corps, civilian officials in the chain of command recognized the 
inadequacies of existing Marine amphibious doctrine, but stopped short of calling for the Corps’ 
demise.  On February 5, 1975, Schlesinger noted that, “[Our] amphibious assault force…has not 
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seen anything more demanding than essentially unopposed landings for over 20 years, and…would 
have grave difficulties in accomplishing the mission of over-the-beach and flanking operations in 
a high-threat environment.”127  However, Schlesinger went on to express support for “modernized 
amphibious forces,” arguing that the “entire globe is not defended by sophisticated surface-to-air 
missiles and high-performance fighters.”128  At least in the direct chain of command, senior leaders 
supported the continued existence of the Marine Corps.  However, the Defense Secretary’s support 
notwithstanding, the Marine Corps saw its budget slashed with respect to the other services in 
1976.  Senators in the Armed Services Committee had effectively argued that the Corps not only 
lacked the capacity to defeat a Warsaw Pact armored threat, but also that it could not quickly 
respond to contingencies in the Middle East or Asia.129   
 Outside of government, two analysts at the Brookings Institution - Martin Binkin and 
Jeffrey Record - wrote critiques of the Corps that played a role in the Corps’ eventual adoption of 
the maneuver doctrine.130  In 1975, Binkin and Record argued that Marine amphibious operations 
in developing countries - the “Third World” - were unlikely given “dwindling prospects for direct 
large-scale U.S. military intervention” in those countries.  Furthermore, the authors questioned the 
utility of Marine operations in “non-amphibious contingencies” such as Europe, given the heavily 
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armored nature of Warsaw Pact forces.131  The authors’ analysis, printed in a major, national 
newspaper, put enormous pressure on the Corps.   
 In 1976 in a book entitled, Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? Binkin and 
Record reinforced their claims and generated a series of recommendations for defense intellectuals 
with respect to the Marine Corps’ future.  The authors recommended the retention of one and one-
third Marine divisions (and their associated air units), out of a total of three Marine divisions, for 
the express purpose of conducting amphibious operations  Additionally, they argued for a reduction 
in Marine tactical aviation by eliminating all of the F-4 and A-6 squadrons, and for the disbandment 
of the Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) reserve.132   The demobilization of the MAF would shrink 
the Corps from 196,000 personnel to 111,700 personnel.133  The authors recognized that this would 
“transform the Corps from what is now essentially a separate service into an appendage of the 
Navy…”134  The remaining one and two-thirds Marine divisions not assigned to the amphibious 
mission would either be disbanded, assigned to inland combat in Asia, assigned to replace the 
Army’s 82nd Airborne Division as an airborne quick-reaction force, or assigned to Europe to join 
Army forces tasked with the defense of NATO.135   
 Binkin and Record questioned the necessity of the amphibious mission and the Marines’ 
tactical aircraft program.  The authors noted, “The USSR and the People’s Republic of China, the 
two most prominent potential adversaries of the United States, are large comparatively autarkic 
continentals; while amphibious assaults along coasts controlled by either country cannot be ruled 
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out, such operations could only marginally influence the outcome of conflict with either nation.”136  
The effectiveness of precision-guided munitions, as illustrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
exposed the vulnerability of amphibious landing craft, transport helicopters, and naval forces 
supporting a Marine amphibious assault.137  The Arab-Israeli War also illustrated the inadequacies 
of the Corps’ doctrine in the face of a heavily armored and numerically superior Soviet force.138  
In regard to Marine aviation, the Corps viewed F-4 Phantom fighters as a critical element of an 
amphibious assault.139  The F-4’s enabled air superiority and provided close air support.  Secretary 
of Defense Harold R. Brown, however, proposed a reduction in F-4 squadrons from twelve to 
nine.140  In the midst of the struggle to preserve its fixed wing force, the Corps modified its close 
air support tactics based on lessons learned from observing the Egyptians’ effective use of Soviet 
anti-air weapons in the Arab-Israeli War.141 
5.1.2.3. The Northern Flank Mission and the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) 
 In 1975, in response to pressure from Congress, the Marine Corps Commandant established 
the Haynes Board to “develop alternative force structures, concepts of employment, and 
disposition and deployment of Marine Corps forces through 1985.”142  The Board attempted to 
preserve the Marines capability to conduct amphibious assault while also “match[ing] its 
traditional missions to the current strategic context and secur[ing] a role for itself in the defense of 
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Western Europe.”143  The chief of staff of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Lawrence F. 
Snowden, fought back against contentions that the Corps was no longer relevant.  Snowden argued 
that the Marines provided not only a critical amphibious capability, but also the ability to respond 
to a “wide variety of possible crisis situations.”  By emphasizing the ability to respond to crises, 
the Marine Corps hoped to persuade policymakers that while the amphibious assault mission was 
their primary mission, the Corps also possessed the capability to serve as a “local force in 
readiness” for other missions.144  Snowden noted that the Corps had been especially innovative 
over its history, developing the first amphibious assault doctrine during the interwar period, the 
vertical envelopment concept after World War II, and more recently, the development of vertical 
and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL).145  Though he didn’t elaborate on its design, Snowden 
implied that the Corps was in the process of adjusting its doctrine to prepare for the next war. 
 The 1979 revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan strengthened the Corps’ 
argument that “flexibility and strategic mobility should not be sacrificed for NATO-only 
reinforcement missions.”146  These events also illuminated the strategic and economic importance 
of the Middle East, reminding U.S. policymakers of the importance of maintaining the military 
capability to react to contingencies in that region.  Secretary of Defense Harold R. Brown proposed 
a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) concept that included the prepositioning of equipment, supplies, 
and ships, and the creation of “air-transportable” military units based in the continental U.S.147  
The Marine Corps supported the RDF concept because it enabled the retention of the amphibious 
assault mission and it gave the Corps leverage in its argument for relevance in the Cold War.  Under 
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the RDF, the Marines planned to train and equip three brigades of 16,500 Marines, each for the 
purpose of “airlifting to distant trouble spots by 1983.”148  The Marine Corps planning chief at the 
time, Major General Paul X. Kelly, noted that, “the Marines wanted to brief reporters on the [RDF] 
because ‘some of our friends’ had gotten the idea that the corps’ mission was being changed…on 
the contrary, the corps is enthusiastic about its new role.”149  With the RDF, the Corps had found a 
mission that preserved its relevance, while at the same time aligning with its cultural emphasis on 
being expeditionary.150 
 With attention focused on the Army’s much larger presence in Europe during the mid-
1970s, the Marine Corps’ shift to Europe during this period is often overlooked.  In the mid-1970s, 
the Corps developed a concept known as the “northern flank scenario,” whereby the Marines 
would provide protection, if necessary, to NATO’s north in the event of a Soviet attack on western 
Europe.151  Operating as NATO’s strategic reserve, the northern flank scenario envisioned a Marine 
occupation in the event of war of Iceland, Norway, and Denmark to put pressure on the northern 
flank of the Warsaw Pact.152  This shift to Europe led the Marines to conduct a series of training 
events in Norway and Germany in 1975 and a brigade-level training operation in Norway by the 
end of the 1970s.153  In total, between 1976 and 1979, the Marine Corps conducted five, multi-
week training events in north Norway.154  Illustrative of the increased threat in the region, in 1978 
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the Soviet Union conducted its own amphibious landing on Osel - a small island in the Baltic 
Sea.155   
5.1.2.4. Maneuver Doctrine and Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 Warfighting 
 The Marine Corps’ shift to Europe in the mid-1970s, done reluctantly, was seen as 
necessary to ensure the organization’s survival.  The northern flank scenario presented a way for 
the Corps to contribute to the defense of NATO while also preserving its amphibious character.156  
However, the Corps was cognizant of the fact that its forces could not stand-up to mechanized 
Warsaw Pact forces in a combat engagement.  The Corps faced a dilemma.  Increasing the 
survivability and protection of Marine forces through mechanization and armor would enable 
Marines to fare better in an engagement against the Soviets, but doing so was thought to be at odds 
with the amphibious mission, and, more importantly, it risked converting the Marines into a second 
land army.157  In 1977, the Marine Commandant stated, “We have no desire to be a second land 
army.”158  Bolstering the Corps’ capability to fight mechanized forces on land in Europe threatened 
the Corps’ existence because redundancy in roles and missions between the Army and the Corps 
would lead to Congressional calls for reduction or elimination of the Corps - particularly given the 
constrained budget environment.  
 The solution to the dilemma emerged by the early 1980s when the Marine Corps developed 
a new doctrine that centered on maneuver warfare.  The rationale for the maneuver doctrine was 
outlined by future Marine Corps Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray: 
Realizing that many of our potential enemies could bring superior numbers of men and 
good equipment to bear against us in a distant theater, it would be foolhardy to think about 
engaging them in fire-attrition duels. Historically, maneuver warfare has been the means 
by which smaller but more intelligently led forces have achieved victory. It is, therefore, 
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my intention to have us improve upon our understanding of the concepts behind maneuver 
warfare theory and to train our units in their practical application.159 
 
 While the immediate reason for the maneuver doctrine was a response to the Warsaw Pact’s 
numerical and equipment superiority, the decision to adopt the doctrine and the character of the 
doctrine itself was affected by the civilian analyst, William S. Lind.160  As discussed in the section 
on the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine, Lind was an active member of the 1970s military reform 
movement161 who promoted a style of warfare focused on maneuverability, mobility, flexibility, 
and surprise to disrupt an adversary’s cohesion.162  Lind was surprisingly assertive in his quest to 
sell maneuver warfare doctrine to a Corps that feared that such a doctrine would be too similar to 
AirLand Battle.   
 Lind found an ally in then Major General Alfred Gray, commander of the 2 nd Marine 
Division, FMF, in 1981.  In 1981, Lind drafted a booklet on his rationale for why the Corps should 
adopt a maneuver-centric doctrine (as opposed to its traditional, firepower-centric doctrine), and 
left a copy of it with Major General Gray’s staff secretary, in addition to a rough draft of a 
questionnaire on maneuver warfare for Gray’s battalion and regimental commanders.163  After 
appealing to the Marines fondness for the Corps’ distinguished history of success in combat, Lind 
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compared maneuver warfare to “judo against your larger opponent” and “a way of fighting smart, 
of out-thinking an opponent you may not be able to over with brute strength.”164   
 Maneuver warfare doctrine also drew heavily from a theory of conflict developed by U.S. 
Air Force Colonel John Boyd.  Boyd’s theory focused on repeated cycles of observation-
orientation-decision-action (OODA) loops between combatants in conflict.165  According to Lind, 
the defeat of an enemy through the use of maneuver warfare occurs when that enemy “becomes 
aware the situation is beyond his control, which is in turn a product of our ability consistently to 
cut inside the time of his observation-decision-action cycle.”166  Adopting a maneuver warfare 
doctrine would enable Marines to succeed in battle against numerically superior forces in Europe 
or the Middle East.  Lind, recognizing the Corps’ interest in the Middle East based in part on the 
RDF established under President Carter, argued that “[m]aneuver warfare would offer a Marine 
amphibious force (MAF) the best chance in assisting Saudi forces” in the event of an Iraqi 
attack.167 
 In 1981, 2nd Marine Division under Gray was the first Marine Corps unit to adopt the 
maneuver warfare doctrine.  Gray established a Maneuver Warfare Board to “spread the concept 
throughout the division,” and he conducted a series of maneuver training exercises at Fort Pickett, 
Virginia.  Rather than advocating maneuver warfare doctrine as a revolutionary concept, Gray 
noted that by studying maneuver warfare, the Marines “gained from history and reinforced our 
current doctrine in order to develop skills applicable to all phases of amphibious operations.”168  
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This approach to maneuver doctrine is informative because it illustrates the continual Marine 
Corps attempt throughout the 1980s to promote the doctrine as an extension of amphibious assault, 
rather than as a replacement.  It is also important to note that maneuver warfare was not a call for 
the Corps to field heavy, armored units.  Rather, the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) concept was 
developed to enhance Marine mobility without burdening the Corps with heavier tanks.169  The 
intent of the wheeled LAVs was to maximize the Marines’ ability to move quickly on the battlefield 
to better conduct indirect attacks, a critical element of maneuver warfare. 
 By 1982, though Major General Gray endorsed maneuver warfare, the concept had not yet 
been embraced by the Marine Corps as an institution.  The Marine Corps Commandant from 1979-
1983, General Robert H. Barrow, passively supported the development of the maneuver concept 
but he did nothing to standardize it across the Corps.  Complicating the matter, unlike the Army, 
the Marine Corps did not have an equivalent of TRADOC - the command in the Army overall 
responsible for developing, publishing, and instituting doctrine.  Barrow’s replacement, General 
Paul X. Kelley, frustrated with the extent of the civilian reform movement’s involvement in Marine 
Corps doctrine, is said to have forbidden Marine officers from inviting Lind onto Marine bases.170  
Lind viewed Kelley’s reign as “a virtual counter-reformation, led from the top.”171  In 1985, Lind 
lamented what he perceived to be Kelley’s “dismantling” of the progress made by the Corps on 
maneuver warfare doctrine.172  The catastrophic bombing of a Marine barracks in Beirut in October 
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1983 was a black-eye for the Corps that occupied much of Kelley’s reign as Commandant from 
1983-1987.  In 1985, Marine Corps planners under Kelley developed a framework for amphibious 
operations in the event of war.  Called PHIBSTRIKE 95, the framework focused on “the 
conventional threat to the MAB [Marine Amphibious Brigade] or MAF [Marine Amphibious 
Force] amphibious assault against Soviet or [Warsaw] Bloc forces employing Soviet antilanding 
doctrine.”173  The framework did not incorporate the major tenets of maneuver warfare.   
  In 1985, Lind published a document that would have a substantial effect on the maneuver 
doctrine published by the Marine Corps in 1989 - the Maneuver Handbook.174  The Handbook, 
along with the numerous op-eds published by Lind during the period, emphasized the maneuver 
warfare concepts that would become the foundation of Marine Corps doctrine. These included 
speed, mobility, the use of fire to disrupt enemy forces, indirect attacks, orders to subordinate units 
that maximized subordinate initiative, and decentralized operations.175  In response to Marine 
critics176 who argued that maneuver warfare was more appropriate to a land-centric force like the 
Army, Lind argued that the Marines’ amphibious doctrine aligned well with the principles of 
maneuver warfare.  Lind and another civilian maneuverist, R. Scott Moore, argued that the Marines 
could conduct amphibious assaults by attacking numerous landing positions, rather than 
concentrating their effort on a single beachhead.  This approach aligned with maneuver warfare 
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because it exploited the value of surprise, the establishment of main and supporting efforts, and 
the decentralization of forces.177 
 General Gray, the Marine Corps officer who embraced maneuver doctrine and 
experimented with it widely as the commander of the 2nd Marine Brigade, promoted the full-scale 
adoption of the concept during his tenure as the Marine Corps Commandant from 1987-1991.  
When Gray took over as Commandant, the tenets of maneuver warfare were applied inconsistently 
across the Corps’ units and its military schools.  Gray recognized that standardization was 
necessary.  To understand the magnitude of the problem, in 1988 Gray dispatched Lind to Marine 
units on the west coast of the U.S. to determine the degree to which Marines understood maneuver 
warfare and incorporated it into their training.178  Lind reported back, “The transition to maneuver 
warfare is simply not occurring at Camp Pendleton.”179  Lind recommended the establishment of 
a “tactical symposium,” a “quick course in maneuver warfare and operational art,” and “a Marine 
Corps-wide program to institutionalize maneuver warfare.”180   
 It is not entirely clear the degree to which Lind’s report affected General Gray, but it is 
clear that Gray took action to formalize the Corps’ approach to maneuver warfare in 1988 and 
1989.  His efforts mark the birth of Marine Corps formal doctrine equal in scale (though not 
necessarily in tone) to the Army.  In July 1988, a former director of the Marines’ Tactics Division 
at the Amphibious Warfare School, Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Wyly, commended the Army’s 
FM 100-5 Operations manual, and called for a “Marine counterpart…designed to fight the Marine 
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air-ground task force…”181  In response, General Gray directed Captain John F. Schmitt to write a 
maneuver warfare manual.182  Gray “wanted a ‘keystone’ document, a general statement of 
commander’s guidance that would reflect combat and leadership philosophy and serve as a 
foundation for other, more detailed doctrinal publications - and ultimately as a guidebook for all 
Marine Corps endeavors.”183   
 Drawing primarily from Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Boyd, Schmitt worked with proponents 
of maneuver warfare such as Lind to draft a version of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 Warfighting 
in March 1989.  The Commandant accepted the draft and authorized its immediate publication and 
release throughout the Corps.184  According to Gray, Warfighting, “describes my philosophy on 
warfighting. It is the Marine Corps’ doctrine and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for how 
we fight and how we prepare to fight.”185  Discussing maneuver warfare, the manual noted: 
 …warfare by maneuver stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a 
position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. The goal is the application of strength 
against selected enemy weakness. By definition, maneuver relies on speed and surprise, 
for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo is itself 
a weapon often the most important. The need for speed in turn requires decentralized 
control. While attrition operates principally in the physical realm of war, the results of 
maneuver are both physical and moral. The object of maneuver is not so much to destroy 
physically as it is to shatter the enemy’s cohesion, organization, command, and 
psychological balance.186 
 
 In addition to FMFM 1, under Gray the Marines published a Marine Corps Campaign Plan 
(MCCP), a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Master Plan, and a Marine Corps Long-Range Plan 
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(MCLP).  He initiated a robust doctrine-writing program that consisted of Operational Handbooks 
(OH’s), Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications (FMFRP’s), and Fleet Marine Force Manuals 
(FMFM’s).187  The Marine Corps finally had a doctrine-producing apparatus that matched the 
Army’s.   
5.1.2.5. Understanding the Sources of the Maneuver Warfare Doctrine 
Environmental Shifts 
 Like the other services, the Marine Corps recognized that if the U.S. went to war against 
Warsaw Pact forces, it would be outmatched numerically.  Unlike the Army, in the 1970s the 
Marines did not possess a significant armored capability that could defeat the heavily armored and 
highly mobile Soviet forces.  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrated the increased lethality of Soviet 
weapons systems.  Given that the Soviet Union was the most likely adversary, the Marine Corps 
recognized that it needed to change its doctrine if it was to have a role in the defense of NATO in 
Europe.  Though the Corps had a robust aviation force and a combat-proven vertical envelopment 
doctrine, the Marines assumed that the Soviet surface-to-air missile capability would render 
Marine aviation extremely vulnerable.  The Marines could no longer count on vertical envelopment 
to remain relevant as they had after the advent of nuclear weapons in the 1950s.   
 The 1979 revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were events that 
validated the necessity for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that could respond to contingencies 
in the Middle East.  The Marine Corps recognized the RDF as an opportunity for relevance, but 
Marine leaders were cognizant of the fact that they would be numerically inferior in a combat 
engagement in that region as well.  These factors put pressure on the Marine Corps to innovate 
doctrinally.   
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Role of Civilians 
 Civilians played a role in the adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine, but not in the way 
that the existing literature on doctrinal innovation predicts.  The civilians who affected the Marine 
Corps’ development of the maneuver warfare doctrine were not in the chain of command.  Rather, 
civilians like retired Air Force officer John Boyd and William Lind were intellectuals outside of 
the chain who had access to Marine officers and published articles in Marine publications.  
According to Packard, these civilians made two contributions. First, since proposing major 
doctrinal changes could be detrimental to a Marine officer’s career, civilian involvement could 
ease some of that pressure.  These civilians did not have the authority to promote innovative 
officers - the mechanism necessary for innovation in Rosen’s theory - but by exploiting their 
position as respected intellectuals and theorists of war, the civilians bolstered arguments made by 
mid-level Marine officers.  Second, these civilians had more time to devote to theory development 
than the Marines.188  Senior Marine officers like General Gray were able to outsource thinking on 
maneuver warfare to civilians like Lind whose detachment from the Corps gave them room to 
study and think creatively. 
 Some scholars have argued that the Marine Corps’ development of the maneuver warfare 
doctrine was, instead, a bottom-up innovation that derived from the ingenuity of junior Marine 
officers.189  While it is clear that a handful of Marine officers helped the Corps develop the details 
of maneuver doctrine, it is not clear that these officers were the impetus behind the Corps’ decision 
to develop the doctrine.  Captain Stephen Miller wrote four articles in the Marine Corps Gazette 
on the topics of mechanization and maneuver.190  Calling for the mechanization of Marine 
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amphibious forces in 1978, Miller argued that the Corps, “configured as a high mobility 
mechanized force with a substantial anti armor and antiair capability, used in a high speed 
amphibious assault could have a pronounced effect on [the European] battlefield.”191  In two 
articles the next year, Miller outlined how the Marine Corps could defeat a numerically superior 
Soviet force and how it could defend against a Soviet counterattack.  In both articles, Miller 
included many of the elements of maneuver warfare that would eventually find their way into the 
Corps’ doctrinal manual.  According to Miller, a Marine amphibious force could defeat Soviet 
forces “Through the high tempo of operations, constant shifting of forces and fluid, flexible action 
by ground and air elements working in close harmony…”192  This will cause “the Soviet-styled 
enemy [to] rapidly lose control, cohesion and momentum.”193  
 Miller’s articles definitely increased the salience of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps 
in 1978 and 1979, but I did not uncover any evidence in the personal papers of Marine leaders at 
the time that these junior officers had much of an effect on their thinking regarding maneuver 
doctrine.  It is clear, however, that the civilian maneuverists, led by Lind, were in the minds of 
senior Marine leaders throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  Damian uncovers evidence that Lind met 
with a group of Marine officers at his home in Arlington and in one of the officer’s quarters on 
Quantico.194  Lind met these officers after he gave a presentation at a Marine tactics class in the 
Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) in the 1980-1981 academic year.195  It is possible that during 
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these meetings, the Marine officers influenced how Lind engaged with senior Marine officers on 
the doctrine, but I did not find evidence to that effect.   
Interservice Rivalry and Organizational Survival 
 The Marine Corps’ search for a new doctrine was deeply affected by its anxiety over its 
survival.  Terriff argues that paranoia196 is a predominant aspect of the Marines organizational 
culture.  He argues, “The Marine Corps sense of organizational paranoia is not only firmly fixed 
in its organizational culture, a critical aspect of its identity, it arguably is one of the, if not the, 
dominant organizational cultural artifact that exerts an influence on other key organizational 
cultural attributes of the Corps.”197  Much of this paranoia can be attributed to the fact that the 
Corps’ functional requirements often overlap with the jurisdiction of other services, particularly 
the Army and the Air Force.198  The Corps also cannot match its jurisdiction with the jurisdiction 
of its adversaries.  Most other militaries do not have a separate service responsible for amphibious 
assault operations.  This explains the Marine Corps’ fear that its ability to fight on land - 
demonstrated throughout the Vietnam War - would lead to the perception of the Corps as a second 
land army.  During periods of budgetary famine, the second land army would be the first one on 
the chopping block because its function(s) would be viewed as redundant.  When President Carter 
created the Rapid Deployment Force concept in 1979, the Corps recognized it as an opportunity 
to carve out a unique jurisdiction in a way that aligned with its cultural emphasis on being 
expeditionary.  
 In his assessment of organizational behavior in the Marine Corps, Marutollo developed 
four types of challenges to the Corps’ existence - economic (arguments to eliminate the Corps 
                                                           
196 Though Terriff uses this word, it is an exaggeration because it implies that there was no basis for concern.  
The Marines had a basis for concern. 
197 Terriff, 2006, p. 483. 
198 Ibid., p. 482. 
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based on economic efficiency), rationalist (arguments to eliminate the Corps based on a “cost 
benefit, mission-oriented analysis”), emotivist (“primordial emotive reactions against an 
unacceptable rival”), and incrementalist (the simultaneous occurrence of each of the first three 
arguments).199  In the 1970s and 1980s, arguments in favor of reducing the size of the Marine 
Corps or eliminating it entirely were primarily economic and rationalist.  Economic arguments 
focused on redundancy of Marine Corps roles with respect to the Army (ground combat) and the 
Air Force (fixed wing fighter capability).  Rationalist arguments questioned the viability of the 
amphibious assault mission in the Cold War environment.   
 Harvey Sapolsky - a political scientist at MIT who is a proponent of the interservice rivalry 
theory of military innovation - wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal in 1987 that illustrates 
the pressure on the Marine Corps in the 1980’s.  His argument aligns with Marutollo’s rationalist 
category.  Sapolsky noted, “The status of the Marine Corps would not be problematic if its main 
mission and size were not so questionable.  Since the 1920s the Corps has focused its training on 
amphibious assault.  But modern weapons make amphibious assaults extraordinarily 
hazardous…And yet we maintain a Corps of 200,000 geared primarily to that mission…”200  
Sapolsky argued that Soviet tank and artillery units would “overwhelm” Marine forces.201   
 Marutollo correctly notes that a shortcoming of the rationalist approach is that it is based 
on assumptions about future warfare that, if incorrect, would invalidate the entire argument.  The 
assumption that the Marine Corps was no longer necessary because amphibious warfare was no 
longer viable was based on the belief that the U.S. focus on the primarily land-locked Soviet Union 
would endure.  Of course, the turmoil in the Middle East in 1979 demonstrated that the Corps 
                                                           
199 Marutollo, 1990, pp. 61-62. 
200 Harvey M. Sapolsky, “The Real Marine Scandal,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1987, p. 32.  Also, cited in 
Marutollo, 1990, p. 169. 
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could play an important role in that region as a “force in readiness.”202  The rationalist challenge 
to eliminate the Marine Corps also couldn’t envision a world without the Soviet Union. 
5.1.2.6. Conclusion 
 In the decade or so that followed the Marine Corps’ return home from the Vietnam War and 
the establishment of its maneuver warfare doctrine, the Corps struggled to reconcile a theory of 
victory that centered on amphibious assault during a period when the amphibious mission seemed 
increasingly unlikely.  Even the Corps’ other historical domain - intervention in developing 
countries (labeled the small wars mission) - seemed untenable given the American public’s 
aversion to that mission set after the failure in Vietnam.  While the Marine Corps should have been 
assured of its survival given that its minimum size was protected by legislation, years of fighting 
on land as a quasi-second army led to familiar calls for the Marine Corps’ disestablishment.   
 Maneuver warfare doctrine was driven by a Marine Corps assumption that Marines would 
be outmatched numerically and inferior with respect to armored capability in the initial tactical 
battles of a war in Europe or the Middle East.  Cognizant that there was a higher probability of 
combat in the Middle East given the Army’s dominance in western Europe, the Corps focused 
initially on potential combat with Iran or Iraq.  Both countries’ militaries held a quantitative edge 
over the Corps.  Winning a battle of attrition through the application of overwhelming firepower 
would not be possible.203  Maneuver warfare offered a way to create fluidity on the battlefield that 
would be highly disruptive to Iranian or Iraqi militaries that operated in symmetrical formations 
incapable of fighting in a decentralized manner.  Marines envisioned a theory of victory whereby 
                                                           
202 Marutollo, 1990, p. 171. 
203 Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 Warfighting noted (p. 30), “Because we have long enjoyed vast numerical and 
technological superiority, the United States has traditionally waged war by attrition. However, Marine Corps 
doctrine today is based on warfare by maneuver…”  It went on (p. 37), “an expeditionary force in particular must be 
prepared to win quickly, with minimal casualties and limited external support, against a physically superior foe. This 
requirement mandates a doctrine of maneuver warfare.” 
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they would use speed, surprise, decentralized command, and combined arms to defeat a 
numerically superior foe.  The Marines envisioned that this same approach would enable them to 
defeat the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces on NATO’s northern flank if activated to fight 
the Soviets as part of NATO’s strategic reserve.   
 Marine assumptions regarding the nature of future war were divorced from the fact that 
war with an adversary in the Middle East or against NATO in Europe would surely be met by the 
entire weight of the U.S. military.  Assuming that Marines would always be overmatched and 
inferior was a superficial assumption that the Corps employed to rationalize the transition to a 
maneuver doctrine.  Though Marine senior leaders presented maneuver doctrine as an extension 
of the amphibious mission, in reality, the new doctrine was necessary for the Corps to maintain 
any role at all in the 1970s and 1980s.  The Corps was unwilling to place its fate entirely on the 
small wars mission.  Marine leaders were determined to preserve both “strains” of Marine Corps 
culture - amphibious assault and expeditionary interventions in the form of small wars204 - with an 
emphasis on the former.   
 The absence of a centralized doctrine center similar to the Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC), limited the Corps’ ability to develop doctrine in a coherent manner.  This 
is one reason why maneuver warfare doctrine emerged from individuals outside of the formal, 
bureaucratic channels of the Corps.205  The establishment of a Doctrine Center under the Marine 
Corps Development and Education Center (MCDEC) at Quantico in 1983, placed the development 
of doctrine under a single headquarters.206  According to the Corps, the “motivating force for this 
change was recognition that doctrinal development has not been a dynamic activity in the Corps 
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in recent years…Many believe the effort has not been well coordinated, and it has not kept pace 
with the rapidly changing demands of the modern battlefield.”207   
 Four years later in 1987, the establishment of the Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC) linked doctrine with the development of Marine training and equipment.  
Both the Doctrine Center under the MCDEC and the MCCDC centralized doctrinal processes, 
putting the Marine Corps on equal footing with the Army in terms of the ability to develop and 
publish doctrinal manuals.  FMFM-1 Warfighting was the first comprehensive, keystone doctrine 
in the Corps history, and its publication occurred within two years of the establishment of MCCDC.  
The numerous doctrinal publications instituted by General Gray during his reign as Commandant 
was a manifestation of the formalization of Marine doctrinal institutions and a general fascination 
with maneuver warfare.   
5.2. Conclusion 
 The two doctrines studied in this chapter - vertical envelopment and maneuver warfare - 
were developed after environmental shocks that shifted the balance of threat.  Both shocks thrust 
the Marine Corps into battles for its organizational survival.  As was the case for the U.S. Army in 
the 1940s and 1950s, nuclear weapons initially appeared to render ground combat irrelevant.  In 
response, the Corps developed a vertical envelopment doctrine that enabled it to make a case for 
the continued relevance of amphibious assault operations.  Like the pentomic organizational 
structure and doctrine, the effectiveness of assaults by helicopter in the wake of a tactical nuclear 
weapons attack is highly debatable.  Fortunately for the Corps, the doctrine was never put to the 
test.   
                                                           
207 Anonymous, “Doctrine Center Established at MCDEC,” Marine Corps Gazette 67, no. 2 (Feb 1983): 10.  
Damian, 2001, p. 38, speculates that the establishment of the Doctrine Center was also a reaction to “the success 
enjoyed by [the] Army and its TRADOC in developing AirLand Battle, which appeared the previous year.” 
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 The maneuver warfare doctrine developed in the post-Vietnam War period, was a response 
to the increased lethality of Soviet weapons systems and the inferiority of the Corps with respect 
to heavily armored and highly mobile Soviet forces.  Again, with the small wars mission in 
question after the failure of such operations in Vietnam, the Corps sensed its existence in jeopardy.  
Maneuver warfare doctrine was the lifeline that the Marine Corps embraced to ensure continued 
relevance for future combat.   
 Like the Army cases of doctrinal innovation, Posen’s argument that intervention by civilian 
officials is necessary to compel doctrinal change is not relevant for both Marine Corps doctrines.  
Instead, we observe a dynamic not accounted for by any theory of military innovation - the 
intervention of civilian academics and theorists outside of the chain of command.  Like the Army 
with respect to AirLand Battle, the Marine Corps adopted ideas on maneuver from defense 
reformers and intellectuals.  Doing so provided reinforcement for the plans of senior Marine 
leaders and allowed those leaders to outsource difficult problem sets to intellectuals with 
credibility in defense circles.  Like the Army cases, Marine leaders are attuned to the interests of 
civilian officials, and when they detect the possibility of intervention, they act in anticipation of 
that intervention to preserve first-mover advantage.  With regard to the doctrines in this chapter, 
Marine leaders recognized the familiar calls for Marine Corps extinction and they innovated.  
When fears of extinction were so great that Marine leaders developed doctrines that were at odds 
with the Corps’ amphibious tradition, those leaders did their best to link the new doctrines to the 
amphibious operations mission.   
 Rivalry between the Army and the Marine Corps also affected the development of vertical 
envelopment and maneuver warfare.  There are two key takeaways.  First, military organizations 
strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain - land, sea, or air.  
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Second, military organizations seek to establish responsibility over a specific set of functions 
within that domain.  When you have responsibility over a unique set of functions, it is easier to 
promote the necessity of your organization to the overall defense effort.  The key here is that the 
duplication of functions between two services is dangerous for both services.  This is why we see 
resistance from both the Marine Corps and the Army to the idea that the former has the capacity 
to serve as a second land army.208   A service that duplicates the functions of another service renders 
itself vulnerable to budget cuts when civilian policymakers look for justification to cut or reduce 
programs.  This concept manifested itself in the Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine.   
 Interservice rivalry is always threatening, but it is particularly threatening when one service 
is much smaller than the other.  Organizational survival concerns are amplified for the smaller 
service.  Also, not only did the Corps have to worry about arguments in favor of extinction, it also 
had to deal with arguments that Corps’ functions should be absorbed by the Army.  Even when its 
minimum size was codified into law, the Marine Corps still worried about its survival when it 
witnessed the other services establish domination over a physical domain of warfare.  This helps 
explain why the Marine Corps is traditionally more politically savvy than the other services. The 
Corps’ standing in the eyes of members of Congress who fund the defense enterprise is a 
mechanism that the Corps uses to protect itself from those who view the service as irrelevant.  
Doctrinal innovation is a tool that a military organization uses to demonstrate adaptability when 
the international security landscape changes.  The Marine Corps uses evidence of doctrinal 
innovation to shore up political support for the organization to ensure its long-term survival.   
                                                           
208 The Marine Corps has a long history of fighting on land either in support of the Army as additional ground 
forces or independently.  Marines first fought as infantry troops on land when a battalion of Marines supported 
General Washington’s army in 1776.  Marines also fought in the Creek and Seminole Wars (1836-1842), in the 
Mexican War with Winfield Scott, in the First Battle of Bull Run in the American Civil War, with the American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France in World War I, and in battles at Bataan and Corregidor in World War II.  See 
Roe, Giust, Johnstone, and Frank, 1962, pp. 6, 13-14. 
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 A major difference between the Army and the Marine Corps was the absence of a tradition 
of formal doctrine for the latter.  The Army’s first keystone doctrinal manual in the modern era 
was published at the dawn of the twentieth century.  Though the Corps published a few important 
manuals prior to 1989, the publication of FMFM 1 Warfighting that year was the Marines’ first 
keystone manual.  The Army’s tradition of formal doctrine accelerated with the establishment of 
TRADOC in 1973.  The Marines did not establish MCDEC until 1983 and MCCDC (the Marine 
equivalent to TRADOC) until 1987.  It is not coincidental that we don’t see a keystone doctrinal 
manual in the Marine Corps until 1989.  The establishment of formal doctrinal institutions is 
associated with an increase in a military’s formal doctrine.   
 As was the case for the Army, both Marine Corps doctrinal innovations occurred during 
periods of peace after war.  Conflict was not necessary to compel change.  Rosen’s theory on 
intraservice competition is not relevant for these innovations.  His theory rests on the promotion 
of innovative officers at the low- and mid-levels of the organization.  Marine Corps innovations 
were primarily top-down and the intervening defense reformers did not have the authority to 
influence promotion at junior levels.   
 Given the Army’s predisposition to innovate doctrinally to defeat the threats that it 
perceived as most dangerous to U.S. national security at the expense of doctrine for the most likely 
threats, it is surprising that the Marine Corps has not recognized the opportunity to establish a 
monopoly over the small wars mission - a mission well-aligned with its expeditionary ethos.  It is 
curious that the Marine Corps has not seized the opportunity to innovate doctrinally for irregular 
warfare given the Army’s unwillingness to do so.  Instead, we see the Corps go to great lengths to 
preserve the amphibious operations mission with the vertical envelopment doctrine and the 
maneuver warfare doctrine.  Long speculates that a preference for amphibious operations is due in 
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part to the tight link with the Department of the Navy required for the execution of these types of 
operations.  Aligning Marine operations with the Navy is another technique that the Corps uses to 
guarantee its survival.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion    
 The purpose of this study was to determine why military organizations innovate doctrinally 
given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic organizations.  The U.S. Army’s 
frequent doctrinal innovation during peacetime served as a puzzling case given political science 
literature that suggests that militaries strive to avoid the uncertainty that comes with change.  A 
secondary purpose of this study was to examine why different military organizations change in 
different ways and at different intensity levels or frequencies when faced with relatively similar 
threat environments, availability of technology, and estimates of the geography of future 
battlefields.  Understanding military doctrinal change is important because international relations 
scholars have long ignored the influence of nonmaterial factors - leadership, morale, doctrine, and 
tactics - by making the assumption that states employ military power optimally.  Force 
employment, and the doctrine that explains that employment, is integral to a state’s power. 
 To answer these questions, I employed a levels of analysis approach using a theoretical 
framework that I devised to analyze doctrinal change.  The source of a levels of analysis approach 
is Kenneth Waltz.1  Waltz’s three images of war were termed levels of analysis by David Singer.2  
The theoretical framework used in this study follows Jack Levy and William Thompson who used 
a levels of analysis approach “for classifying the different causal factors influencing the policies 
and actions of states and of other actors” that led to war.3  I adopted their approach to the study of 
military doctrine.  Rather than examining causation at the system, state and societal, and decision-
making levels of analysis like Levy and Thompson, I examined causation at the system, 
organizational, and interservice levels of analysis.  There are three limitations to this approach.  
                                                           
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 
2 David J. Singer, “The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14, no. 1 (1961): 
77-92. 
3 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 14. 
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First, causal factors that are present in one level are not always exclusive to that particular level.  
Second, a levels of analysis approach will leave readers who expect a monocausal explanation for 
military doctrinal change unsatisfied.  Finally, the levels of analysis framework is better at 
classifying variables than classifying theories, since theories often employ variables from one or 
more levels.4 
 In general, systemic-level shifts had the greatest effect on military doctrinal change, 
particularly when those shifts threatened a military organization’s survival or its monopoly over a 
jurisdictional domain.  Military organizations are attuned to shifts in the balance of threat and to 
the interests of civilian policymakers.  However, civilian intervention to compel change is unlikely 
because military organizations seek to maintain first-mover advantage; they will initiate change 
processes in advance of civilian intervention.  While the organizational level of analysis 
illuminated the mediating influence of culture on change, interservice factors played a more 
important role.   
6.1. Major Findings 
 Below, I summarize the seven, major findings from the comparative case study analysis in 
the preceding chapters.  These findings have important implications for the study of political 
science, security studies, and military innovation.   
 First, the systemic-level causes of military doctrinal innovation are better described by 
balance of threat than balance of power theory.  The balance of power approach which argues that 
states change their military doctrine in response to changes in the distribution of power in the 
system, fails to explain why the U.S. Army changed its doctrine three times from 1945 to 1982 
when the bipolar order of the U.S. and the Soviet Union remained constant.  Applied to military 
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innovation, balance of threat theory argues that militaries will develop doctrine in response to shifts 
in the threat.  Shifts in the power of potential adversaries and/or the capabilities and intentions of 
those adversaries, leads militaries to evaluate their theory of victory and increases the chances that 
those militaries will innovate.   
 Balance of threat theory helps us understand why militaries innovate for some types of 
conflict and not others.  The unwillingness of the Army to innovate doctrinally with respect to 
irregular warfare in the 1960s and again in the 1990s, is in part explained by the Army’s tendency 
to treat the most menacing threat to the state as the top priority in the doctrine development process.  
Though fighting an irregular war might be the policy preference of senior civilian policymakers, a 
military organization is inclined to spend less time preparing for such a war given the 
organization’s inclination to prioritize the highest intensity threats.  Army culture values offensive, 
firepower-centric doctrines that emphasize mid- to high-intensity operations. 
 There is general consensus that militaries optimized for low-intensity conflict are likely to 
fail in mid- to high-intensity wars.  However, military personnel are less willing to acknowledge 
that a military optimized for mid- to high-intensity combat will not succeed in irregular war.  
Planning purely for mid- to high-intensity war that is done without consideration for the probability 
of that type of war can leave a military unprepared for low-intensity conflict.  This helps explain 
the U.S. military’s history of poor performance in irregular war.  Also, if a military organization 
has an aversion to a certain type of war, it might be biased in the way that it characterizes the 
intensity and/or probability of that type of war.  Threat intensity and probability are inherently 
subjective.   
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 Complicating the problem is the unproven assertion by U.S. military leaders that militaries 
trained for conventional war will be adequately prepared for irregular war.5  Time and time again, 
this argument has proven to be specious for the U.S. military.  Optimization for the highest intensity 
war does not mean optimization for war at lower intensity levels.  While conventional warfare is 
normally an important element of irregular war, success in the latter requires competency in 
different areas such as security sector reform, economic development, the training of host nation 
security forces, population security, and establishment of the rule of law.  The organizational 
structure of modern-day ground combat forces, optimized for success in conventional war, might 
preclude success in irregular war.  The U.S. Army’s recent establishment of Security Force 
Assistance Brigades - units designed to train other state’s militaries - might be a positive step 
forward with respect to reorganizing and developing a doctrine for irregular warfare, but time will 
tell whether these units will operate under a doctrine for irregular war or whether they are merely 
skeleton structures for the Army’s future expansion.  A rising China and an increasingly menacing 
Russia have already given Army leaders a reason to jettison lessons learned from fifteen years of 
irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan for a renewed focus on the high-intensity operations that 
would define a confrontation with either superpower. 
 Second, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation.  
In most of the innovations analyzed in this study, civilian intervention played little role in causing 
the innovation.6  The most significant example of civilian influence occurred in the case of the 
Army’s AirLand Battle and the Marines’ maneuver warfare doctrine, when both organizations 
                                                           
5 We see a similar claim in the 1950s when the Army asserted that optimization for an atomic battlefield would 
also enable success on a non-atomic battlefield.  I find no evidence that confirms this assertion. 
6 Jensen, 2016, p. 147, also finds little evidence of civilian intervention.  However, it is difficult to reconcile this 
finding with his contention that advocacy networks consisting of “defense and civilian officials” (emphasis mine) 
caused doctrinal change. 
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outsourced the intellectual development of doctrine to civilian defense reformers who were outside 
the chain of command.  Rather than serving as confirmation of the necessity for civilian 
intervention to force military change, these cases are evidence of the sophistication with which 
militaries will approach doctrinal change when the doctrine in question aligns with organizational 
preferences.  Militaries will leverage civilian expertise to bolster the rationale that military leaders 
use to support efforts to change their organization’s doctrine.   
 When militaries sense civilian intervention to compel change, they will act in anticipation 
of that intervention to preserve first-mover advantage.  This is most likely when there is civilian 
preference for a doctrinal innovation for irregular warfare.  First, the civil elements of irregular 
warfare are seen by military leaders as outside the military’s core purpose.  Minimal coverage of 
irregular warfare in doctrine reduces the odds that the organization will be employed in such 
warfare.  Second, the military’s poor historical record of performance in irregular war makes 
participation in such war less desirable.  As such, militaries are not inclined to innovate for 
irregular war on their own.  When militaries perceive possible civilian intervention to compel 
change, we will see evolutionary or cosmetic changes to doctrine that are promoted as major 
changes.  This was the case with respect to counterinsurgency doctrine before, during, and after 
the Vietnam War, and doctrine for stability operations in the 1990s.  The Army branded the 1990s 
doctrine with the Full-Spectrum Operations slogan to emphasize the organization’s embrace for 
warfare across the spectrum of conflict, down to and including irregular war.  However, the 
changes to doctrine that were made for irregular war were superficial and limited.  Doctrine was a 
tool that the Army used to minimize civilian interference.  Peripheral changes like these can easily 
be abandoned or reversed in the future, especially when they occurred at the prompting of civilian 
actors.   
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 Third, military organizations constantly strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a 
particular jurisdictional domain.  The most common physical domains are land, sea, and air.  
Establishing dominance over a domain is integral to the organization’s survival, as long as it can 
be shown that the possibility for future combat in that domain exists.  Claims regarding the 
irrelevance of ground combat in a nuclear world put the Army’s organizational survival in 
jeopardy.  If combat in the land domain was no longer a possibility, the Army could no longer 
justify its existence.  The Marine Corps has always operated at the seams of the three domains.  
This helps explain why the Corps perceived its organizational survival to be in jeopardy on 
numerous occasions throughout its history.  With amphibious warfare operations, the Marine Corps 
found an area within which it had a semi-monopoly.  When those operations were threatened in 
the nuclear era, the Corps innovated to develop vertical envelopment.    
 As the behavior of the Marine Corps and the Army after the advent of nuclear weapons 
shows, military organizations will innovate doctrinally to justify their relevance even if the 
innovations are unlikely to work or are in tension with the organization’s culture.  The Army’s 
pentomic structure and doctrine would not have made the Army viable in the face of hundreds of 
nuclear detonations in combat.  Similarly, it is not clear that the Marines’ insertion by helicopter 
would have made Marine units less vulnerable to a tactical nuclear weapons attack than an 
amphibious operation.  Neither doctrinal innovation aligned well with organizational culture, but 
the Army and the Marine Corps were willing to change in order to preserve their organizational 
survival.   
 In addition to establishing jurisdiction over a particular domain, military organizations are 
sensitive to duplicating the functions of another service (or having their functions duplicated by 
another service).  As James Q. Wilson notes, organizations pursue “a distinctive area of 
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competence, clearly demarcated clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a 
function, service, goal, issue, or cause.”7  Responsibility for a unique set of functions helps a 
military organization justify the necessity of its role in the broader defense establishment.  
Duplication of functions between services risks civilian intervention and/or reduction in a service’s 
budget.  This is why the Marine Corps has been loath to embrace the unofficial designation of 
America’s second land army, even though it has demonstrated its ability to fight on land 
consistently over its history.  With respect to maneuver warfare doctrine, Marine leaders feared 
that the doctrine would be too similar to the Army’s AirLand Battle.  The fact that maneuver 
warfare doctrine was indeed the basis for AirLand Battle made Marine leaders uncomfortable and 
they sought ways to distinguish the Marine approach from the Army approach.  
 If dominance of and functional specificity within a domain is indeed a dynamic that 
influences doctrinal innovation, then the recent addition of two new domains - space and 
cyberspace - should serve as the impetus for change.  In fact, there are indications that the services 
are already competing for relevance in these domains.  The U.S. Army recently unveiled a concept8 
called Multi-Domain Battle.  According to the current commander of TRADOC, “Multi-Domain 
Battle is an emerging concept between the Army and Marine Corps, in concert with the Joint Force, 
to help maintain American military dominance in all five domains - land, air, maritime, space, and 
cyberspace, and across the electromagnetic spectrum.”9   While the description implies concerted 
effort between services, it is not clear that the other services have subscribed to Multi-Domain 
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Battle which envisions the Army and the Marine Corps operating in multiple jurisdictional 
domains simultaneously.   
 Interservice competition does not explain all of the innovations in this study.  While the 
pentomic innovation occurred in the context of rivalry between the Army and the Air Force, the 
root cause of that rivalry was the increased prominence of the Air Force in the eyes of civilian 
policymakers in the aftermath of the advent of nuclear weapons.  This was also the case for the 
Army in the 1990s when many claimed that the Air Force’s ability to deliver precision guided 
munitions in the 1991 Gulf War was proof of the irrelevance of ground combat.  Active Defense 
and AirLand Battle were influenced not by competition between the Army and the Air Force; these 
doctrines were shaped by cooperation between the two services.  While the two services still 
competed with each other for resources, they ensured that there was a careful delineation of 
responsibilities in the new doctrines which were separated between the land and air domains.  The 
doctrines were acceptable to both services because they ensured the services’ continued dominance 
of their respective domains.  Finally, the Army might have been determined not to cede jurisdiction 
over counterinsurgency to the Marine Corps in the 1960s, but its determination was not substantial 
enough to lead to doctrinal innovation.   
 Interservice rivalry can amplify concerns related to organizational survival.  The Marine 
Corps sees itself engaged in a perpetual competition for resources with the other services, and, 
therefore, is always worried about its survival.  As the military’s smallest service, the Marine Corps 
operates at a relative disadvantage in terms of resources.  Over time, the Marine Corps has become 
the military’s most sophisticated service with respect to engaging with the U.S. Congress.  
Interservice rivalry not only improves civilian control of the military.  It can also increase the 
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strength of the individual services.10  Doctrinal innovation, particularly as it relates to the 
acquisition of weapons and equipment, is a tool that the Marine Corps employs to shore up political 
support to maintain its survival.  It is difficult to understand why the Marine Corps continued to 
worry about its survival even after its minimum size was codified into law.  I did not uncover a 
clear rationale for this, but I suspect that it is because it is difficult to shed concerns over 
organizational survival after such a long history in which that survival was in jeopardy.  Even in 
the absence of a threat to survival, it is normal for a military organization to be sensitive to any 
encroachments on its domain which risk the organization’s prestige within the broader military.   
 Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the 
strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve.  Insoluble strategic problems can lead to 
frequent doctrinal changes as a military organization attempts to develop new methods of fighting 
to solve those problems.  However, innovative doctrines cannot ensure military success when the 
strategic problem-set is insuperable.  The military organization will perceive innovation as 
necessary to maintain the prestige of the organization and its survival, but the insolubility of the 
strategic problem will render military solutions to it impracticable.  Too much change risks 
damaging organizational efficiency, coherence, and readiness and wasting scarce resources.   
 The clearest example of this dynamic is seen in the U.S. military’s response to the 
emergence of nuclear weapons after World War II.  The Army and the Marine Corps developed 
doctrines designed to enable tactical success on a nuclear battlefield, but these doctrines could not 
overcome the fundamental problem - how to preserve the viability of a large ground-combat unit 
in the face of hundreds of nuclear detonations.  The abandonment of the pentomic and vertical 
envelopment doctrines was in part a recognition of their unfeasibility.  Similarly, the intractability 
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of the counterinsurgency problem helps explain the schizophrenic behavior of military 
organizations with respect to doctrinal innovation for irregular warfare. 
 Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal 
explanations of military doctrinal innovation are insufficient because they fail to account for the 
interaction effect that occurs between independent variables.  Of the seven doctrines studied across 
two services, no single, independent variable stands out as the most causative factor for innovation.  
This is why future studies of military doctrine (or military innovation more broadly), should be 
conducted through the lens of a levels of analysis approach.  Though it doesn’t result in a 
parsimonious theory of doctrinal change, such an approach broadens the researcher’s 
understanding of what is often a very nuanced innovation process.11  The field of military 
innovation studies would be wise to move away from the seemingly perpetual debate over Posen 
versus Rosen.  While both scholars made tremendous contributions to the literature, attempts to 
pit one theory against the other oversimplify the causes of innovation and prevent recognition of 
potential for the explanations to be complementary.  The recent interservice approach to innovation 
based on the work of Sapolsky et al. was a major contribution to the literature, but competition 
between services is also not, on its own, sufficient for explaining doctrinal change.   
 Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military 
organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external 
environment.  Counterintuitively, military organizations are uncomfortable with periods of peace 
because their leaders are forced to make assumptions about the character of future war, but are not 
afforded an opportunity to confirm or deny those assumptions in war.  As Posen notes, “[d]octrine 
must lend some utility and coherence to the necessarily disjointed and partial peacetime 
                                                           
11 Similar to the way in which Levy and Thompson, 2010, do with respect to the causes of war. 
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simulations of the rigors of war.”12  As General Ridgway stated, “[i]t is not the dangerous days of 
battle which most strongly test the soldier’s resolution, but the years of peace, when many voices, 
offering many counsels, bewilder and confound him.”13  Since doctrinal change during war is even 
more difficult, militaries are apt to initiate change processes during peace.  As Donald Rumsfeld 
infamously stated, “you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish 
to have at a later time.”14   
 Wilson tells us that when an organization is distressed, the incentives for accurate problem 
identification go up, and the organization is willing to devote more of its limited resources to 
problem solving.  A military organization is most stressed when it is in combat.  However, 
organizational distress is not exclusive to combat.  Distress in peacetime manifests itself in the 
form of reduced budgets, uncertainty regarding the capability and intentions of adversaries, angst 
over the suitability of existing modes of fighting, and the continuous desire to prevent 
encroachment of your jurisdictional domain by other services.  This distress compels military 
organizations to initiate processes of doctrinal change.  When fear of stagnation during peace 
motivates military officers to promote change, there is always potential for change that is not 
necessary or prudent. 
 Finally, the existence of a doctrinal institution with purview over doctrine creation, 
publication, and distribution, will increase the volume of doctrine that a service produces and it 
will create a norm for a reliance on formal doctrine.  While obvious, this point is important because 
it sheds light on why the Army has a longer tradition of formal doctrine than the Marine Corps.  
                                                           
12 Barry R. Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 39, no. 2 (2016): 167. 





More importantly, it helps explain why the Army has consistently strived to reinvent itself 
doctrinally since the establishment of TRADOC in 1973.  Today, TRADOC’s stated purpose is to 
“change the Army for the future.”15  The fact that the organization exists to change the Army 
suggests that change is necessary and continual.   
 It’s worth considering whether or not the proliferation of keystone doctrines and their 
rollout through comprehensive branding campaigns is indicative of too much change in the Army.  
Bacevich illustrates the concern best: “The fitfulness of recent American military thought stands 
in contrast to the orderly and consistent evolution of Soviet doctrine.  Consistency, especially if it 
implies stagnation, may not be a virtue.  On the other hand, neither is continuous change 
masquerading as reform.  At some point, the frequency with which the leadership steps off in a 
new direction outstrips the institution’s ability to follow.  However well intentioned, such change 
leads to disorientation and confusion rather than improvement.”16  Doctrinal schizophrenia might 
be more harmful for a military organization than doctrinal stasis.  
6.2. Recommendations for Future Research 
  The study of military doctrine is important for political science and the state.  Besides 
serving as useful guidance to a military on how to fight, doctrine orients the military organization 
on “the preparation for possible battles that are critical to the success of a state’s foreign policy,” 
it informs society about “what the organization does,” and it reassures civilians that the military is 
not a threat to the state.17  Military doctrine is important for reasons that go beyond its practical 
purpose inside the military organization.  Militaries use doctrine to deal with uncertainty, and much 
of that uncertainty stems from the international political environment.  Doctrine specifies the 
                                                           
15 See http://www.tradoc.army.mil/SitewideContent_TRADOC/Docs/TRADOC_Priorities.pdf. 
16 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: National 
Defense University Press, 1986), pp. 143-144. 
17 Posen, 2016, p. 160. 
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means that a military intends to employ, and those means cannot be divorced from political and 
strategic objectives.  Also, as we see in the cases in this study, the doctrine in a military’s formal 
manuals, at least in the case of the U.S. military, is not boilerplate.  Formal doctrines have a 
significant effect on military training and education, they develop cohesion among soldiers, and 
they provide a much-needed framework for how militaries plan on fighting in war.  This is not to 
suggest that some doctrines are not more influential on the workings of a military organization 
than others.  As we see in the case of the U.S. Army, doctrines purported to emphasize operations 
for irregular warfare were underdeveloped and inconsequential for military operations in war. 
 Farrell and Terriff argue that focusing on doctrine is problematic because: (1) not all 
militaries have a doctrinal tradition, (2) doctrine means different things in different national 
contexts, (3) changes to doctrine are unimportant if they don’t come with changes to the central 
functions of the organization, and (4) doctrine might serve political ends as much as they might 
serve strategic or operational ends.18  I concede the first point - comprehensive doctrines are not 
the norm in most non-western militaries.  The authors’ second and third points illustrate the 
importance of precisely defining doctrine and ensuring that you only label a doctrinal change as a 
major one if it comes with changes to the central functions of the military organization.  Finally, I 
don’t dispute the authors’ claim that doctrine might also serve political ends, but this is precisely 
the reason that we should study it.  
 Further research on military doctrine should focus on four areas.   
 First, the influence of defense budget authorizations on military doctrine and doctrinal 
change is understudied.  Asa A. Clark IV provides the most comprehensive theoretical account of 
                                                           
18 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in Farrell and Terriff, eds. The Sources of 
Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 4-5. 
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the effect of defense budgets on military doctrine formulation.19  Clark hypothesizes that during 
periods of increasing budgets (budgetary feast), military organizations are inclined to retain 
existing status quo doctrines and rarely innovate.  During periods of decreasing budgets (budgetary 
famine), military organizations are inclined to innovate doctrinally to attain their own “doctrinally-
sanctioned domains” within which they can assure an autonomy of roles and missions.20  This 
theory is counterintuitive.  I considered the influence of budget authorizations on doctrine in this 
study, but a quantitative analysis might be a more effective way to do so.  The challenge for the 
researcher is to account for the possibility that changes in the allocation of the budget might already 
take into account upcoming changes to doctrine.  There is significant room here for future research. 
 Second, we still know very little about the influence of the senior military leader on 
doctrinal innovation.  Collins makes a significant contribution in this area.  He finds that senior 
leaders play a significant role in the adoption of military innovations but “in order for innovation 
to occur, the senior military leader must also employ the right influence tactics throughout the 
innovation process.”21  Collins only focuses on one doctrinal innovation - the adoption of 
counterinsurgency doctrine under General David Petraeus in the 2003 Iraq War.  My research on 
Active Defense illuminated DePuy’s influence on the Army’s Active Defense doctrine, but it is 
not clear if the Army would have developed the same defense-oriented doctrine in the absence of 
DePuy.  Better understanding of the role of military leaders on doctrinal innovation would 
contribute to individual-level theories of international relations.  It also has implications for the 
                                                           
19 A. A. Clark, “Interservice Rivalry and Military Reform,” in Asa A. Clark, Peter W. Chiarelli, J.S. McKitrick, 
and J.W. Reed, eds., The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1984), pp. 250-271. 
20 Ibid., p. 259. 
21 Liam S. Collins, The Criticality of the Senior Military Leader (Ph.D. diss, Princeton University, 2014), p. 
313. 
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state, given that military leaders are nominated and confirmed by civilians in the political 
establishment.  
 Third, scholars would be wise to study the inconsistency between learning from past wars 
and estimating the character of future wars.22  To what extent should militaries consider lessons 
learned from previous wars to develop doctrine and methods of fighting future wars?  Is the U.S. 
military’s record of poor performance in counterinsurgency due to a failure (or unwillingness) to 
learn from past engagements in irregular warfare, or are the prospects for success in 
counterinsurgency operations dismal regardless of the character of doctrine?  
 Finally, future research might consider the effect of allied preferences on a state’s military 
doctrine.  The Army’s Active Defense doctrine drew heavily from Germany’s forward defense 
concept.  The preferences of leaders in the German High Command as they related to the defense 
of NATO Europe appeared to influence the military doctrine developed by the U.S. Army.  Future 
research might examine how the strategic objectives of an ally affect a state’s military doctrine.  
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